Who are the True "Fulul" of Post Revolution Egypt?

Magdy SamaanFikra Forum - January 12, 2012

The literal meaning of Arabic verb falla is ‘to nick a blade of a sword and make it jagged,’ or ‘to blunt an object.’ So if a sword, for instance, is made jagged, it has ‘fulul’ (notches), or it has lost its edge and requires smoothening and sharpening. When the term is applied to a nation, it implies a defeated or a vanquished people.In the wake of the Egyptian revolution, the term ‘fulul’ has been used to connote those loyal to the deposed Mubarak regime or those who benefitted from it, and has inaccurately been translated into English as ‘remnants.’ The question is, have the cronies of the previous regime lost their power and become the proverbial blunted sword?The mistaken rendering of the word fulul has in part led to the state of paralysis and the conflict that is stripping the Egyptian revolution of its worth today. Most Egyptians now feel that allowing the army to assume command of this interregnum was a historic mistake, and that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) represents no more than an extension of the previous regime, or ‘remnants,’ as the conventional translation of the word is used. But the truth is that no chink has been made, no defeating blow delivered yet. With the approach of the first anniversary of the January revolution, Egyptians find themselves governed by the same rules of the regime which they presumed they had gotten rid of when the former president stepped down. Bit by bit, the old faces and practices have reemerged, to the point where the activists now find that it is they themselves that might more accurately be termed the fulul (notches) and that the revolution, if it assumes the role of sword in the analogy, has been blunted and ultimately discredited.The popular intifada against Mubarak’s rule initially came with the blessing of the military, which saw in the uprising an opportunity to rid itself of a source of irritation, namely, the idea of hereditary succession of power. Although the military establishment – which otherwise represents the solid core of the previous regime – initially aided the revolutionaries and assured them that they would relinquish power to civilian forces, subsequently created in the months following an about-face scenario which would preserve the old balance of power and its beneficiaries and restore military control. The SCAF deliberately utilized the security vacuum and the dire economic situation to play on the ordinary citizen and intimate that the revolution was responsible for these. In the last three months, the military establishment has made its antagonism to the revolution and its instigators clearly known, with accusations resurfacing from the first days of the uprising that Tahrir Square does not represent Egypt and that activists are funded by outside sources bent on wreaking havoc, and so on.Following the revolution, the effort to expunge fulul from the government was limited to former ruling NDP party members, personalities related to the former president and, more specifically, those who may have been implicated in the agenda to allow for the hereditary succession of power. The SCAF attempted to delude the revolutionaries into believing that the regime had fallen by putting select representatives of this ‘succession wing’ of the old regime to trial, while simultaneously re-introducing ‘pre-succession’ regime figures.With nearly one year passed now since the uprising, it would appear that the regime which the revolution sought to overthrow is far broader than those implied by the term fulul. How, then, should we categorize the regime?Following the Free Officers’ revolt against civilian rule in 1952, the military sought a purge of social agents who had themselves been tapped by the proponents of the liberal trend which led the 1919 revolt, and which the Free Officers viewed as unrepresentative of society as a whole. The July officers sought to distribute wealth and influence more evenly and aimed to design a new social network, one founded on loyalty to them.In the thirty years that Mubarak held the reins of power, this network continued along the same lines set out during the Nasser and Sadat eras – a system of patronage and loyalty won out over direct rule by the military establishment. But in the final decade of Mubarak’s rule, an unexpected change occurred to the ‘loyalty’ model – Mubarak himself decided to upend the system that the July officers set out years ago, giving rise to the notion of his son assuming power after him. This prompted the ascension of new beneficiaries, professing loyalty to the heir apparent and triggered resentment towards the Old Guard, foremost among these the military establishment. An unspoken power struggle ensued between these two camps. The civilian heir was a feckless and unconvincing candidate, particularly in the eyes of the military. Similarly, the Old Guard questioned the share of the political pie accorded to these ‘new upstarts’ - most of whom were businessmen – and disputed their administerial competence, embodied in the person of Ahmed Ezz, former Secretary of Organizational Affairs for the NDP. In Old Guard circles, the resentment grew.Security services played an essential role in manufacturing the loyalties of key influencers, following one of two methods to produce these social agents: the first was to attract the wealthy, from prominent families, with a particular talent to inspire and use their status to control their respective constituencies. In order to buy loyalty, the old regime would offer benefits and concessions, assuring these individuals of continued influence over their spheres. Examples of this are numerous – heads of the various religious sects, heads of well-known families, businessmen, movie stars, soccer players, etc. Those who benefitted from this system perceived a kind of threat after the revolution. Some attempted to adapt to the revolution, to change their stripes to suit the revolution. Most, however, worked to curtail the revolution, as was tried in vain at the beginning of the uprising. These individuals found themselves in a similar spot throughout the final years of the Mubarak era, unable to carry out their designated roles, due to the great cost of the dirty game and the corruption stemming from the regime’s succession project. The people were no longer convinced, and societal anger had become greater than the regime could manage. This is what ultimately tipped the scales.The other model involves the creation – and infiltration - of something like a syndicate for the political elite and civil society, with a view to easily controlling that body. But this elite, which rode the demands of the revolution and claimed to represent it, ultimately lacks political savvy and the ability to construct a solid political base capable of filling the void left by those affiliated with the previous regime, and has gradually returned to its traditional role of ‘domesticated opposition.’In the twilight years of his rule, Mubarak’s age stunted his capabilities. His son was stunted from the outset by having failed to convince anyone of his capacity to lead. The so-called fulul¬, however, have yet to be stunted in any way. They continue to resist change, and it is they who retain real power and enjoy the support of regional forces which view democratic change in Egypt as a worrisome threat to their own retention of control. Be that as it may, the persistence and courage demonstrated by the youth of Tahrir in recent confrontations could yet turn the tables.

عندما تتحول الانتخابات الديمقراطية إلى انتخابات ثيوقراطية

مجدي سمعانAtlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

قبل أن تذهب ماريان شكري من مدينة أولا صقر بمحافظة الشرقية بمصر للإدلاء بصوتها كان عليها أن تتصل برقم خاص للشركة المصرية للاتصالات (شركة حكومية) لمعرفة البيانات الانتخابية الخاص بها. رد عليها موظف "السويتش" وقبل أن يعطيها البيانات الانتخابية الخاصة بها فاجأها بالسؤال: "لمن ستدلي بصوتك؟" ردت عليها وهي متفاجئة: "لا أعلم بعد" فأجاب: "طبعا ستعطي صوتك لحزب النور" يحلو للكثيرين اغماض أعينهم عن التجاوزات الجسيمة التي شهدتها انتخابات مجلس الشعب المصري للقفز إلى نتيجة مفادها أن الانتخابات كانت "حرة ونزيهة" لكن من وجهة نظري فالانتخابات لم تكن كذلك، فالتعاطف والمساندة التي لاقتها الأحزاب الإسلامية لم تكن فقط من موظف "السويتش" بل أيضا من قضاة وموظفين من المشرفين على الانتخابات طبقا لكثير من تقارير متابعة الانتخابات، هذا التعاطف عززه من ناحية أخرى تغاضي اللجنة العليا المشرفة على الانتخابات عن خروقات جسيمة للقانون والدستور خلال العملية الانتخابية، وخاصة من جانب الأحزاب الإسلامية. من لم يتصل وذهب للجنة الانتخابية مباشرة، مثل كثير من البسطاء والأميين، كان بانتظارهم أمام اللجنة خيمة مجهزة بها شخص ينتمي لحزب الحرية العدالة الإخواني، يجلس خلف كمبيوتر ومعه البيانات الخاصة بالناخبين. بعد أن يقوم هذا الشخص بكتابة بيانات الناخب على ورقة دعائية عليها صورة مرشح حزب الحرية والعدالة يكتب له أسماء مرشحي الحزب ورمز القائمة، ووفي ظل تكدس استمارة الإقتراع بالأسماء لا يجد الناخب من يعرفه سوى هذا الشاب المبتسم، والذي سبق وأن قدم حزبه بعض السلع التموينية له، والورقة الاسترشادية التي في يده. وبالرغم من شكوى القوى السياسية من هذه الممارسة المخالفة لقانون الانتخابات الذي يحظر الدعاية الانتخابية في يوم الإقتراع، إلا أن الجنة العليا المشرفة على الانتخابات لم تتخذ أي إجراء على مدى الثلاث مراحل الانتخابية لوقفها. ومن ناحية أخرى كان السلفيون يستخدمون المساجد كمقار انتخابية، ليس هذا فقط، وإنما استخدمت دعاية دينية وطائفية هي محظورة بحكم الإعلان الدستوري وقانون الانتخابات، وأصبح الخيار كنتيجة لذلك هكذا: "انتخب الكتلة المصرية التابعة للنصارى بقيادة رجل الأعمال نجيب ساويرس، أو انتخب حزب النور أو الحرية والعدالة "لنصرة الإسلام" أو "لتدخل الجنة" ووصل الأمر إلى تكفير من ينتخب قائمة الكتلة أو يصوت للأحزاب الليبرالية. كما لم تسائل الحكومة الأحزاب الإسلامية على تخطي حملاتها الدعائية والانتخابية سقف الإنفاق المالي المسموح به، وعن مصدر هذه الأموال الهائلة التي كان لها الكلمة العليا في الإستعداد الجيد للانتخابات، كما تغاضت عن التحقيق الجاد في اتهامات من مصادر مختلفة عن تلقي هذه الأحزاب لأموال من دول الخليج. يأتي هذا في وقت يشن فيه المجلس العسكري حملة منظمة لتشويه صورة التيارات السياسية العلمانية والمجتمع المدني بإلصاق تهمة تلقي تمويلات أمريكية، بالرغم من أن هذه التمويلات تمر عبر قوانين منظمة وتشرف عليها الحكومة- ولا يقتصر الأمر على التشويه فقط بل واكبه استخدام مفرط للقوة في مواجهات سقط خلالها أكثر من 60 قتيلا من الناشطين السياسيين الشباب، الذين ناهضوا سياسات المجلس العسكري في توجيه العملية الانتقالية في اتجاه ينفي عنها كونها عملية ديمقراطية. بينما تغاضت السلطات الحاكمة بقيادة المجلس العسكري عن قيام مجموعات سلفية بالدعوة على موقع الفيس بوك لتأسيس هيئة بإسم "هيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر" على غرار السعودية، ولم تكتفي بالدعوة وإنما عرضت مكافأة مالية قدرها 500 جنيه شهريا لمن ينضم إليها، وأستوردت شحنة صواعق كهربائية، صادرتها السلطات من ميناء السويس لكن لم تفتح تحقيقا مع من استوردها، وقام بعض السلفيين بالفعل بالاحتكاك بالمواطنين لنهييهم عن "المنكر" تبادل الخدمات بين المجلس العسكري بدأ منذ وقت مبكر من المرحلة الانتقالية، فقد دعم الإسلاميون الإستفتاء على التعديلات الدستورية الذي فرض بمقتضاة المجلس العسكري سيناريو للمرحلة الانتقالية لازالت البلاد تعاني من تبعاته، ورد العسكر ذلك بمنح تراخيص للأحزاب الإسلامية بالمخالفة للدستور وقانون الانتخابات الذي يحظر انشاء أحزاب سياسية على أساس ديني، والآن يجني الإسلاميين ثمار سيناريو المرحلة الانتقالية الذي وضعه العسكر، ويسعون لاقناع القوى السياسية بضمان عدم محاسبة قادة الجيش على أفعالهم قبل وبعد الثورة. وتتجه التيارات الإسلامية إلى الفوز بنسبة ثلثي مقاعد البرلمان، وهو ما سيجعل لها الكلمة العليا في تقرير مسار العملية السياسية في مصر، وصياغة دستور ما بعد الثورة، وسيضع البلاد في مفترق طرق ما بين اندماج الإسلاميين في عملية سياسية ديمقراطية أو تحقيق حلم إقامة الدولة الإسلامية الذي سيفتح موجة ثانية من المواجهة ليس فقط مع المجلس العسكري ولكن مع أصحاب الأغلبية من الإسلاميين

