Thursday, May 31, 2012

The Dream of Creative Arab Youths in the Face of the U.S. Administration’s Old Strategies





Magdy Samaan
Fikra Forum


If you ask the average man on the street in Egypt, “What role should the United States play in supporting democracy in Egypt?” he will answer with the question, “Does the U.S. truly want to support democracy in Egypt?!” or say, “Leave us in our situation."


This is not only the sentiment of the average person you meet, but also that of Arab liberals, who once bet on President Bush's freedom agenda for the Middle East, but have now become skeptical of the sincerity of U.S. intentions after the U.S. administration failed them and left them in the middle of the road. The United States’ credibility has been losing ground among people in the Arab world, especially with the issue of foreign organizations operating in Egypt, which has greatly tainted the image of the United States. The Military Council portrayed these organizations as dens of spies working against the Egyptian revolution.


More so, the U.S. has lost much of its credibility due to its two-faced discourse witnessed over the past decades, chanting slogans in support of democracy and human rights while simultaneously supporting non-democratic regimes on the ground. So, the question now is not “How can the U.S. support democracy in Egypt?” but rather, “How can the U.S. repair its relationship with the Egyptian people?” Sooner or later, the U.S. will have to deal with whomever the Egyptian people choose.


During her testimony in the case of foreign organizations operating in Egypt, Egyptian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Fayza Abul Naga, stated that the “goal of the U.S. in financing organizations during the period between 2005 and 2010 was to put some pressure on the former regime that would not amount to aborting it.” She also noted that the United States was aiming at provoking weak actors in the former regime who would comply with its wishes and improve its image internationally as caretakers of human rights by funding these organizations.


In my opinion, there does not seem to be any fundamental change in the U.S. strategy in dealing with Egypt and the countries of the Arab spring. While Arab youths have used creative ideas to overcome the control of the ruling authority, which is on its way to extinction, the U.S. administration has used the same classic strategy that it has used since the end of colonialism after World War II. This strategy is essentially the alliance with authoritarian regimes hated by their people, and can be controlled by waving principles of freedom and democracy before the American people, which disturbs these regimes.


Training programs relating to the support of democracy are the last thing that Egyptians need right now; there is a strong political road that knows what it wants. The obstacle hindering democracy in Egypt does not lie in their ignorance of how it works, but in the fact that the ruling army in control of the country has no political will for this to happen. We need Washington to stop taking the side of anti-democratic forces in Egypt, whether at home or abroad, and the Egyptians themselves will take care of the rest that needs to be achieved.


The deposed President Hosni Mubarak used the Islamists and the preservation of peace in the Middle East as tools to block democracy. The same cards used by Mubarak can be reversed and used to support democracy by pressuring for peace in the Middle East between the Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand and pressuring Islamists to comply with the essence of the democratic system on the other hand.


Islamists represent an obstacle to the democratic transition in Egypt. Until now, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic religious parties cannot be considered democratic forces. The unfolding conflict in Egypt since the uprising of January 2011 can be summarized as a conflict between democratic forces and non-democratic forces, the Military Council and Islamic movements on one side and the democratic civil forces on the other. When Dr. Mohamed El Baradei withdrew from the upcoming presidential elections, having been the most prominent competing civil force, the power struggle in Egypt in the presidential elections scheduled for later this month shifted to a competition between two forces that have a tainted and questionable understanding of democracy.


The U.S. position in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to reach power was one of the main reasons for the group to reverse their decision not to compete for power in Egypt. The MB is aware that the economic situation in Egypt does not hold them responsible for international isolation similar to Iran or even Gaza. It is not required to exclude Islamists--that is unrealistic and ineffective--but their commitment to democratic norms--to which they have not complied so far--is required. The United States should tell us in advance its position in the event that the Islamists do not abide by the terms of a democratic system established by the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton which was stated repeatedly. In case of their access to power, will the U.S. deal with them in that case or not?


Perhaps the Military Council, an ally of Washington, has succeeded in aborting the revolution, while reproducing a façade of a democratic system, directing it from behind the scenes to save their interests as well as the international and narrow regional interests, which is the same as what Washington wants. However, controlling the aspirations of the people in the Arab world is difficult. Young people leading political movements on the street now have a dream like the dream of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Mandela, a dream to be part of the free world and part of a homeland that provides a free and dignified life for them. Standing by their side is in the best interest of peace and mutual interests.


When American principles are in conflict with their interests, the U.S. administration prefers interests than principles, which is their right and duty, but the game of dual speech, secretly working for their interests and improving their image by pretending to support democracy, has already been revealed and is unacceptable. Egyptians will not accept that anybody uses their blood to improve their image. More so, the U.S. government has to look for a new formula when dealing with the Middle East and take the people into consideration as a first step in repairing their relationship with the growing Egyptian street, rather than repairing the collapsing Military regime.

حلم الشباب العربي المبدع في مواجهة الازدواجية الأمريكية التقليدية



مجدي سمعان

منتدى فكرة

10-5-2012


لو سألت رجل الشارع العادي في مصر عما يجب على الولايات المتحدة فعله لدعم الديمقراطية في مصر، سيرد عليك إما بالسؤال مستنكرا: "وهل حقا تريد الولايات المتحدة دعم الديمقراطية في مصر؟!" أو بالقول: "يتركوننا في حالنا"

ليس فقط رجل الشارع العادي، فحتى الليبراليين العرب، الذي راهن قطاع منهم على أجندة الرئيس بوش للحريات في الشرق الأوسط، أصبحوا الآن متشككين في صدق النوايا الأمريكية، بعد أن خذلتهم الإدارة الأمريكية وتركتهم في منتصف الطريق.