When Democratic Elections Turn Theocratic

Magdy Samaan January 11, 2012Atlantic Council Rafiq Hariri Blog Egypt SourceBefore Marianne Shukri, a resident of Awlad Saqr in the Sharqiyya governorate of Egypt, could cast her vote, she had to call the state-run Egyptian Communications Company to determine the location of her polling station. The operator answered her call but before he would give her the information, Ms. Shukri was astonished by his inappropriate question, “Who will you vote for?” Surprised, she answered, “I’m not sure yet,” to which he replied, “Of course you’ll vote for the [Salafi] Nour party.”Many have turned a blind eye to the serious abuses witnessed during Egypt’s parliamentary elections and jump to the conclusion that the process was “free and fair.” From my point of view, however, they were not. The sympathy and support expressed for the Islamist parties came not only from the switchboard operator, but also from the judges and election workers according to many reports from those who have followed the elections. This sympathy, reinforced by the indifference of the High Election Commission (HEC) that monitors the elections, has led to serious breaches of the law and the constitution during the elections process, particularly on the part of Islamists.Those who did not call ahead and went directly to the election station, such as the poor and illiterate, found a tent in front of the station attended by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) who sat at a computer with voter information. After that person wrote the voters’ data on a campaign flyer with a picture of the FJP candidate on it, he would write the names of the FJP candidates and draw the logo for their list. Confronted with a massive ballot form full of names, the voters would find no one they knew but for the smiling face whose party had earlier offered its assistance and whose campaign flyer they held in their hand. Despite complaints from other political forces regarding this violation of the elections law that prohibits campaigning on the day of the vote, HEC monitors took no steps over the course of the three rounds of voting to stop it.On the other hand, the Salafists not only used mosques as elections headquarters, but also used sectarian and religious campaigning which was also prohibited by the constitutional declaration and the elections law. The end result was this: either vote for the Christian Egyptian Bloc headed by businessman Naguib Sawiris, or vote for the Nour Party or the FJP for the “glory of Islam” or “to get into heaven.” It reached the point where voting for the Bloc or the liberal parties was akin to apostasy. As a result 80 percent of the votes were cast along sectarian lines, according to the Nasar Human Rights Center, an Egyptian organization that monitored the elections.Neither did the government investigate the Islamist parties’ violation of the financial ceiling permitted for campaigning and advertising, nor did it question the source of the massive funding – much of it allegedly obtained from the Gulf monarchies -- that enabled them to prepare and campaign so effectively.This situation was compounded by the poor and at times chaotic administration of the elections process. Under Mubarak’s rule, elections results were commonly rigged by counting the votes of the deceased. One would hope that this practice would have been eliminated in the new Egypt, so it was shocking to discover that one candidate who died a week before start of parliamentary elections not only remained on the ballot, but amassed more than 4,000 votes in a Sharqiya district, prompting a court to order a re-run. One election worker told me that his colleague received money from the candidates in exchange for inflating their vote counts. Last Tuesday, several candidates held a press conference announcing that they had discovered 9 million surplus votes over the course of the three election rounds, due to voters casting multiple ballots. All this at a time when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is waging an organized smear campaign against secular revolutionary activists and civil society groups accusing them of illegally receiving American funding without the necessary government registration permits. This harassment campaign is not limited to defamation but has also included the use of excessive force in confrontations with protesters resulting in the deaths of at least 60 activists who have criticized the SCAF’s handling of the transition. While targeting liberal activists and democracy-promoting NGOs, the SCAF has turned a blind eye to Salafi propaganda including a new Facebook group called “The Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,” clearly inspired by Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi establishment, which offers a monthly stipend of LE 500 to the group’s members. The government also ignored an imported shipment of electric detonators confiscated by the authorities from the port of Suez and neglected to open an investigation into the source of the shipment. Fistfights and altercations have been reported between Salafis seeking to prevent “vice” and non-Islamist Egyptians.The alignment between the SCAF and the Islamists began early in the transitional period, when the Muslim Brotherhood strongly supported the referendum on the SCAF’s proposed constitutional amendments. The military seemed to reward the Islamists for their support by tolerating their violation of electoral regulations including the law forbidding the establishment of political parties based on religion. The Islamists are now reaping the fruits of the transitional roadmap developed by the military and are working to shield Egypt’s military leaders from accountability for their actions before and after the revolution.The Islamists are set to win two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, which could grant them the final say over the trajectory of Egypt’s transition. Their parliamentary majority will also enable Islamists exert significant influence over the drafting of the post-revolution constitution, which will need to address the integration of Islamists into a democratic political process. If Salafi groups seek to incorporate their vision of an Islamic state into Egypt’s future legal framework, they could provoke a new round of confrontations between the SCAF and Islamists.

SCAF Plays the Victim to Isolate Protesters

Magdy Samaan December 19, 2011http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/scaf-plays-victim-isolate-protestersWhen the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni armies were repressing the revolts of their people by force, the Egyptian army was boasting that it sided with the people and toppled their leader. However, the latest round of clashes in Cairo, which had resulted in 11 casualties and over 300 injuries by December 19, demonstrate that the armed forces are no longer protecting the people and are now engaged in a lethal campaign to suppress protesters calling for an end to military rule. The cruelty shown by military forces over the last few days – ruthlessly beating unarmed protesters and stripping them of their clothes -- exceeds the brutality of Hosni Mubarak’s former regime.The shocking images of army officers – wearing regular military uniforms and equipped with anti-riot gear -- beating and firing at demonstrators and stripping women in plain public view – is an escalation of the SCAF’s iron-fisted approach to protests, which has been on display for months. This trend became increasingly apparent with the Maspero incidents on October 9, when 28 Coptic protesters were crushed to death by military vehicles and killed by live ammunition. The SCAF’s crackdown escalated again on November 19, when 42 protesters were killed and over 2000 injured – many of them blinded – by rubber bullets in Mohammed Mahmoud Street.Rather than claim responsibility for its mishandling of the recent violence, the SCAF has consistently blamed the clashes on protesters. In a press conference on December 19, SCAF member Major General Adel Emara claimed that previous incidents in October and November were part of a “systematic plan to bring down Egypt.” General Emara used the same logic applied by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who denied responsibility for the deaths of thousands of Syrian protesters, and that of former Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi, who tried to delegitimize protesters by portraying them as foreign agents and mercenaries. General Emara tried to draw a false distinction between the youth who led the January 25 Revolution and the youth currently clashing with the military, claiming that the later is not representative of the Egyptian people and is motivated by subversive elements and foreign agendas. Once again, the SCAF is determined to portray itself as a victim rather than the perpetrator of violence. Throughout Emara’s press conference, Twitter was buzzing with sarcastic and angry reactions from the youth of the revolution.Emara’s statements echo the language one might expect to hear from thugs and bullies harassing a weakling. Protesters are demanding that the SCAF be held accountable for its crimes, but there are few means for legal recourse when the accused perpetrator is running the political system.All along, the SCAF has been trying to win sympathy by playing the victim card. Despite a huge volume of video footage documenting the crackdown on Twitter and Youtube, the SCAF is selectively using images of the clashes to portray protesters as violent vandals. General Emara pointed to a picture of children throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails at burning government buildings along with confessions of children and adolescents – possibly given under duress – claiming that they were paid to destroy public property. The SCAF is spewing this propaganda as evidence to support its claim that “hidden fingers” and “systematic schemes” are working to undermine the transition.While General Emara was making his announcement, the Middle East News Agency broadcast statements by an anonymous official source who claimed that “the involvement of former party and parliamentary figures, businessmen, and political activists in the recent incidents in Egypt, including those at the cabinet, could lead to a ‘Syria’ scenario by transforming the power struggle into a clash between the army and the people.”Some analysts fear that the army’s confrontation with protesters in Tahrir Square could bring about a crisis resembling Syria’s if protesters refuse to except the military’s roadmap and timeline for transition. Others consider the situation in Egypt different from that in Syria because the Egyptian people toppled the president while Assad still clings to power. One of the activists tweeted describing the situation in Egypt: “The army sacrificed Mubarak to save the regime and killed the revolution.” As the protesters know, the SCAF has been able to retain power because of the military establishment’s vast resources and institutional infrastructure – much like Syria’s – which make regime change extremely difficult. In Libya, where Qaddafi’s patronage network and constituency was not as broad as in Syria or Egypt, protesters were finally able to unravel the regime.Even though the army announced a timetable to transfer power to civilians by the end of June 2012, mistrust and apprehension about the SCAF’s true intensions is rising. There Is a growing sense among activists that the SCAF is trying to isolate the political forces by dragging them into violent confrontations and taking advantage of the average citizen’s fatigue with continued protests and insecurity to justify restrictions on expression and the right to protest. Nearly one year after the revolution, the Egyptian public is becoming increasingly frustrated with continued insecurity and there is widespread concern that the country is on the brink of a dangerous political firestorm and economic crisis.

الانتخابات البرلمانية في مصر: لا شيء يوحي إلى ثورتها

مجدي سمعانمنتدى فكرة 6 ديسمبر 2011تشبه أول انتخابات برلمانية تشهدها مصر عقب ثورة يناير وضع خمرا جديدا في إناء قديم، فالشعب عاد بقوة للمشاركة السياسية لكن الأحزاب المشاركة لم تتخلى عن أساليب الانتخابات التي إعتادت عليها. وكشفت الانتخابات أن القوى الثورية لازالت أقلية، وأنه بالرغم من المشاركة غير المسبوقة للمواطنين والتي بلغت 52% فإن شيئا لم يتغير فيما يتعلق بالاستخفاف بإرادة الناخبين. فقد شهدت الانتخابات، التي جرت أولى جولاتها يوم 28 نوفمبر الماضي وتستمر حتى 10 يناير، استمرار كثير من الممارسات القديمة التي عادة ما كانت تشهدها انتخابات عصر مبارك، مثل شراء الأصوات عن طريق تقديم إعانات عينية للفقراء، واستمرار الدعاية الانتخابية خارج اللجان بل وداخلها، وما تم رصده من تلاعب في عد الأصوات، وأضيف إلى الانتهاكات استخدام الدين على نحو واسع لم تشهده البلاد من قبل. كل هذه الانتهاكات تضع علامات استفهام حول نزاهة الانتخابات، وشرعية المجلس الذي سيشرف على وضع الدستور والذي بدأت الدعاوى القضائية للطعن في صحة الانتخابات تتولى عليه. وبالإضافة إلى أنه لازال هناك علامات استفهام تتعلق بمدى احترام التيارات الإسلامية لقواعد اللعبة الديمقراطية، في شقها المتعلق بإحترام الحقوق والحريات الأساسية والمساواة بين المواطنين والقبول بمدأ التنوع، فإنه حتى الجزء الإجرائي للديمقراطية، الذي قبلته تلك التيارات، والمتمثل في الانتخابات، لم يحترموه، وكانت التيارات الإسلامية هي أكثر من ارتكب مخالفات وانتهاكات تمثلت في شراء الأصوات بشكل غير مباشر عن طريق تقديم إعانات للفقراء واستغلال الدين لتصوير أنهم هم من يمثل المسلمين متهمين التيارات المدنية بأنها تمثل تقف في صف المسيحيين، واللعب على الوتر الطائفي. والسؤال، هو: إذا كانت التيارات الإسلامية لم تحترم قواعد اللعبة الديمقراطية، وهي لم تمكن بعد من الحكم، فماذا سيكون الوضع في حالة سيطرتها على زمام الأمور في البلاد؟! وبعد عادت القوة الثورية إلى ميدان التحرير في 19 نوفمبر الماضي، في احتجاجات أعادت إلى الذاكرة وقائع ثورة يناير، وسقط خلال المواجهات التي استمرت لحوالي 10 أيام 42 قتيل وحوالي 2000 مصاب، وذهب البعض إلى تسمية الإحدى عشر يوما السابقة لإجراء الانتخابات بالموجة الثانية من الثورة. وبعد أن كانت الاحتجاجات التي إمتدت في معظم المحافظات قاب قوسين أو أدنى من سحب الشرعية من المجلس العسكري الحاكم، وتنفيذ المطلب الرئيسي لها المتمثل في تولي حكومة إنقاذ وطني مدنية زمام الأمور في البلاد، جاءت الانتخابات لتسحب الشرعية من ميدان التحرير، لتتكسر الموجة الثانية للثورة على عتبة الانتخابات، وتعيد القوى الثورية الديمقراطية إلى المربع رقم واحد. ومكنت الانتخابات المجلس العسكري من زمام الأمور مرة أخرى، وأعطت القوى غير الديمقراطية المتمثلة في الإسلاميين اليد العليا على تقرير مصير دستور البلاد الذي سيحكم قواعد اللعبة السياسية. فالشباب الذي قاد الثورة المصرية في يناير الماضي وخرج في 19 نوفمبر الماضي للإحتجاج مرة أخرى عاد ليصبح في مقاعد المعارضة، وهناك شعور بالمرارة، فرسالة التغيير لم تصل بعد إلى القواعد الجماهيرية التي تلقى بلائمة عدم استقرار أحوال البلاد على ميدان التحرير. وبعد أن كان الشعار "لا صوت يعلو على صوت التحرير" أصبح من يعتصمون في الميدان الآن أقلية محاصرة تشعر أنها هي من قدمت التضحيات بينما يجنى الثمار آخرون يملكون رؤية مختلفة لشكل نظام الحكم، يراه الشباب أنه نوعا آخر من الاستبداد ساير الثورة حتى مفترق الطرق، ويتأهب للقفز عليها. فلانتخابات الجارية بمثابة حصاد لسنوات حكم عسكر يوليو، والتي تم خلالها أسلمة المجتمع المصري وبث روح الطائفية فيه، بعد أن كان يميل إلى الليبرالية والوسطية قبل عام 1952. وحتى في حالة ما تمكنت القوى السياسية من صياغة دستور ديمقراطي يضمن قواعد عادلة وشفافة للمنافسة السياسية فالطريق أمام تلك الأحزاب والتيارات العلمانية لازال طويلا، فالكلمة العليا خلال الفترة المقبلة ستكون للتيارات الإسلامية التي تجد دعما من فلول النظام القديم في الداخل والخارج

Poised for a Parliamentary Majority, Islamists Shed Restraint

By: Magdy Samaan EgyptSource, a project of the Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East December 06, 2011
For decades, Egyptians knew only fraudulent elections under the harsh constraints of Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. Faced with pervasive ballot fraud, violence and intimidation by the repressive security forces, they largely withdrew from the political process, choosing to boycott rather than casts ballots that had no hope of bringing about meaningful change. But in last week's elections, Egyptians participated in unprecedented numbers, with 52 percent of eligible voters turning out at the polls on November 28-29.The massive level of turnout proved that the political consciousness of Egyptians has been fundamentally transformed by the revolution. This newfound enthusiasm for political participation and pluralism has produced a spectrum of parties and movements unprecedented in their diversity. But ideological diversity inevitably gives rise to extremes, including the hardline fringe of the Islamist movement, whose Salafi candidates swept an unexpected 20 percent of the votes this week.Looking at the Egyptian street today, the familiar image of the smiling well-dressed Egyptian man wearing a suit and that of the Egyptian woman wearing her hair down and dressed in a short skirt have been replaced by less modern styles that reflect conservative Wahhabi influence. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, which failed to win a single seat during the semi-liberal era before 1952, is leading election returns and poised to claim at least 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. While the Brotherhood has long been a powerful fixture in Egypt’s political scene, the rise of the hardline Salafis is a new phenomenon and begs the question: Where did this new surge in religious conservatism originate? Before the 1952 military coup, Egyptian society was becoming increasingly modern and liberal in its character, beginning to resemble contemporary Tunisian society in its demographic and ideological makeup. But six decades of authoritarian rule took a serious toll on voter attitudes and reversed the liberalizing trend seen before 1952.Authoritarianism supported the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and accelerated its project – Islamizing Egypt – which has now been in progress for 83 years. Some analysts have suggested that the strong military establishment that assumed power after the 1952 coup had the effect of curbing the influence of Islamists. In my opinion, however, the period of military rule was actually an “enabling phase” that catalyzed the growth of Islamic movements. This shift in the public discourse and mood -- from moderation and liberalism toward Islamism -- revealed itself fully in the results of this week’s elections.The stunning success of the Brotherhood and Salafi parties at the polls suggests that Islamic values that had previously been confided to the private, personal realm in Egyptian society are now dominating debates in the formal political arena. In Islamic jurisprudence, there is the concept of a “phase of vulnerability,” during which Muslims were a minority in Mecca. This period was characterized by tolerance of other religious groups, as Muslims lacked the political authority and demographic weight to impose their views on society. However, this framework changed dramatically during the “enabling phase,” after the Prophet Mohammad emigrated from Mecca to Medina, where Muslims represented the dominant religion. No longer constrained by their minority status, Muslims became increasingly assertive in reengineering their societies in conformity with Islamic moral and legal principles, even in liberal cosmopolitan cities like Cairo. In 2003, I spoke with Essam al-Erian, deputy head of the FJP, during my work at Cairo Times magazine, about a draft bill presented by the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc that made alcohol consumption a crime punishable by whipping, in accordance with Islamic Shari'a. At the time, al-Arian insisted that the Brotherhood “was not in a hurry to implement the Shari'a.” “Our primary goal is to construct the individual and Muslim society, and then the fruit will fall on its own,” He said. Looking at this week’s election results, it looks like the fruit is finally hitting the ground.With the FJP poised to capture a plurality and possibly a majority of seats in parliament, the Brotherhood will undoubtedly reconsider its pre-revolutionary slogan, “participation not competition,” which reflect the restraint and pragmatism that become hallmarks of the group’s political strategy under Mubarak’s rule. At the beginning of the revolution, the Brotherhood announced that they would preserve the same slogan and would not compete for more than 30% of the parliamentary seats. Additionally, the Freedom and Justice Party stated that it would not nominate candidates for the presidential election. However, in recent months, the Brotherhood’s position has shifted gradually, reflecting heightened political ambitions, with the FJP announcing that it would field candidates for 50% of the parliamentary seats, a 10% increase over the previously announced threshold. What led to this strategic shift?The electoral success of the Islamic movement in Egypt can be partially attributed to regional dynamics. Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf monarchies would welcome an Islamist majority in Egypt’s next parliament, and there is evidence that these countries have provided significant funding to support Egyptian Salafi NGOs and political parties in recent months. Statements by US officials pledging to work with Islamist parties represented in the next parliament may have emboldened the FJP to go public with its rising political ambitions. Meanwhile, the electoral victory of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco may have whetted the Brotherhood’s appetite for power. On the same day that Morocco’s Justice and Development party won the elections, a Brotherhood spokesman issued a statement saying that the ruling military council "must task the party with a [parliamentary] majority to form the next government."Judging by the results of the first round, Islamists are on their way to winning an absolute majority in the next parliament that would enable them to impose their religious ideology on the new political system by drafting the country’s new constitution – a task that was delegated to a constituent assembly selected by the People’s Assembly under the interim constitution issued in March. If Islamists gain control of parliament, it would alter the balance of power for the remainder of the transitional phase scheduled to end with a presidential election by the end of June 2012.Ironically, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) may view the Brotherhood’s political victory as a solution to its current legitimacy crisis, rather than a threat to its power. So far, the SCAF has steadfastly refused to task Mohamed ElBaradei or any other political figure associated with the revolution to form the national salvation government demanded by protesters. But if the Brotherhood gains significant power in the new political system, it could represent a power-sharing compromise, striking a balance between the expectations of revolutionary forces and the interests of the military establishment and former regime. The SCAF will be able to point to a democratically elected parliament as proof that it is advancing the transition, while still keeping power out of the hands of the revolutionaries themselves.An Islamist majority in parliament is likely to inspire new alliances and coalitions between secular and liberal parties, which will need to cooperate in a united bloc if they want to have their voices heard. If the Islamist majority in parliament succeeds in imposing its vision on Egypt’s next constitution, the country could be headed for a theocratic system that contains some of the institutional trappings of democracy but not its core values.