فقدت الولايات المتحدة كثير من مصداقيتها بسبب خطابها المزدوج على مدار عقود بترديد شعارات دعم الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان من ناحية، ودعم أنظمة غير ديمقراطية على أرض الواقع من ناحية أخرى. والسؤال الآن ليس في كيفية دعم الولايات المتحدة للديمقراطية في مصر، ولكن في كيفية ترميم علاقاتها مع الشعب المصري، فإن إجلا أم عاجلا سيكون على الولايات المتحدة التعامل مع من يختاره هذا الشعب.

خلال شهادتها في قضية المنظمات الأجنبية العاملة في مصر، قالت فايزة أبو النجا، وزيرة التخطيط والتعاون الدولي المصرية، إن الهدف الأمريكي من تمويل المنظمات خلال الفترة بين عامي 2005 و2010 "كان ضغط على النظام السابق بدرجة لا تصل إلى حد إسقاطه."وأشارت إلى أن الولايات المتحدة كانت تستهدف إثارة القلاقل في النظام السابق بما يرسخ الخضوع لها، إلى جانب تحسين صورتها دولياً كراعية لحقوق الإنسان عبر تمويل تلك المنظمات.

لا يبدو لي أن تغيرا جوهريا قد طرأ على تلك الاستراتيجية الأمريكية في التعامل مع مصر ودول الربيع العربي. وبينما يستخدم الشباب العربي أفكارا مبدعة في مواجهة محاولات السيطرة من قبل السلطة الحاكمة، تستخدم الإدارة الأمريكية نفس الاستراتيجية الكلاسيكية، التي استخدمتها منذ سقوط الاستعمار القديم عقب الحرب العالمية الثانية، التحالف مع الأنظمة الشمولية المكروه من شعوبها، والتي يسهل التحكم فيها بالتلويح بالمبادئ الأمريكية في الحرية والديمقراطية، التي تزعج تلك الأنظمة.

إن برامج التدريب المتعلقة بدعم الديمقراطية هي آخر ما يحتاجه المصريين الآن، فهناك شارع سياسي قوي يعرف ما يريد، فالعائق أمام الديمقراطية ليس في جهل المصريين بآالياتها، وإنما في غياب الإرادة السياسية لدى الجيش المتحكم في إدارة البلاد. إن المطلوب من واشنطن هو الكف عن الوقوف في صف القوى المعادية للديمقراطية في مصر سواء في الداخل أو الخارج، وسيتكفل المصريون بباقي المهمة المنوط بهم وحدهم تحقيقها.

استخدم الرئيس المخلوع حسني مبارك ورقة الإسلاميين والسلام في الشرق الأوسط كأدوات لضرب الديمقراطية، وقد يكون اللعب بنفس أوراق مبارك مدخلا لدعم الديمقراطية، وأقصد بذلك الضغط من أجل احلال سلام عادل في الشرق الأوسط بين الإسرئيليين والفلسطينيين من ناحية، الضغط على الإسلاميين للإلتزام بجوهر النظام الديمقراطي، ومن ناحية أخرى.

يمثل الإسلاميون عقبة أمام التحول الديمقراطي في مصر. لا يمكن اعتبار الإخوان المسلمين أو الأحزاب الدينية الإسلامية الأخرى قوى ديمقراطية حتى الآن. يمكن تلخيص الصراع الدائر في مصر منذ انتفاضة يناير 2011 بأنه صراع ما بين القوى الديمقراطية والقوى غير الديمقراطية، المجلس العسكري والتيارات الإسلامية من ناحية، والقوى المدنية الديمقراطية من ناحية. حين خرج الدكتور محمد البرادعي، مرشح القوى المدنية الأبرز من المنافسة على الرئاسة، أصبح صراع السلطة في مصر في الانتخابات الرئاسية المقرر اجرائها أواخر الشهر الجاري بين القوتين التي يشوب مفهومهما للديمقراطية علامات استفهام.

كان الموقف الأمريكي، غير الممانع من وصول الإخوان المسلمين للسلطة، هو أحد الأسباب الرئيسية لتراجع الجماعة عن قرارها بعدم المنافسة على الحكم في مصر. يدرك الإخوان أن الوضع الإقتصادي في مصر لا يجعلها تتحمل عزلة دولية شبيهة بإيران أو حتى غزة. ليس مطلوبا اقصاء الإسلاميين، فهذا أمر غير واقعي وغير فعال، وإنما المطلوب دفعهم على الالتزام بالقواعد الديمقراطية، التي لا يلتزمون بها حتى الآن. على الولايات المتحدة أن تخبرنا مقدما عن موقفها في حالة ما لم يلتزم الإسلاميون بشروط النظام الديمقراطي التي وضعتها وزيرة الخارجية الأمريكية هيلاري كلينتون في تصريحتها المتكررة، في حالة وصولهم إلى السلطة. هل ستتعامل معهم في تلك الحالة أم لا؟

قد يكون المجلس العسكري، حليف واشنطن، قد نجح في اجهاض الثورة، ويعمل على إعادة انتاج نظام ديمقراطي صوري يوجهه من خلف الستار لحفظ مصالحه والمصالح الدولية والإقليمية الضيقة، وهو نفس ما تريده واشنطن، لكن السيطرة على تطلعات الشعوب العربية هو أمر صعب، فالشباب الذين يقودون الشارع السياسي الآن لديهم حلم شبيه بحلم غاندي ومارتن لوثر كينج ومانديلا، حلم أن يكونوا جزء من العالم الحر، وجزء من وطن يوفر لهم حياة حرة كريمة. إن الوقوف في صف هؤلاء هو ما سيصب في صالح السلام والمصالح المتبادلة.