الانتخابات المصرية: “بروفة جنرال” لحجم الإسلاميين

by Magdy Samaan on Tuesday, November 29, 2011 at 4:40pm

EgyptSource

قبل تقديم عرض مسرحي جديد، يؤدي المشاركون في العمل بروفة أخيرة تسمى “بروفة جنرال” لقياس مدى إتقان الأبطال للنص وردود الفعل الأولية قبل الوقوف على خشبة المسرح حيث لا مكان للخطأ أو التراجع. في 28 نوفمبر المقبل تشهد مصر أول انتخابات برلمانية بعد الثورة تعد بمثابة “بروفة جنرال” لقياس مدى قوة التيارات السياسية المختلفة وعلى رأسها التيارات الإسلامية، لكنها لن تحسم سؤال: من سيحكم مصر.وبعكس الانتخابات التونسية التي حددت نصيب التيار الإسلامي ممثلا في حزب النهضة من كعكة الحكم بـ41%، فالفائز في الإنتخابات البرلمانية المصرية لن يشكل الحكومة، فمهمة البرلمان الانتقالي الأساسية هي الإشراف على صياغة الدستور الجديد، بينما سيظل المجلس العسكري ممسكا بزمام السلطة لحين إجراء انتخابات رئاسية، لم يعلن عن موعد إجرائها بعد، وإن كان يفترض أن تجرى عقب الانتهاء من الدستور أواخر العام المقبل، ثم يعقب ذلك انتخابات برلمانية أخرى، سيتحدد أهميتها بناء على شكل الحكم الذي سيقرره واضعوا الدستور، ففي حالة اختيار نمط حكم الجمهورية البرلمانية فستكون الانتخابات البرلمانية هي الفاصلة في تحديد من سيحكم مصر.وبالرغم من أهمية الدستور الجديد على مستقبل الحكم في مصر، لكن نسبة الإختلاف ليست كبيرة، فالتيارات السياسية الرئيسية شبه متفقة على الخطوط العريضة له، وأهمها بقاء المادة الثانية من الدستور، التي تنص على أن الإسلام دين الدولة، ومبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية هي المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع، مع النص على حماية حقوق المواطنة والمساواى بين المواطنين، وبالطبع فإن تفسير المادة الثانية هو ما سيفرق ما بين ما يعرف بالتيارات المدنية والإسلامية في الحكم.لكن الانتخابات المرتقبة على أي حال ستعطي مؤشرات لتوجهات الناخبين المصريين البالغ عددهم 50 مليون ناخب تقريبا، غالبيتهم يدلون بأصواتهم للمرة الأولي في انتخابات برلمانية، كما ستعطي فرصة للأطراف المختلفة لترتيب أوراقها قبل الجولة الحاسمة.ويعتبر البعض أن نتيجة الاستفتاء على التعديلات الدستورية في مارس الماضي، التي أيدتها التيارات الإسلامية ودعوا المواطنين لتأييدها، ووافق عليها 77% من الناخبين، بينما استجاب لدعوة التيارات والأحزاب المدنية برفضها 23% فقط، بأنها مؤشرا لقوة التيار الإسلامي، لكن الظروف التي احاطت بالاستفتاء تختلف عن الظروف المحيطة بالانتخابات البرلمانية، فقد جرت في النهر مياه كثيرة.وقد سارعت التيارات المدنية بعد استفتاء مارس بالتأكيد على موافقتها على بقاء المادة من الدستور التي تنص على أن مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية هي المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع. ولإحداث توازن ما بين النص على المادة الثانية وضمان بقاء الشكل المدني للدولة بادر الدكتور محمد البرادعي، المدير السابق للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية والمرشح المحتمل للرئاسة، بإصدار ما أسماه بوثيقة المبادئ فوق الدستورية، (عدل التسمية فيما بعد لتكون المبادئ الحاكمة للدستور بعد اعتراض الإسلاميين على المسمى الأول) وذلك لضمان الحقوق والحريات الأساسية في ظل بقاء المادة الثانية من الدستور، وتلا ذلك صدور العديد من الوثائق بلغ عددها حوالي 10 وثائق، أهمها: وثيقة الأزهر، وثيقة منظمات حقوق الإنسان، ووثيقة التحالف الديمقراطي، الذي قاده حزب الحرية والعدالة، الزراع السياسي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وحزب الوفد شبه الليبرالي، وانضم إليه 39 حزبا وقوة سياسية اشتركت في وضع وثيقة تحدد المبادئ الأساسية للدستور.واتفقت غالبية هذه الوثائق على الإبقاء على المادة الثانية من الدستور مع النص على الإلتزام بمواثيق ومعاهدات حقوق الإنسان الدولية، وحماية حقوق المواطنة، وبالتالي فالدعاية التي استخدمتها التيارات الإسلامية خلال الإستفتاء بالقول بأن التيارات الليبرالية واليسارية والأقباط يريدون تغيير هوية الدولة الإسلامية مردود عليها بعد أن وافقت هذه التيارات على الإبقاء على المادة الثانية من الدستور.أما نقاط قوة التيار الإسلامي فمعروفة، ولا تحتاج لتأكيد، ومنها التمويل الجيد، ودعم دول الخليج التي تطبق النموذج الإسلامي في الحكم الذي يسعى السلفيين للإاقتداء به، والتنظيم الجيد خاصة لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، ووضوح البرنامج المتمثل في إقامة دولة تحكمها الشريعة الإسلامية، وسيطرتهم على ميكروفونات المساجد، وارتفاع نسبة الأمية..لكن على الجانب الأخر فقد يكون للظهور المكثف للتيارات الإسلامية وخاصة السلفيين، وما صاحبه من تصريحات مثيرة للجدل، وعنف لفظي، وأحداثا طائفية، كانوا في بعض الأحيان محركا لها، أثرا سلبيا على التيار الإسلامي بشكل عام، وقد يكون بمثابة الدبة التي قتلت صاحبها، وهو ما قد يجعل المواطن المصري العادي يخشي عواقب التصويت لهذه التيارات.

 

معضلات التحول في مصر:

وفي حين يبدو التحول الديمقراطي يسير بشكل سلس في تونس، فإن الانتخابات في مصر تواجه صعوبات جمة، فعلاوة علي عدم الإستقرار الأمنى، والضغوط والتدخلات من الأقليمية المعادية لتحول مصر إلى ديمقراطية فهناك معضلتين خيل للبعض أن الثورة المصرية، التي أظهرت درجة من الوعي الكبير قد تجاوزتهما، وهما علاقة العسكر بالحكم، وعلاقة الإسلاميين بالديمقراطية. فالمجلس العسكري يدير البلاد بنفس عقلية نظام مبارك، مما أدي إلى توتر متصاعد في علاقته مع القوى المدنية، فالجيش الذي حكم قادته البلاد منذ انقلاب يوليو 1952 وراكم مصالح ونفوذ يبدو مترددا وغير واضحا في قيادته للعملية الانتقالية ومن ثم تسليم السلطة لحكومة مدنية منتخبة.أما الأحزاب والتيارات الإسلامية، فالبرغم من الاجتهادات ومحاولة التوفيق بين النظام الديمقراطي ونظام الحكم الإسلامي، أو بمعني أخر “أسلمة الديمقراطية” لكن هذه المحاولات لم تصل إلى درجة التقدم التي وصل لها حزب النهضة التونسي، ذو المرجعية الإسلامية.ويحاول المجلس العسكري استغلال الحضور الإسلامي القوي والمقلق لتصدير فكرة وصايته على حماية الدولة المدنية، وقد ظهر ذلك في وثيقة المبادئ الدستورية التي أصدرها نائب رئيس الورزاء علي السلمي، والتي تجعل الجيش فوق المحاسبة.وقد دأب الإخوان على التأكيد على أنهم لا يسعون للوصول للحكم في هذه المرحلة، واستمرار تبنيهم لشعار “مشاركة لا مغالبة” ومن المرجح أن يلتزموا بما قطعوا على أنفسهم من عهد، لأسباب عديدة أهمها أن الحكم في الفترة المقبلة سيكون مهمة صعبة، قد يؤدي فشلهم فيها إلى إنهيار التنظيم العتيد. أما التيارات السلفية فتهدف إلى استغلال الظرف التاريخي للوصول للسلطة لإقامة دولة الشريعة.ولا يبدو أن الأحزاب ذات الطبيعة المدنية قد استعدت بشكل كاف للمنافسة، كما أنها انشغلت بمعارك جانبية خلال الشهور التي تلت سقوط النظام، وفشلت في تكوين تحالف مدني قوي في مقابل التحالف الإسلامي، بل أن بعضها تحالف مع الإخوان في الانتخابات ضمن “التحالف الديمقراطي من أجل مصر” مثل حزب “غد الثورة” الذي يقوده الدكتور أيمن نور، المعارض السياسي الشهير.لكن وبالرغم من قوة التيار الإسلامي، تنظيميا وماديا، إلا أنه من المتوقع ألا يحصل أي من التيارات السياسية على أغلبية مريحة.ملامح خريطة سياسية جديدةبعد أن تصدر حزب النهضة انتخابات الجمعية التأسيسية في تونس، ينتظر أن تكمل الانتخابات المصرية الجملة فيما يتعلق بوضع ونصيب الإسلاميين في دول الربيع العربي. وستعطي نتيجة الانتخابات المصرية مؤشرا لشكل خريطة العالم العربي السياسية في المستقبل.وتدعم السعودية سيناريو وصول الإسلاميين الأكثر تشددا لحكم مصر، وهو ما سيخلق تكتلا إسلاميا يضم دول الربيع العربي إلى جوار دول الخليج، وهو ما يتمناه آل سعود لتقوية نفوذهم بعد أن كانت عروشهم مهددة.ويأتي قرار إسرائيل تنفيذ عملية عسكرية في هذا التوقيت ليصب في صالح تقوية التيار الإسلامي، بينما أظهرت الإدارة الأمريكية استعدادا للتعامل مع شرق أوسط إسلامي، بتصريحاتهم عن قبول وصول الإخوان للسلطة إذا جاءوا في انتخابات نزيهة، بالرغم من أن الإخوان أنفسهم لم يعلنوا أنهم يسعون للسلطة.وعلى أي حال فهناك واقع يشير إلى أن دول الربيع العربي تستعد لدخول عصر جديد يتولي فيه الإسلاميين الحكم أو يشاركون فيه. لكن في ظل التباس مفهوم الديمقراطية لدى التيارات الإسلامية فثمار الربيع العربي لن تكون ناضجة، والمستقبل مرشح لصراع سياسي ايديولوجي، لا تنافس سياسي يدفع نحو التقدم وحل المشاكل المزمنة التي تكونت عبر عقود من الحكم العسكري الذي تميز بفقر الخيال وسوء الإدارة.

 

Egyptian Elections: A ‘Dress Rehearsal’ Determining Islamists’ Clout

by Magdy Samaan on Tuesday, November 29, 2011 at 4:39pm

Before the debut of any theatrical work, the players engage in one final run – what the Italians and Egyptians call a ‘prova generale’ – to determine that lines are solidly memorized, reaction times are seamlessly sequenced, and so on. The ‘big night on the stage’ allows no margin for error and no turning back. This upcoming 28th of November, on which Egypt will witness its first parliamentary elections since the uprising, represents a similar ‘dress rehearsal’, determining the extent of the strength of the various political trends, the Islamists foremost among them. What will not be determined, however, is the question of who rules Egypt.Unlike the Tunisian elections in which the Islamist trend, represented by the Ennahda party, seized some 41 percent of the political pie, the victor in Egyptian parliamentary elections will not form a government. The essential objective of this transitional parliament is overseeing the drafting of a new constitution; meanwhile the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will retain the reins of power until the completion of presidential elections. A firm date for these elections has not yet been announced, but they are widely presumed to occur towards the very end of next year. This will then be followed by another set of parliamentary elections, whose import will be determined by those earlier constitutional deliberations – in the event that they follow the model of parliamentary rule, the elections will serve as the determinant of who will govern Egypt.Despite the new constitution’s significance in driving the future of Egypt’s governance, the degree of dispute over that constitution is minimal. The main political factions are for all intents and purposes in agreement over the broad outlines of that document, most significantly the permanence of Article 2 of the old constitution, which stipulates that Islam is the religion of the state and that Islamic law is the primary source of reference for legislation. How one interprets Article 2 is what distinguishes the so-called secular or ‘civilian’ trend from the religious one.Be that as it may, the upcoming elections will provide some indicator of the sentiments of the more than fifty million eligible voters, most of whom are casting votes in parliamentary elections for the very first time. Additionally, it provides an opportunity for the various factions to get their cards in order before the decisive stage.Some hold the view that last March’s referendum on constitutional amendments – for which the Islamic trends secured 77 percent of the public backing – provides an indication of the strength of the Islamic trend, but the circumstances surrounding the referendum differ from those of the parliamentary elections and much water has passed under the bridge since.After the March referendum, the secular trend hastened to affirm its agreement to the permanence of Article 2. In an effort to obtain balance between that article and guarantees that the overarching state would retain a ‘civilian’ form, Dr. Muhammad ElBaradei – former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and presumptive candidate for president – initiated what are known as the ‘supra-constitutional principles’ (the terminology was subsequently changed to the ‘governing principles for the constitution,’ following objections of the Islamists to the first term). This was done to ensure rights and basic freedoms in light of Article 2’s staying in the constitution. What followed was a series of other documents defining basic constitutional principles, numbering around ten in total. Among the most significant were the Azhar document, the human rights organizations document, and the Democratic Alliance document (spearheaded by the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the neoliberal Wafd party, joined by some thirty-nine other parties and political forces).Most of these documents agreed on maintaining Article 2 in the constitution as a textual component declaring commitment to international human rights treaties and protection of the rights of all citizens. The propaganda which the Islamic trends used during the referendum – asserting that leftists, liberals, and Copts wanted to alter the Islamic identity of the state – was soundly rebutted when these trends agreed that Article 2 remain.The strengths of the Islamic trend are well-known and don’t require much explanation: They are well-funded, enjoy the support of Gulf states that seek to impose an Islamic model of governance driven by Salafists, they are well-organized – particularly the MB – and have a clear program to establish a state governed by Shari’a. Finally, they control the mosques’ microphones and are aided by rising rates of illiteracy.On the other hand, given the vast proliferation of Islamist parties – Salafi parties in particular – and all that accompanies them, from controversial statements to verbal abuse and sectarian conflicts, these corollaries could backfire – like the dog that bites the hand that feeds it – making the average Egyptian citizen think twice about the consequences of voting in favor of the Islamists.The Dilemma of Transformation in EgyptWhile democratic transformation appears to be proceeding smoothly in Tunisia, elections in Egypt face enormous obstacles. In addition to the absence of security, and pressures and interventions by regional players antagonistic to democratic transformation in Egypt, there are two main difficulties, which some presumed that the Egyptian revolution, with its degree of relative consciousness, had already dealt with: namely, the relationship of the military to governance and the relationship of Islamists to democracy. Indeed, the SCAF are running the country with the same mindset as that of the Mubarak regime, inspiring increasing tension in its relationship with civilian forces. The army – whose leaders have held the reins of the country since the ’52 revolution and have amassed wealth and personal interests – now appear tentative and elusive regarding the process of handing over power to an elected civilian government.Egyptian Islamic parties and trends, meanwhile continue to flounder (unlike Ennahda, their Tunisian counterparts) despite their efforts to harmonize democracy with Islam or, to be more accurate, to ‘Islamize’ democracy.The military council capitalizes on the presence of Islamic forces and the associated fear surrounding them to promote the notion of the SCAF’s able custodianship of the ‘civilian’ state. We see this manifested in the ‘constitutional principles’ document issued by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Silmi, which effectively places the army above the law.The MB have insisted that they do not intend to achieve a monopoly of power at this stage, noting repeatedly their embrace of the slogan, ‘participation, not contestation.’ This is likely a self-imposed strategy, borne largely of the admission that governance in the upcoming period is going to be a formidable task and that failure during the transition could lead to the collapse of the long-established organization. Salafists meanwhile seek to seize the historic moment to come to power and establish a state governed by Islamic law.The so-called secular parties don’t appear to be up to the fight, having consumed themselves with tangential debates in the months following the fall of the old regime and having failed to coalesce in a bloc strong enough to counter the Islamists. Indeed, some of these secular groups have signed on with the MB in their Democratic Coalition for Egypt, such as Ghad al-Thawra, the party of well-know opposition figure Ayman Nour.Despite the advantages the Islamists enjoy, organizationally and financially, no political faction is expected to gain a comfortable majority.Contours of the New Political Map Following the rise of Ennahda in Tunisia’s constituent assembly elections, it is widely anticipated that Egyptian elections will follow suit with regard to the prominence and proportion of Islamists. It is also believed that the results of the Egyptian elections will provide an indication of the shape of the future map of the Arab world.The House of Saud supports a scenario in which more fundamentally conservative Islamists come to power in Egypt, figuring that such a bloc of ‘Arab Spring’ states might ally with the Gulf states and would thereby strengthen the hand of a number of recently challenged thrones.Israel’s decision to carry out military operations at this particular time bolsters the Islamist trend. And at the same time, the American administration appears prepared to deal with an Islamist Middle East, according to their statements accepting an MB rise to power, provided it comes through honest elections (as if this were a fait accompli – the MB themselves have yet to announce that they seek such power).In any case, the reality points to the fact that the countries of the Arab Spring are preparing for the arrival of a new era in which Islamists either rule outright or participate significantly in that rule. But given Islamists’ ambiguous conceptualizations of democracy, the yield of the Arab Spring will not be fruitful. The immediate future looks set for greater ideological struggle, rather than a political competition that drives the body politic towards progress in solving the problems of that have characterized the decades of paucity of vision and administrative ineptitude of military rule.