حين تتعارض المبادئ الأمريكية مع مصالها فإن الإدارة الأمريكية تفضل المصالح على المبادئ، وهذا حقها وواجبها، لكن لعبة الخطاب المزدوج، بالعمل سرا من أجل المصالح والتجمل بالتظاهر بدعم الديمقراطية، أصبحت لعبة مكشوفة وغير مقبولة، فلن يقبل المصريين أن يتجمل أحد بدمائهم. وعلى الحكومة الأمريكية أن تبحث عن صيغة جديدة للتعامل مع الشرق الأوسط تضع الشعوب في اعتبارها، وأولى الخطوات هى ترميم العلاقة مع الشارع المصري الصاعد بدلا من ترميم النظام العسكري المنهار.

Egypt's Election is Replicating the Hamas Scenario



Magdy Samaan | May 30, 2012
Egypt Source


The first round of Egypt’s presidential election has set the stage for a confrontation between the 60-year old military establishment (represented by Ahmed Shafik) and the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed Morsi, competing for control over the post-Mubarak system. But don’t be fooled into thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood is aiming to remove the military from power. I believe that the alliance between the military and Brotherhood which began during the January uprising continues to this day, despite efforts on both sides to feign the appearance of mutual hostility.
In 1952, a group of military officers – many of them members of the Brotherhood – staged a coup that brought an end to Egypt’s nascent experiment in democracy. With the Brotherhood's backing, the military successfully sold the military coup to the public as the "July Revolution." The alliance unraveled in 1954 when the two forces began competing for power. Since then, the military establishment has used the Brotherhood as a scarecrow to justify the suppression of democracy, while at the same time tolerating the Islamization of society in the hands of the Brotherhood.
After the January uprising, the Brotherhood aligned once again with the ruling military council to control the street, and together they convert the uprising’s momentum into a military coup. The question now is: Will the final outcome be the Brotherhood’s acceptance of military control by allowing the election to tilt in Shafik’s favor? This scenario would allow the Brotherhood would resume its scarecrow role, frightening Egyptians into voting for another military dictator. Or alternatively, will the two parties switch places, in which case their alliance will continue along the lines of the Pakistani model?
Assuming the continuation of the alliance and common interests between the military and Islamists, voters faced with the choice between the former regime’s candidate and the Islamist candidate will lead to a repeat of the scenario that circumvented democratic demands during the first Arab spring witnessed by Egypt and Palestine in 2005 and 2006. Islamist electoral victories – in which the Egyptian Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in Parliament following a deal with the Mubarak regime and Hamas won 57 percent of seats in the Palestinian Parliament – gave authoritarian regimes a pretext for scaling back democratic reforms as a counterweight to the rise of political Islam.
For two months prior to the presidential election, the Muslim Brotherhood had been showing signs of hostility toward the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and demanding the dismissal of Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri and his Cabinet. This was the second time the Brotherhood had stood in the way of the SCAF, the first being its opposition to the controversial supra-constitutional principles proposed by former Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy before the parliamentary elections, which would have enshrined a special status for the military in the new constitution. But eventually the Brotherhood backed down from its opposition to the document and abandoned protests in Mohamed Mahmoud Street and outside of the Cabinet building, even going so far as to attack protesters and defend the military. Although the SCAF was angered by the Brotherhood’s overzealous victory in the parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood placated the military by passing amendments to the Military Justice Code giving the military judicial immunity and gives military courts jurisdiction over any case involving a member of the military, even if the conflict is civil in nature.
The use of the Brotherhood scarecrow has become a familiar game played by the military over and over again, but I believe the public will not be fooled as easily as in the past, and the country could witness a second mass uprising – this time against the military-Islamist coalition that has been in place. The beginnings of public unrest have been stirring since the one-year anniversary of the January uprising.
After a year and a half of manipulation of the masses and popular will and the implementation of political decisions that do not reflect the demands of the revolution, Egypt is headed toward an explosion of outrage, the sparks of which could be seen in a demonstration in Tahrir Square on May 28 in protest of the election results. Protesters in Tahrir Square said that the SCAF intended for the elections to result in a face-off between Morsi and Shafik to pave the way for a restoration of the former regime. Statements spread on twitter such as, “I refuse to kill the rebels” – a reference to Shafik – and “I refuse to be silent in the face of their deaths” – a reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. One protester accused the Brotherhood of contributing to the abortion of the revolution through its alliance with the military, and another said, “We will not accept either Morsi or Shafik as president."
The military hopes that the presidential election will be the final scene of the transition, but the festering revolutionary current hopes that a Shafik victory would be invalidated with charges of election fraud, a scenario that would provoke a new revolution against the military and its ally the Brotherhood

الانتخابات الرئاسية المصرية تكرار مبدع لسيناريو حماس

مجدي سمعان
Egypt Source

وضعت الجولة الأولى من الانتخابات الرئاسية المصرية، المؤسسة العسكرية الحاكمة للبلاد منذ انقلاب 1952 ويمثلها الفريق أحمد شفيق، والإسلاميين ممثلثين في مرشح جماعة الإخوان المسلمين الدكتور محمد مرسي، في وضع المواجهة لحسم من سيخلف الرئيس المخلوع حسني مبارك في حكم مصر بعد 15 شهرا من الإضطراب السياسي. لكن لا ينبغي التسرع بتصور أن الإخوان المسلمون ينازعون المؤسسة العسكرية السلطة، ففي اعتقادي إن علاقة التحالف العلنية والخدمات المتبادلة التي بدأت منذ انتفاضة يناير لازالت مستمرة، بالرغم من اجتهاد الطرفين في اظهار قدر من العداء.


في عام 1952 قام مجموعة من الضباط، انتمى معظهم لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، بإنقلاب عسكري أطاح بالتجربة الديمقراطية المصرية. تحالف العسكر والإخوان لتحويل الإنقلاب العسكري إلى ما سمى لاحقا بـ"ثورة يوليو" في عام 1954 انقلب العسكر على جناح من الإخوان حين حدث تنازع معهم على السلطة. منذ ذلك الحين استخدمت أنظمة يوليو الجماعة كفزاعة لتبرير مصادرة الديمقراطية، وفي نفس الوقت سلمتهم المجتمع الذي ساهمت سياسات الدولة والإسلاميين في أسلمته، وغلقه.