Inside Egypt's electoral alliances

by Magdy Samaan on Tuesday, November 29, 2011 at 4:36pm ·

Ten months after the January uprising, Egypt’s political scene is more diverse and competitive than ever before, as dozens of new parties ranging in ideology from Salafi to secular seek a place in the post-Mubarak political order. However, only a handful of the more than fifty-registered parties are organized enough to stand a chance at winning parliamentary representation on their own. Acknowledging that strength lies in numbers, most of the smaller parties have aligned themselves with one of four major electoral coalitions, which differ significantly in their constituencies and ideological orientation. So far, the primary beneficiaries of the coalition-building process appear to be the Islamist movements, which are confidently predicting a strong showing in the parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, liberal and civil parties – weakened by divisions and rivalries – have struggled to build a cohesive alliance with a clear campaign platform.Taking advantage of these divisions, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has moved swiftly in the weeks leading up to elections to consolidate its power and privileges by issuing a set of constitutional principles that would preserve a strong political role for the military and shield its budget from oversight by the next elected parliament. Whether or not the four major electoral coalitions will be able to overcome their fragmentation and work together in the next elected government to hold the SCAF accountable remains to be seen.The four main alliances:The Democratic Alliance for Egypt includes many small parties and is led by the Freedom and Justice Party, the official political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.The Islamic Alliance includes the Salafi al-Nour (Light) and Asala (Authenticity) parties along with official political arm of the formerly militant Islamist group, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Building and Development party.The Egyptian Bloc Alliance includes the liberal Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party (founded by the prominent Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris), and the leftist Tagammu Party.The Revolution Continues Alliance includes seven primarily leftist parties, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, and the liberal Egypt Freedom party.The electoral coalitions reflect the polarization between Islamist and what so called “Civilian powers” as well as between new political powers after the revolution and what so called “Flol” or (the ex regime remnants) and under the unstable security situation, and the political tension, there is a potential that the election will witness violence increase the state of polarization.The Democratic Alliance for Egypt, initially launched by the Freedom and Justice and Wafd parties, at one pointed included 43 parties. However, the FJP’s dominant position within the Alliance and alleged efforts to manipulate its electoral lists prompted the Wafd and several other liberal parties to defect from the coalition.The FJP was keen to keep the Democratic Alliance, to avoid a state of polarization. Before it began to fragment under the strain of internal rivalries, the Alliance succeeded in reaching a consensus on key principles to be included in the next constitution, including citizenship rights and the preservation of Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which identifies Islamic Shari’a law as the primary source of legislation. The FJP continues to advocate a strong role for religion in Egypt’s next political system, despite constitutional and legal provisions that ban religious-based political parties and the use of religious slogans, such as the Brotherhood’s Islam is the solution,” in campaigning. Meanwhile, the SCAF has continued to grant licenses to Islamist parties such as Building and Development, formed by the formerly militant group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, which appear to violate the existing legal framework.In addition to the FJP, other new Islamist forces are emerging as serious contenders on the political scene. The Salafi Movement is fielding candidates in the elections under the banner of the Islamic Alliance. The Salafi al-Nour (Light) Party, which dominates the Islamic Alliance, has significant financial assets enabling it to coordinate extensive voter outreach and campaign activities across the country. 610 of the Alliance’s 693 candidates are affiliated with al-Nour.Overall, the Islamist parties appear more organized and better funded than their secular and liberal counterparts, while maintaining a clear goal of establishing a Shari’a state. Meanwhile, “civil” parties have failed to form a strong coalition that offers a clear alternative, and still practice politics with the same defensive mentality that they were forced to adopt under Mubarak’s rule, when the opposition had no real chance of winning meaningful representation in parliament. Given the disorganization and timidity displayed by its civil rivals, it is no surprise that the FJP is confidently acting as though it has already won a parliamentary majority.An FJP victory is far from certain, however. Some think that the large number of Islamist candidates from a variety of parties and movements may contribute to splitting the Islamist vote, reducing their overall representation in parliament and giving an advantage to civil and liberal candidates, independents as well as the so-called remnants of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which have regrouped in at least eight different NDP-affiliated parties that are fiercely campaigning in the hopes of staging a political comeback, despite the government’s promise reactive a Nasser-era Treachery Law that would bar former NDP members from political activity for five-year period.In an attempt to confront hardline Salafis groups with a strong grassroots following, the civil parties are now beginning to coordinate with another Islamist force, the Sufis, whose 15 million followers adhere to a more moderate interpretation of Islam. Although the Sufi movement has traditionally been largely apolitical,Sufi groups have recently stepped into the formal political arena by licensing official parties, like the Sufi-dominated Egyptian Tahrir Party. Despite the weak coordination between “civil” parties and their lack of preparedness, most of these new parties, including the Adl (Justice) Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and al-Masriyin al-Ahrar (Free EgyptiansParty), are working hard to catch up. One the oldest and most organized parties in the civil camp, the Wafd, will benefit from established support networks, although the party has recently suffered from internal disputes over its alliance with Brotherhood prior to its withdrawal from the Democratic Alliance.Although Islamists had an antagonistic relationship with the former regime, the FJP and other Islamist forces have shown support for the SCAF since Mubarak’s fall, Islamists forces are taking a very different and more cooperative approach to the current military leadership in an effort to carve out a strong role for themselves in the new political system. Early on in the transition, the Muslim Brotherhood showed support for the SCAF by backing the constitutional declaration in March 2011. But the alliance between Islamists and the SCAF began to deteriorate in July, after large-scale demonstrations by the FJP and other groups fueled fears of an Islamist takeover. As Islamists became increasingly assertive in the post-revolutionary political order, the SCAF made a clear shift, moving closer to liberal and civil political parties and drafting a set of supra-constitutional principles that Islamists fear would limit their influence over Egypt’s next constitution. In another sign of its alignment with liberal forces, the SCAF appointed two well-known liberals as deputy prime ministers, Hazem al-Beblawy and Ali al-Selmi, who was assigned to draft the new constitutional document.The draft constitutional principles signaled the SCAF’s commitment to preserving a civil state, but political forces soon realized that the document has another important objective: protecting the military’s political and economic privileges and shielding its budget from parliamentary oversight.While these four major coalitions will play an important role in upcoming elections, the polling process will likely give rise to new political forces and unforeseen alliances that could either work together or against one another in the next parliament. The inability of any one party to secure an absolute majority will encourage the formation of new coalitions or mergers between parties with similar orientations such as the more than fifteen new liberal parties that have formed since the revolution.The campaign season and electoral process will likely deepen the division between Islamists and "civil” powers, which has been expanding since the March referendum. Election results are impossible to predict, but Egypt’s next parliament will undoubtedly reflect a fundamentally altered political landscape marked by new voices, alliances and rivalries.

Bassem Youssef Interview

By Mara Revkin and Magdy Samaan
Egypt Source
While some seek to achieve political change through protests and elections, Egyptian YouTube sensation Bassem Youssef is determined to transform Egypt’s political landscape with comedy. Dubbed “the Jon Stewart of Egypt,” Youssef’s top-rated show “al-Bernameg” (“The Program”) has developed a mass following by pushing the boundaries of political discourse and boldly tackling taboo subjects that were off limits to the media under Mubarak’s rule, including sectarianism and the military’s political and economic privileges. Describing his style as “post-revolutionary political soap opera” in exclusive comments to EgyptSource, Youssef said that the show’s method is unique and unfamiliar in Egypt’s established media landscape. Despite Youssef’s popularity, some traditionalists are skeptical of his unfamiliar brand of comedy. “Political Satire is a new art in Egypt and we still have a long way to go to make it acceptable to people,” Youssef said.Youssef’s rise to fame has its roots in the revolution. Before he was a media sensation, the 37-year-old Youssef was a practicing cardiothoracic surgeon who personally treated injured protesters in Tahrir Square. After witnessing firsthand the government’s brutal crackdown on protesters, Youssef reacted strongly to the way Egyptian state media covered the uprising. While the Mubarak regime was collapsing, it used every tool at its disposal to isolate protesters. Official TV stations as well as some private stations were podcasting propaganda continuously, using statements from celebrities and major media personalities loyal to the regime as well as one-time opposition voices who had been co-opted by the ruling party. These commentators passionately defended the embattled Mubarak, even after his defiant last speech in which he steadfastly refused to meet the demands of protesters. In the early days of the uprising, state media waged informational warfare against the protesters in an ugly smear campaign aimed at delegitimizing the objectives of the revolution. The airwaves were saturated with sensational, fabricated tales of debauchery and treachery by protesters: a young female girl confessed to having been trained by the CIA to instigate the revolution, while a popular actor claimed that protesters in Tahrir Square were engaging in group sex.Appalled by this toxic media environment, Bassem Youssef decided to speak out. On March 3, he launched his own YouTube channel and began producing a low-budget video series called “The Bassem Youssef Show,” which drew inspiration from Jon Stewart’s popular program. Within four weeks, the videos had become an internet sensation, attracting 1.2 million viewers. In one of his earliest videos, Youssef parodied the actor and Mubarak loyalist Tala’t Zakaria, who has been accusing protesters of staging scandalous orgies in Tahrir Square, complete with “drums, horns, dancing, drugs...and full sexual relations.” During the show, Youssef pretended to call a friend, urging him to join the party in Tahrir Square, while simultaneously displaying video footage of armored vehicles steamrolling over protesters. Fans began calling him “the voice of the revolution.”Although Mubarak’s rule ended with his resignation on February 11, Youssef cautioned viewers that “the regime is not down yet.” Youssef’s YouTube videos were a powerful reminder to protesters that the success of the revolution could not be taken for granted, and his satirical brand of investigative journalism has inspired Egyptians to help hold the interim government accountable through continued vigilance, scrutiny and constructive criticism.From his humble beginnings on YouTube, Youssef has since been catapulted to stardom as one of Egypt’s most recognized media personalities with his own prime-time talk show. After Youssef managed to attract a mass following on a shoe-string budget, he was approached by ON TV, owned by the billionaire Naguib Sawiris, with an offer to broadcast his show on a prime-time network. Under the new name “al-Bernameg” (“The Program”), Youssef’s show went on air in July 2011 and has since become one of Egypt’s top-rated programs. But Youssef is quick to recall how his home-grown media empire started in a low-tech studio run out of Youssef’s own apartment. The viral YouTube videos that registered millions of hits were created by a production team of just two people: Youssef wrote the script, while his friend Tarek Elqazaz was in charge of production.With elections approaching in less than two weeks, Youssef will undoubtedly have much to say about the polling process and results. With the campaign process well underway, Youssef noted the growing polarization of the political scene and divisions between different ideological groups – liberals, Islamists, and Coptic Christians – which are pursuing very different agendas and visions for the next political system. Meanwhile, the trend toward fragmentation has weakened pressure on the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and opened a window of opportunity for consolidating the military’s political power and economic privileges. The SCAF has a strong strategic interest in keeping the political field divided, and Youssef suspects that the council is deliberately enflaming divisions and rivalries between political forces to consolidate and prolong its control over the system. “The army succeeded in splitting the political powers … Now, getting all those forces together is doubtful, at least for the time being.” With most parties weak, under-funded and resistant to cooperation, it is unlikely that any single force will win a plurality in the next parliament.Although he declined to make predictions on the outcome, Youssef said that the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) is likely to make a strong showing. “I think there will be a definite comeback from NDP members; lots of them will return,” Youssef said. He also expressed concern about the potential for violence and misconduct during the voting process, which is expected to see record levels of turnout. “I think there will be a lot of chaos and violence that may give [the military] an excuse to enforce martial laws.”Despite his concerns about the electoral process, Youssef said that the long-term prospects for a successful democratic transition look promising. “I am generally optimistic about the transition period, even though it will take a few years though to see the real change,” he said.