عقب انتفاضة يناير تحالف الإخوان مع المجلس العسكري للسيطرة على الشارع، تمكنا من تحويل الانتفاضة من ثورة إلى انقلاب عسكري. والسؤال الآن: هل يكون المشهد الختامي هو اكمال للدور الذي بدأته الجماعة بقبول قيام المؤسسة العسكرية بتوجيه الانتخابات الرئاسية لصالح شفيق من خلال الاستمرار في لعب دور الفزاعة لاحداث حالة من التباين تجعل المصريين يختارون مضطرين العودة لحكم شخصية عسكرية أخرى؟ أم هل يعيد العسكر والإسلاميين صياغة تحالفهم بحيث يتبادل الطرفين المقاعد ويستمر التحالف على النمط الباكستاني؟


ومع افتراض استمرار علاقة التحالف وتبادل المصالح بين العسكر والإسلاميين، ففي اعتقادي أن الدفع نحو أن يكون خيار الناخبين في جولة الإعادة ما بين مرشح النظام وبين المرشح الإسلامي هو تكرار مبدع لسيناريو الالتفاف حول المطالب الديمقراطية في الربيع العربي الأول خلال الانتخابات البرلمانية التي شهدتها مصر وفلسطين عامي2005 و2006، وأدت إلى اجهاض مطالب التحول الديمقراطي أمام فزاعة الإسلاميين وإحراج القوى المطالبة به، حين فاز الإخوان بـ20% من مقاعد البرلمان في مصر بناء على صفقة مع النظام، كما كشف مرشد الجماعة السابق محمد مهدي عاكف، في حوار له مع جريدة المصري اليوم نشر عام 2009، كما تمكنت حركة حماس من الفوز بالانتخابات التشريعية الفلسطينية.


لكن استخدام فزاعة الإخوان من جديد أصبحت لعبة مستهلكة استخدمتها حكام يوليو مرارا وتكرارا، وفي اعتقادي أن هذه المرة لن يمر السيناريو كما حدث في السابق، وفي حالة ما شهدت البلاد انتفاضة جماهيرية جديدة فهذه المرة ستكون ضد تحالف العسكر والإسلاميين وهو ما بدأت ارهاصاته في المظاهرات التي شهدتها البلاد في الذكرى الأولى لانتفاضة يناير.


عام ونصف من التلاعب بالإرادة الجماهيرية وفرض خيارات لا تعبر عن مطالب الثورة في طريقها لإنفجار في مصر بدأت تلوح بوادره في الأفق بالمظاهرة التي شهدها ميدان التحرير مساء الإثنين الماضي اعتراضا على نتيجة الانتخابات. من نزلوا لميدان التحرير قالوا أن المجلس العسكري وجه الانتخابات لتكون الإعادة ما بين مرسي وشفيق تمهيدا لاستعادة النظام للسلطة من خلال انتخابات موجهة. انتشرت على تويتر وفيس بوك تعليقات تقول أرفض من قتل الثوار، في إشارة إلى شفيق، وأرفض من صمت على قتلهم، في إشارة إلى جماعة الإخوان المسلمين.أحد الذين خرجوا للتظاهر قال إن الإخوان ساهموا بتحالفهم مع المجلس العسكري في إجهاض الثورة، وقال آخر "لن نقبل وصول مرسي أو شفيق للرئاسة".

يأمل العسكر أن تكون الانتخابات الرئاسية بمثابة المشهد الختامي للمرحلة الانتقالية، لكن التيار الثوري المحتقن يأمل في أن يكون وصول شفيق لاعتاب استعادة السلطة، في انتخابات عليها علامات استفهام بحدوث عمليات تزوير لصالح شفيق، بمثابة بداية جديدة للثورة على المؤسسة العسكرية، وحليفتها جماعة الإخوان المسلمين.


Wednesday, May 23, 2012

will the presidential election bring stability to Egypt?


By Magdy Samaan


For three weeks Egypt has witnessed presidential campaigning, rallies, debates, and the rest of the paraphernalia of electoral politics. It has seemed as if Egypt is turning from authoritarianism to democracy, but a close look at the process suggests that it continues to be a virtual simulation, lacking the essence of the democratic process.
There is a piece of graffiti on Mohammed Mahmoud Street in downtown Cairo, showing a military officer wearing a cape but with his face replaced by the date 30 June, 2012 – the day set by Egypt's interim government, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to hand power to an elected president.
Many Egyptians believe that the presidential election, starting on Wednesday, will in fact be the last episode in a series of steps, masquerading as a "messy transitional period", intended to guarantee the power of the military regime that has ruled the country since 1952, and not to promote democracy and freedom.
Here are the important questions waiting to be answered in the forthcoming days. Will the presidential election bring stability to Egypt? Will it end the rule of military after 60 years? Is Egypt going to turn into a democratic country?
The answer of the stability question depends on how free and fair the election will be.
There are already doubts of the fairness of some of the procedures put in place before the elections both by SCAF itself and by the Presidential Election Committee.
If the election process sees serious violations – as was so common under the old Mubarak regime – the situation can explode in another round of revolutionary protests. That will especially be the case if Ahmed Shafiq, a former general and Mubarak's last prime minister, wins.
The main competition will be between the candidates of the ruling military and of the various Islamic "currents". The former rely on the networks of the central state bureaucracy, such as the security forces, the dissolved National Democratic Party, and the beneficiaries of the regime such as business and big families – all those who are seeking to preserve their interests.
For them, victory for Mr Shafiq, or for Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the of the Arab League and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, would be a success.
On the other hand the Islamists rely on networks of Islamic religious institutions, which despite its secular image ballooned during the period of military rule after 1952. Their most prominent candidates are Mohammed Morsi, a candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood and Abdulmoneim Aboul Fotouh, a renegade former Brotherhood leader who promotes himself as moderate but is also backed by the ultraconservative Salafists.
The question is which of these two institutional machines can capture the so-called "Sofa Party", those never before concerned with politics.
Over the last year and a half, these "average citizens" have become fatigued by the absence of security, and the economic crisis. They are worried by the collapse of the state, and cannot afford the consequences.
For these there is no place for risk: slogans of freedom and democracy are not the top priorities of the more than 40 per cent who are illiterate and the more than a half the population dependent on subsidies for their daily lives.
These voters with low awareness and high life burdens were obvious targets during the parliamentary elections for the Islamist parties, who played on their religious sensibilities and their daily needs. This time the same voters are targets for the old regime propaganda machines, telling them that Mr Shafiq, with his military background, is the best candidate to bring stability.
This contest of machine politics, leading to another general in office, is not what the revolutionaries who filled Tahrir Square in February last year had in mind. And it is not clear that, once the results are known, they will stand for it. There is a long way to go before Egypt's "democratic transition" plays itself out.
The Daily Telegraph