The SCAF's End Game

By Magdy Samaan

Egypt Source

November 22, 2011

“I want the country to be cleansed” said activist Ahmad Harara, a young dentist in his thirties who lost his right eye in the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution on January 28 and lost his left eye last Saturday, November 19, when he was shot by police snipers. Rooftop snipers have not been seen since last January, but this week they returned, more brutal than ever and backed by military units, to confront the second wave of the revolution.The story of Harara and hundreds of young Egyptians who are facing bullets bare-chested in Tahrir Square has become a source of inspiration for protesters who are back on the frontlines of battle with brutal security forces to demand regime change all over again . Despite the deteriorating situation in the square, Ahmad Harara displayed a broad smile in a November 21 interview with journalist Yosri Fouda, apparently sensing a shift in momentum in favor of the protesters. “We asked [the SCAF] to cleanse the police, media and judiciary, but they did not respond … We want a country not stalling.”As protesters call for a second uprising, Ahmad and his friends in Tahrir Square are telling the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), “Enough is enough,” after months of mismanaging the transition and thwarting the revolution’s demands. The SCAF’s recent behavior has convinced protesters that the military is simply reproducing the regime that they supposedly toppled last January.The confrontations began on November 19 following a major demonstration against the military on Friday, November 18. Islamic movements led the demonstration to protest the constitutional principles document prepared by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi, which outlined sweeping powers for the military, and to demand a quick transfer of power to civilian leadership. While most political movements left the square on the evening of November 19, around 200 injured protesters and their families remained, determined to continue their sit-in overnight. The police’s use of excessive force to break down their demonstration was “the straw that broke the camel's back.” It led to the “explosion” of confrontations that are ongoing, in a manner that is reminiscent of the early days of the revolution. I participated in the deliberations that took place around the Tahrir Square’s main stage the night Mubarak stepped down (February 11, 2011). As the former president transferred executive authority to the SCAF, protesters were divided into two camps on the question of how to respond to the power transfer. Some called for continued demonstrations until the SCAF had fulfilled the demands of the revolution, while others felt that the SCAF should be given a chance to meet their demands and called on protesters to end their sit-in. Ultimately, the second camp prevailed. However, protesters have since come to the conclusion that leaving the Square before the revolution’s demands were met was a historic mistake. The military will not easily give up the power it has held since 1952, and it now seems that the entrenched interests of the SCAF are in danger of extinguishing the revolution’s dreams. According to Amnesty International, some of the human rights violations perpetrated by the current government are worse than those committed by the former regime. The current clashes, signaling a renewed determination to fully realize the revolution unmet demands, raises many questions:Will the elections, scheduled for November 28, be held on time?How dangerous is it to hold elections under the current circumstances with many parties announcing their withdrawal from the electoral race?How legitimate will the elected parliament be?How much more will the clashes escalate?With the bloody confrontations entering their fifth day, the increase in the number of victims and injured (around 33 dead and 2000 injured by November 21) and the spread of protests to over ten governorates, it seems that Egypt’s political crisis has reached the point of no return and the window of opportunity for reaching a political resolution that would allow elections to start on time is rapidly closing. The speech made on the evening of November 22 by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, which he formally accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Essam Sharaf’s cabinet and agreed to hand over power by the end of June 2012, failed to appease the protesters in Tahrir Square who are demanding that the SCAF surrender power immediately to a new governing council headed by a civilian, potentially one of the leading presidential candidates or the head of the Supreme Judiciary Council. Some political forces have nominated the presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei to form a “national salvation government.” ElBaradei has hinted that he is ready to take on this role, saying that he “would do anything to prevent the country’s fragmentation.”For the protesters in Tahrir Square, the SCAF has fundamentally lost its legitimacy. In light of all the crimes it has committed, it is clearly time for the military to give up power and form a national salvation cabinet tasked with administering the remainder of the transitional period. However, it appears that leading political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are no longer representing the interests of protesters after they met with Field Marshal Tantawi on November 22 and agreed to his “solution” and timeline for a transfer of power by June 2012. But it is clear that these political leaders do not speak for the protesters in Tahrir Square and do not have the ability to control or disperse them. While the current clashes represent a dramatic escalation of the military’s repressive tactics, it should be noted that the army has been using excessive force to suppress peaceful protests for months, most recently in the Maspero incident on October 9, which resulted in 27 casualties, mostly Coptic Christians. Whereas the SCAF has been careful to avoid crossing the line of excessive violence in previous confrontations, the military is showing no such restraint in the current clashes. Some have attributed the crackdown to the SCAF’s desire to cancel elections, but is this motivation really powerful enough to prompt a Syrian-style bloodbath?If the SCAF continues to use excessive force in the face of demands for its overthrow and prosecution, Egypt will likely follow the Syrian example rather than the Tunisian one. In the first round of the revolution, protesters’ forced the regime to meet their core demand: Mubarak’s removal. Will they succeed this time or will the revolution devolve into a Syria-style meltdown, as the military deploys lethal violence in a desperate attempt to retain control?

Inside Egypt's electoral alliances

Magdy Samaan November 18, 2011

Ten months after the January uprising, Egypt’s political scene is more diverse and competitive than ever before, as dozens of new parties ranging in ideology from Salafi to secular seek a place in the post-Mubarak political order. However, only a handful of the more than fifty-registered parties are organized enough to stand a chance at winning parliamentary representation on their own. Acknowledging that strength lies in numbers, most of the smaller parties have aligned themselves with one of four major electoral coalitions, which differ significantly in their constituencies and ideological orientation. So far, the primary beneficiaries of the coalition-building process appear to be the Islamist movements, which are confidently predicting a strong showing in the parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, liberal and civil parties – weakened by divisions and rivalries – have struggled to build a cohesive alliance with a clear campaign platform.Taking advantage of these divisions, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has moved swiftly in the weeks leading up to elections to consolidate its power and privileges by issuing a set of constitutional principles that would preserve a strong political role for the military and shield its budget from oversight by the next elected parliament. Whether or not the four major electoral coalitions will be able to overcome their fragmentation and work together in the next elected government to hold the SCAF accountable remains to be seen.The four main alliances:The Democratic Alliance for Egypt includes many small parties and is led by the Freedom and Justice Party, the official political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.The Islamic Alliance includes the Salafi al-Nour (Light) and Asala (Authenticity) parties along with official political arm of the formerly militant Islamist group, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Building and Development party.The Egyptian Bloc Alliance includes the liberal Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party (founded by the prominent Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris), and the leftist Tagammu Party.The Revolution Continues Alliance includes seven primarily leftist parties, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, and the liberal Egypt Freedom party. The electoral coalitions reflect the polarization between Islamist and what so called “Civilian powers” as well as between new political powers after the revolution and what so called “Flol” or (the ex regime remnants) and under the unstable security situation, and the political tension, there is a potential that the election will witness violence increase the state of polarization.The Democratic Alliance for Egypt, initially launched by the Freedom and Justice and Wafd parties, at one pointed included 43 parties. However, the FJP’s dominant position within the Alliance and alleged efforts to manipulate its electoral lists prompted the Wafd and several other liberal parties to defect from the coalition. The FJP was keen to keep the Democratic Alliance, to avoid a state of polarization. Before it began to fragment under the strain of internal rivalries, the Alliance succeeded in reaching a consensus on key principles to be included in the next constitution, including citizenship rights and the preservation of Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which identifies Islamic Shari’a law as the primary source of legislation. The FJP continues to advocate a strong role for religion in Egypt’s next political system, despite constitutional and legal provisions that ban religious-based political parties and the use of religious slogans, such as the Brotherhood’s Islam is the solution,” in campaigning. Meanwhile, the SCAF has continued to grant licenses to Islamist parties such as Building and Development, formed by the formerly militant group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, which appear to violate the existing legal framework.In addition to the FJP, other new Islamist forces are emerging as serious contenders on the political scene. The Salafi Movement is fielding candidates in the elections under the banner of the Islamic Alliance. The Salafi al-Nour (Light) Party, which dominates the Islamic Alliance, has significant financial assets enabling it to coordinate extensive voter outreach and campaign activities across the country. 610 of the Alliance’s 693 candidates are affiliated with al-Nour.Overall, the Islamist parties appear more organized and better funded than their secular and liberal counterparts, while maintaining a clear goal of establishing a Shari’a state. Meanwhile, “civil” parties have failed to form a strong coalition that offers a clear alternative, and still practice politics with the same defensive mentality that they were forced to adopt under Mubarak’s rule, when the opposition had no real chance of winning meaningful representation in parliament. Given the disorganization and timidity displayed by its civil rivals, it is no surprise that the FJP is confidently acting as though it has already won a parliamentary majority.An FJP victory is far from certain, however. Some think that the large number of Islamist candidates from a variety of parties and movements may contribute to splitting the Islamist vote, reducing their overall representation in parliament and giving an advantage to civil and liberal candidates, independents as well as the so-called remnants of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which have regrouped in at least eight different NDP-affiliated parties that are fiercely campaigning in the hopes of staging a political comeback, despite the government’s promise reactive a Nasser-era Treachery Law that would bar former NDP members from political activity for five-year period.In an attempt to confront hardline Salafis groups with a strong grassroots following, the civil parties are now beginning to coordinate with another Islamist force, the Sufis, whose 15 million followers adhere to a more moderate interpretation of Islam. Although the Sufi movement has traditionally been largely apolitical,Sufi groups have recently stepped into the formal political arena by licensing official parties, like the Sufi-dominated Egyptian Tahrir Party. Despite the weak coordination between “civil” parties and their lack of preparedness, most of these new parties, including the Adl (Justice) Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and al-Masriyin al-Ahrar (Free EgyptiansParty), are working hard to catch up. One the oldest and most organized parties in the civil camp, the Wafd, will benefit from established support networks, although the party has recently suffered from internal disputes over its alliance with Brotherhood prior to its withdrawal from the Democratic Alliance.Although Islamists had an antagonistic relationship with the former regime, the FJP and other Islamist forces have shown support for the SCAF since Mubarak’s fall, Islamists forces are taking a very different and more cooperative approach to the current military leadership in an effort to carve out a strong role for themselves in the new political system. Early on in the transition, the Muslim Brotherhood showed support for the SCAF by backing the constitutional declaration in March 2011. But the alliance between Islamists and the SCAF began to deteriorate in July, after large-scale demonstrations by the FJP and other groups fueled fears of an Islamist takeover. As Islamists became increasingly assertive in the post-revolutionary political order, the SCAF made a clear shift, moving closer to liberal and civil political parties and drafting a set of supra-constitutional principles that Islamists fear would limit their influence over Egypt’s next constitution. In another sign of its alignment with liberal forces, the SCAF appointed two well-known liberals as deputy prime ministers, Hazem al-Beblawy and Ali al-Selmi, who was assigned to draft the new constitutional document.The draft constitutional principles signaled the SCAF’s commitment to preserving a civil state, but political forces soon realized that the document has another important objective: protecting the military’s political and economic privileges and shielding its budget from parliamentary oversight.While these four major coalitions will play an important role in upcoming elections, the polling process will likely give rise to new political forces and unforeseen alliances that could either work together or against one another in the next parliament. The inability of any one party to secure an absolute majority will encourage the formation of new coalitions or mergers between parties with similar orientations such as the more than fifteen new liberal parties that have formed since the revolution.The campaign season and electoral process will likely deepen the division between Islamists and "civil” powers, which has been expanding since the March referendum. Election results are impossible to predict, but Egypt’s next parliament will undoubtedly reflect a fundamentally altered political landscape marked by new voices, alliances and rivalries.