Saturday, May 12, 2012

Vox Pop: Egyptians Prepare to Choose a President

 
 
 




By Magdy Samaan
Democracy Lab - 9 May, 2012
The presidential election campaign in Egypt is under way. Thirteen candidates are competing for the job held for 30 years by Hosni Mubarak. The first round of the elections takes place on May 23 and 24. But so far no clear leaders have emerged.
Polling suggests that the main divide runs between Islamist candidates and those associated with the Mubarak regime. Among the former, the most likely contenders are
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member in the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Mohamed Morsi, the current candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. Those associated with the old regime include Amr Moussa, the ex-foreign minister and former secretary-general of the Arab League, and Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's last prime minister. But the recent decision by the High Electoral Commission to exclude the previous front-runners on a variety of technical grounds has thrown the race into confusion.
We hear a lot about Egypt in the news these days, but we rarely have an opportunity to hear what Egyptians themselves think about what's happening in their country. So we at Democracy Lab decided to ask Egyptians from all walks of life about their presidential preferences. On the eve of Egypt's first-ever presidential debate, we present some of their responses -- with a minimum of editorial intervention:
"The people are confused. If they elect a candidate from the former regime, does that mean that the country will go back to the way it was? But if they elect a candidate from the Islamists, they don't know what course the country's going to take, since the Islamists have no experience of actually being in power, and they have a tendency towards violence."
Saeed Abdul Aal, mid-40s, teacher from Izzbet El-Nakhel, north Cairo.
Vote: undecided.
"Mubarak didn't allow any other politicians to share the stage. He systematically eliminated anyone who was capable of competing with him. If you ban people from playing football in the neighborhood for a while, and then you allow them to play it again, their skills will be weak at first. Over time, the level of candidates will improve."
Mohammed Hassan Ali, 38, welder from Izzbet El-Nakhel.
Vote: Aboul Fotouh.
"Drivers spend nearly half a day waiting for a turn at the gas station. You work for a day and then you have to spend another day to get gas. If this country isn't reformed, it will explode."
"Look at this vast desert we've got here. All that land is controlled by a small number of people who don't use it. If one of the candidates announces that he will redistribute the unused land to the people, so that it can be used, I'll vote for him."
"The Muslim Brotherhood is very influential in the countryside. People here expect their problems to be solved by God and the Brotherhood. For example, in religious festivals, Brotherhood Member of Parliament
Abdul Aziz Khalaf buys clothes for the poor. He doesn't charge people who can't afford to pay for medicine from his pharmacy. No matter what else you hear about the Brotherhood, they're people who aren't going to change their minds."
Mahmoud Abu-Dahab, taxi driver from Assuit, 370 kilometers south of Cairo.
Vote: undecided.
"In Upper Egypt, every group forms an opinion and the members of that group will follow it. The Copts will have a preferred candidate, and the Muslims will have another."
"Most Copts support Amr Moussa because he's a secularist and won't violate their freedom of religion. But I, like a lot of the other young Copts, support
Hisham Al-Bastawisi, the candidate of [the secular leftist party] Al-Tagammu."
"Electing a new president, whatever his political orientation, does not mean that the regime will end. The regime, whose head was Mubarak, has lots of arms, such as the army, the police, and local municipalities. The demands of the revolution will continue."
Ehab Amir, 36, lawyer from the Coptic village of Izziyah, Assuit.
Vote: Al-Bastawisi.
"I believe that the
presidential election is part of a game between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood got the parliament and the SCAF will get the presidency through one of the former regime candidates."
"I don't trust Aboul Fotouh because he's a former Muslim Brotherhood member. He says that he's an independent, but I don't believe him."
"I won't vote for anyone who was associated with the former regime, or for anyone who's associated with the current military regime that doesn't respect human rights."
"I'll vote for someone who can fight corruption so that we can build our country, so I'll go with
Marwa Rashed, 25, female graphic designer, Alexandria.
Vote: Al-Hariri.
"The people are waiting for the election to end the unstable transitional period and bring a return to normal life. Even though the election is taking place under abnormal conditions, I still believe that electing a new president will be a step forward for stability, which we need."
"Coptic people are worried about an Islamic candidate winning because they think that will increase discrimination against them. I won't be afraid as long the Islamists guarantee us equal rights."
Marian Nader, 19, female student at Ain Shmas University, from Mataryia, Cairo.
Vote: Moussa.
"Rich people want a candidate from the old regime, someone like Moussa or Shafiq, to return the country to the way it was. They want us to go on being their slaves and they want to go on being the masters. They want a president to maintain their interests and save them. But normal people are waiting for real programs that will get something done. People want the country to go in the right direction. The Egyptian people are too poor and too tired. They've spent their entire history being robbed. We want the new president to work for the people, not for special interests."
"I will decide when I see the programs, but I won't vote for anyone who's connected with the Mubarak regime."
Yasser Gamal, 38, government employee, Assuit.
Vote: undecided.
"When people still respected the police, minibus drivers didn't dare to do that [pointing at minibus drivers parking illegally in a public square]. I'll nominate myself for president, and when I win, I'll put all those drivers in prison. The only problem is that the prisons won't have enough capacity, so I'll have to build new ones."
Mahmoud Abdel Razek, 60s, taxi driver, Cairo.
Vote: undecided.
"I think I'll vote for Hisham Al-Bastawisi. He's a fair judge who has a clean hand, but the Islamists will say that he's secular and an infidel."
"The Islamists fooled us in the referendum and the
parliamentary elections by using religion against the secular candidates, and they'll fool the people again in the presidential election."
Hamada Abdullah, 29, taxi driver, Cairo.
Vote: Al-Bastawisi.
"I'll vote for Mohamed Morsi because we want a real Islamic state. Right now Egypt is an Islamic state in name but not in practice. ‘Islam is the solution' was a slogan. Now we want to put it into practice."
Tanseem Al-Said, early 20s, female student in the Department of Islamic Studies at Mansoura University (and member of the Muslim Brotherhood).
Vote: Morsi.
"People still think that the next president will stay in power forever, but actually he'll only be in power for four years, and then he'll leave and someone else will replace him. We need a transition between the old regime and the new one. The new political parties can use this period to organize themselves."
Sami al-Abdullah, in his 50s, doctor, Cairo.
Vote: Shafiq.
"I voted for the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party [in the last parliamentary elections], but I'm not going to vote for them again because of
their [initial] decision not to run a candidate for the presidency. I was a supporter of the Brotherhood, but after they backed down I lost confidence in them -- not only me but also most of my friends."
Ahmed Saeed, 23, student at Assuit University.
Vote: Aboul Fotouh.
"I supported [Salafi candidate]
Hazem Salah Abu Ismail before he was disqualified [by the High Election Commission]. Now I'm going to boycott the election. I don't want the Muslim Brotherhood to win the presidential election. We don't want a single party to control everything. We don't want a new National Democratic Party."
Mahmoud Ghareeb, 30, computer company owner in Assuit.
Vote: boycott.
"We need someone to apply God's holy law, not someone who is greedy for power. People in my neighborhood prefer the Islamic candidate. The candidates of the old regime, like Moussa and Shafiq, had the opportunity to do something in the past but they didn't manage to get anything done. So I don't believe that they'll do anything now."
Amer Abu Alail, 48, sales director, Cairo.
Vote: undecided.
"Omar Suleiman was my favorite candidate because he knows the ins and outs of the country. He can keep the current situation stable. Even if the situation is bad, the alternative is collapse. We'd rather live with a little water rather than brave the drought."
"Since Suleiman was disqualified, I support Shafiq. He's better than the Islamists, the best of the worst."
Dahi Azer, 34, Copt, teacher from Assuit.
Vote: Shafiq.
"I will not elect any secular candidate because he will be against Islam. We are afraid of the secularists, even if they've said that they will keep
Article 2 [the constitutional clause that stipulates that sharia should be the basis of all legislation]. They may work against the religion from under the table. I don't have any leanings toward a specific candidate. I lean towards an Islamic candidate who will apply sharia. That's my first priority, and then I will look into who is better."
Waleed Wagdy, 30s, doctor, Assuit.
Vote: undecided.
"We were deceived by the army. They realized that they can't stand in front of the people's protests, so they claimed that they were for the revolution even while they were working to control it."
"The election will be the last stage of the control process they've been putting in place in the last year and a half. Nothing has changed."
Sarah Mahmoud, 33, female doctor, Cairo.
Vote: undecided.
"I wanted to vote for Hazem Salah Abu Ismail.. But when he was disqualified, Salafi leaders recommended that we vote for Aboul Fotouh. They know better than we do. I'll vote as they say."
Mohammed Mosbah, early 20s, student at Mansoura University.
Vote: Aboul Fotouh.
"I won't vote for a Brotherhood candidate. I don't see any freedom or justice in what they do, only hearing and obeying the same policy of the blind majority. They obey the word of their own supreme guide more than the word of God."
Mahmoud Al-Mougi, 20, law student at Mansoura University.
Vote: Aboul Fotouh.

Wednesday, May 09, 2012

حتى لا نضيع مزيد من الوقت في التعلم من الأخطاء... رسالة إلى البرادعي




مجدي سمعان


استغرقت ثورة 1919 أربع سنوات لانتزاع بعض مطالب الثورة، وعلى رأسها الدستور، من المحتل البريطاني العنيد. كان الكفاح السلمي هو السبيل، مثلما كان سبيل غاندي ولوثر وماندلا. نحن نتعامل مع محتل داخلي فاسد هو المجلس العسكري، وريث نظام يوليو، لكن الضغط الأخلاقي وسلمية الاحتجاجات هو ما سيجعل الغالبية العظمى من الضباط والجنود تقف إلى جوارنا، ومع استمرار المطالب والإصرار عليها سيحدث التغيير، ليس بيدنا فقط ولكن بيد أخوتنا في الجيش أيضا، فغالبيتهم غير مستفدون ويعانون مثلنا!




والمطلوب الأن عمل وقفة لفرز النخبة السياسية والثقافية بعد عام ونصف من الثورة، وقفة للفرز واستجماع الطاقات، فهؤلاء الذين تم تصنعيهم على يد مباحث أمن الدولة والمخابرات العامة، مكنوا، من خلال المنابر الإعلامية التابعة للنظام، وأصبحوا متحدثون بإسم الثورة. لا يغرنكم من يزايد في الشتيمة، الفيصل في المواقف السياسية، وقد أظهرت لنا الأحداث كيف ضلل هؤلاء الشارع مرارا وتكرارا.



وإذا كان المجلس العسكري والقوى المعادية للثورة قد تمكنوا من السيطرة عليها من خلال نخبة مخترقة وإعلام ممول من كبار المستفدين من النظام، فعلينا أن نصنع نخبتنا، وإعلامنا المستقليين. نحتاج قيادة سياسية غير مخترقة للحديث بإسم الثورة، ومنابر إعلامية لا تتلاعب ببوصلة الحركة السياسية وتوجهها لتضيع المجهود في نقاشات جانبية.


حزب "الدستور" قد يكون نواة لما نتحدث عنه، لكن للأسف البرادعي لم يتعلم من أخطاءه، حين تعاون مع أشخاص مخترقين أمنيا، بداية بمجموعة الثلاثين مخبر التي زارته في منزله عقب عودته لمصر، وفرضت عليه تكوين الجمعية الوطنية للتغيير، وورطوه في خلافات جانبية لتبديد المجهود، ثم قبضوا الثمن لاحقا، وحين أدرك هذا وقرر التعامل مع الشباب، كان في انتظاره من أدعى قيادة حملة دعمه، ثم قبض الثمن سواء من أصبح منهم عضوا في مجلس الشعب ، أو من فتحت له قنوات الفلول... الخ وللأسف فكثير من قيادات حزب الدستور ليست فوق الشبهات في علاقتها بالأمن، حتى من يبدو منهم أن له تاريخ نضالي، فأجهزة الأمن لدينا بارعة في عمليات السيطرة والابتزاز، المطلوب قيادات جديدة، نفرزها نحن ونقدمها من خلال منابر إعلامية ، لا من يتم اختيارهم بواسطة إعلام أمن الدولة. قيادات لم تحصل على مكاسب، فمن عين في مجلس قومي، أو من لديه برنامج تلفزيوني، لم يحصل عليه بمجهوده، فلا أحد في ظل هذا النظام يسمح له بالحصول على شيء ما لم يدفع ثمنه!

وأخيرا، فمهما كان حجم اختراق النخبة فهناك 20 مليون مصري تواق إلى التغيير، هؤلاء هم رصيدنا الحقيقي بوعيهم السياسي العالي سيفرزون نخبتهم إن آجلا أم عاجلا!

هذه رسالة أرجو أن تصل إلى البرادعي، حتى لا نضيع مزيد من الوقت في التعلم من الأخطاء.




A Wave of Anger Threatens to Disrupt Presidential Election





By Magdy Samaan
Egypt Source

A microbus was moving slowly down Ramses Street in downtown Cairo due to the clashes in Abassiya Square between angry youth and military police near the Ministry of Defense. On the bus, a female passenger expressed her anger about the return of violence. The woman did not know who was killing whom, or what was the cause; all she knew was that the country was not gaining anything from this disturbance but ruin.
Over the past three days (since May 2), Egypt has seen a new round of violence and protests resulting from the military’s insistence on conducting elections in accordance with procedures that raise concerns about the integrity of the upcoming presidential election scheduled for May 23 and 24.
The events began in the early hours of the morning on May 2, when around two hundred protesters – most of them supporters of the disqualified Salafi presidential candidate Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail who objected to their candidates’ exclusion from the race and other measures related to the administration of elections – were surprised by thugs who appeared intent on opening fire, which lead to the outbreak of clashes in which eleven people were killed and 168 more injured, according to official statistics.
Following the events, a number of youth movements coalesced to organize a mass march in solidarity with the protesters in Abbassiya. The protest continued in Tahrir Square on Friday, May 4 at the urging of political forces, but a number of youth groups led by the April 6 Movement decided to demonstrate in front of the Defense Ministry despite the military’s warning against encroaching on state property. When confronted by military police, the youth responded throwing stones, prompting the police to retaliate with water cannons and tear gas. At least 370 people have been injured in the clashes so far.
The demands put forward by protesters -- an immediate transfer of power to civilians and the amendment of Article 28 of the interim constitution just three weeks before the presidential election -- are viewed by an increasingly skeptical public as unrealistic, prompting many to sympathize with the SCAF.
The most obvious result of the events has been to distract attention from the presidential election, as the media has been entirely preoccupied with covering the violence for the past few days. All of the Islamist and revolutionary presidential candidates have temporarily suspended their campaigns, while only the two candidates associated with the former regime, Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafiq, remain on the campaign trail.
These violent events are not the first of their kind. Before the parliamentary elections, police attacked around 200 protesters in Tahrir Square provoking the infamous clashes that became known as the incident at Mohamed Mahmoud Street near the Cabinet building, which left dozens dead and hundreds injured. These events pulled the spotlight away from the impending parliamentary elections, during which Islamist parties committed extensive electoral violations, including exceeding limits on campaign spending and the illegal use of religious slogans. This instigation of sectarianism aided the Islamists in their electoral victory.
Some believe that the provocation of the angry youth is aimed at dragging the country into deeper instability to postpone the presidential election and with it the transfer of power beyond the scheduled deadline at the end of June. During the press conference held by members of the SCAF on the day following the violence, a large banner was hanging behind the three SCAF representatives with the words, “The Armed Forces Are Committed to Their Promise.” During the conference, General Mohamed al-Assar vowed, “The presidential election will be 100 percent fair,” yet political forces still have doubts.
There are two possible scenarios that could arise from the latest violence in Cairo. First, there is the possibility for an escalation of protests that will intensify pressure on the SCAF to respond to the demands they have raised, foremost among them the amendment of Article 28 of the interim constitution, which bars appeals to decisions made by the Supreme Presidential Election Commission (SPEC). In the second scenario, limited protests may persist, resulting in the disruption of the presidential election and portray revolutionary and Islamist forces as instigators of chaos seeking to perpetuate the state of instability that a majority of Egyptians are tired of, and would like to bring to an end. Eagerness to end the transitional period with elections will favor the candidates affiliated with the former regime, who will benefit from the public’s desire for the restoration of normalcy.

موجة غضب غير محسوبة تشوش على الانتخابات الرئاسية





مجدي سمعان
Egypt Source

كانت سيارة ميكروباص لنقل الركاب تسير ببطء في شارع رمسيس بوسط القاهرة بسبب الاشتباكات في ميدان العباسية بين شباب غاضب وقوات الشرطة العسكرية بالقرب من وزراة الدفاع. دار حديث بين الركاب كانت المتحدثة الرئيسة فيه سيدة ترتدي ملابس نساء المناطق الشعبية. عبرت عن غضبها لعودة الاشتباكات. لا تعلم تلك السيدة من يقتل من، وما السبب. كل ما تعرفه أن البلاد لم تجني شيئا من وراء هذا الاضطراب سوى الخراب.
على مدار الأيام الثلاثة الماضية (منذ فجر الأربعاء الماضي) تشهد مصر جولة جديدة من العنف والاحتجاجات ناتجة عن اصرار المجلس العسكري الحاكم على تمرير الانتخابات الرئاسية طبقا لاجراءات تثير شكوك من نزاهة الانتخابات الرئاسية المقرر اجرائها يومي 23 و24 مايو الجاري. 

بدأت الأحداث في الساعات الأولى من يوم الأربعاء الماضي حين فوجئ حوالي مائتي معتصم، غالبيتهم من أنصار المرشح الرئاسي المستبعد حازم صلاح أبو اسماعيل من المعترضين على استبعاد مرشحهم وعلى الاجراءات المتعلقة بإجراء الانتخابات، ببعض البلطجية، الذي اعترف بعضهم بأنه مستأجر، يطلقون النار عليهم، مما أدى إلى اشتباكات اسفرت عن مقتل 11 شخص، وإصابة 168 طبقا للأرقام الرسمية. عقب الأحداث تضامنت عدد من الحركات الشبابية ونظموا مسيرة كبيرة انضمت إلى المعتصمين. وتواصل الاحتجاج يوم الجمعة بدعوة بعض القوى السياسية إلى مظاهرة بميدان التحرير، لكن مجموعة من القوى الشبابية وعلى رأسها حركة 6 أبريل قررت التظاهر أمام وزارة الدفاع بالرغم من تحذير الجيش. تبادل الشباب الاشتباك مع قوات الشرطة العسكرية بالحجارة، ثم استخدمت الشرطة خراطيم المياه والغاز المسيل للدموع لتفريق المتظاهرين. أسفرت الاحداث عن مقتل شخصين وإصابة قرابة 370 شخص.
النتيجة الأبرز للأحداث هي سحب الانتباه من الانتخابات الرئاسية، حيث انشغلت وسائل الإعلام بما يجري من أحداث على مدار الأيام الماضية. وعلق المرشحين الرئاسيين الإسلاميين والثوريين حملاتهم الدعائية مؤقتا، بينما واصل المرشحين المنتمين للنظام السابق، عمرو موسى وأحمد شفيق حملاتهم. 

المطالب التي تبناها المعتصمون بالرحيل الفوري للمجلس العسكري وتعديل المادة 28 من الإعلان الدستوري قبل 3 أسابيع من الانتخابات الرئاسية تبدو للشارع العادي غير واقعية، وهو ما دفعهم للتعاطف مع المجلس العسكري.

هذه الأحداث ليست الأولى من نوعها فقبل انتخابات مجلس الشعب قامت قوات من الشرطة بالهجوم على حوالي مائتي معتصم بميدان التحرير مما أدى إلى استفزاز النشطاء في أحداث عرفت بإسم أحداث شارع محمد محمود، تلاها احداث مجلس الوزارء، والتي سقط فيها عشرات القتلى ومئات المصابين. أدت هذه الأحداث إلى سحب الأضواء من الانتخابات البرلمانية التي كانت الأحزاب الإسلامية تقوم خلالها بتجاوزات تخل بنزاهة العملية الانتخابية وخاصة في تجاوز سقف الانفاق المالي واستخدام شعارات دينية وطائفية محظورة ساعدتها على الفوز بالانتخابات.
يعتقد البعض أن استفزاز الشباب الغاضب يهدف إلى جر البلاد لحالة من عدم الاستقرار لتأجيل الانتخابات الرئاسية ومن ثم تأجيل تسليم السلطة في الموعد المقرر في نهاية يوينو المقبل. لكن خلال المؤتمر الصحفي الذي عقده أعضاء المجلس العسكري في اليوم التالي علقت لافتة كبيرة خلف أعضاء المجلس العسكري الثلاثة مكتوب عليها: "القوات المسلحة تلتزم بما وعدت" أكد خلالها اللواء محمد العصار عضو المجلس على أن "الانتخابات الرئاسية ستكون نزيهة 100%" لكن القوى السياسية لديها شكوك في هذا.
هناك سيناريوهان للأحداث المستمرة في القاهرة، الأول هو استمرار الاحتجاجات وانضمام أعداد كبيرة من المتظاهرين للشباب وهو ما سيؤدي إلى الضغط على المجلس العسكري للاستجابة للمطالب المرفوعة وعلى رأسها تعديل المادة 28 من الإعلان الدستوري، التي تحصن قرارات اللجنة العليا للانتخابات الرئاسية من الطعن، والثاني بقاء الاحتجاجات محدودة، وهو ما سيؤدي إلى التشويش على الانتخابات الرئاسية، وتصوير التيار الثوري والإسلامي بأنه فوضوي يسعي لاستمرار حالة عدم الاستقرار التي تشعرغالبية المصريين بتملل منها وتتوق إلى انتهاء المرحلة الانتقالية بإجراء الانتخابات الرئاسية، وهو سيصب في مصلحة المرشحين المنتمين للنظام الحاكم.