Fighting for Seats in a Powerless Parliament

Magdy Samaan November 29, 2011

Egyptians have been patiently waiting since the early hours of the morning to cast their ballots on the second day of voting for the parliamentary elections, unfazed by the long lines even though their faces reflect their exhaustion with the deteriorating economic situation and continued political instability.But not all Egyptians attribute such importance to the election. Protesters in Tahrir Square, now entering the eleventh day of their sit-in, are watching the process skeptically, uncertain that elections will help fulfill their core demands: an end to the SCAF's military rule and the formation of a civilian "salvation" government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the other Islamist parties - more organized than their liberal and leftist counterparts - are happy to see elections proceed on time, confident that they will dominate the next parliament and eager to define the rules of the new system on their own terms.But it is clear from observing the first day of polling that there is a strong desire for elections to succeed, on the part of the Egyptian people as well as the SCAF, whose legitimacy has been severely undermined by the latest clashes in Tahrir Square. Renewed confrontation between the people and the regime is starting to look like the second wave of the revolution that started last January, and is now continuing alongside the electoral process.Clashes between demonstrators and the military and security forces subsided noticeably on the eve of elections, with both sides showing restraint in the interest of allowing elections to proceed smoothly. However, the relative lull in protests may be short-lived. Elections could escalate the antagonism and mutual distrust between the SCAF and the major political forces. If the SCAF succeeds in administering reasonably free and fair elections, the result would be to support the military's preferred transitional scenario, which would allow the SCAF to remain in power until presidential elections in June 2012.Looking at the breakdown of candidates competing for the 168 People's Assembly seats that will be contested in the first stage of elections, Islamist parties clearly have a numerical edge over most of their liberal and leftist competitors. Among the 36 parties and coalitions competing in the elections, 7 parties account for 50 percent of the total candidates. Of these 7 parties the three with the most candidates are all Islamist: the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), with 135 candidates; 2) al-Wasat, with 112 candidates; 3) and the Salafi Nour Party, with 108 candidates.In addition to the proportional strength of the Islamist parties in terms of their share of the candidate pool, the well-funded Islamists have a financial edge in disseminating campaign propaganda and are also working to mobilize voters with old-school patronage tactics, such as distributing food and gifts to voters, which continued illegally during the two-day voting process. And while a number of civil parties suspended their campaign activities for nearly a week during the clashes in Tahrir Square, Islamists continued campaigning at full-speed, announcing that they would participate in elections despite the unstable security situation.While Islamist parties have been campaigning aggressively, civil and liberal parties are expressing concerns that the SCAF may be unable and unwilling to administer fair elections. This week, eleven human rights organizations issued a report documenting a range of human rights violations under military rule, confirming that the SCAF is replicating many of the same repressive methods used by the former regime, such as using the media to smear activists and human rights groups while exaggerating the threat of Islamic fundamentalists as a "scare crow" and only alternative to the authoritarian status quo. This "us-or-them" tactic is the same strategy used by Mubarak to retain the support of the U.S. government and resist calls for reform.The authority of the elected parliament and its role in forming a new government could induce serious political conflict. Confident that its candidates will dominate today's elections, the Brotherhood is already maneuvering to shape the scope of the next parliament's powers. Brotherhood spokesman Mahmud Ghozlan said on November 27 that the ruling military council "must task the party which gains the biggest number of seats to form the next government."The SCAF, however, clearly envisions a more limited mandate for the parliament. SCAF member Mamdouh Shahin recently stated that the next People's Assembly will not have the power to form a government or cast a vote of no confidence, noting that the interim constitution issued in March transferred all executive authority - including the power to appoint and dismiss the cabinet - to the interim military leadership. Following the collective resignation of the Cabinet last week, Mohamed ElBaradei called for the formation of a "national salvation government" and offered to lead it, the SCAF rejected his proposal and instead appointed Kamal Ganzouri, a former official in Mubarak's government, as the new prime minister.Despite signs that the SCAF is intent on limiting the powers of the next parliament, voters are still lining up by the thousands to cast their ballots. The dense crowds outside of polling stations are proof that Egyptians are fiercely committed to participating in the political process after nearly six decades of dictatorship, during which the public largely abandoned formal politics out of frustration with the lack of democratic reform.

Fighting for Seats in a Powerless Parliament

Egyptians have been patiently waiting since the early hours of the morning to cast their ballots on the second day of voting for the parliamentary elections, unfazed by the long lines even though their faces reflect their exhaustion with the deteriorating economic situation and continued political instability.But not all Egyptians attribute such importance to the election. Protesters in Tahrir Square, now entering the eleventh day of their sit-in, are watching the process skeptically, uncertain that elections will help fulfill their core demands: an end to the SCAF's military rule and the formation of a civilian "salvation" government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the other Islamist parties - more organized than their liberal and leftist counterparts - are happy to see elections proceed on time, confident that they will dominate the next parliament and eager to define the rules of the new system on their own terms.But it is clear from observing the first day of polling that there is a strong desire for elections to succeed, on the part of the Egyptian people as well as the SCAF, whose legitimacy has been severely undermined by the latest clashes in Tahrir Square. Renewed confrontation between the people and the regime is starting to look like the second wave of the revolution that started last January, and is now continuing alongside the electoral process.Clashes between demonstrators and the military and security forces subsided noticeably on the eve of elections, with both sides showing restraint in the interest of allowing elections to proceed smoothly. However, the relative lull in protests may be short-lived. Elections could escalate the antagonism and mutual distrust between the SCAF and the major political forces. If the SCAF succeeds in administering reasonably free and fair elections, the result would be to support the military's preferred transitional scenario, which would allow the SCAF to remain in power until presidential elections in June 2012.Looking at the breakdown of candidates competing for the 168 People's Assembly seats that will be contested in the first stage of elections, Islamist parties clearly have a numerical edge over most of their liberal and leftist competitors. Among the 36 parties and coalitions competing in the elections, 7 parties account for 50 percent of the total candidates. Of these 7 parties the three with the most candidates are all Islamist: the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), with 135 candidates; 2) al-Wasat, with 112 candidates; 3) and the Salafi Nour Party, with 108 candidates.In addition to the proportional strength of the Islamist parties in terms of their share of the candidate pool, the well-funded Islamists have a financial edge in disseminating campaign propaganda and are also working to mobilize voters with old-school patronage tactics, such as distributing food and gifts to voters, which continued illegally during the two-day voting process. And while a number of civil parties suspended their campaign activities for nearly a week during the clashes in Tahrir Square, Islamists continued campaigning at full-speed, announcing that they would participate in elections despite the unstable security situation.While Islamist parties have been campaigning aggressively, civil and liberal parties are expressing concerns that the SCAF may be unable and unwilling to administer fair elections. This week, eleven human rights organizations issued a report documenting a range of human rights violations under military rule, confirming that the SCAF is replicating many of the same repressive methods used by the former regime, such as using the media to smear activists and human rights groups while exaggerating the threat of Islamic fundamentalists as a "scare crow" and only alternative to the authoritarian status quo. This "us-or-them" tactic is the same strategy used by Mubarak to retain the support of the U.S. government and resist calls for reform.The authority of the elected parliament and its role in forming a new government could induce serious political conflict. Confident that its candidates will dominate today's elections, the Brotherhood is already maneuvering to shape the scope of the next parliament's powers. Brotherhood spokesman Mahmud Ghozlan said on November 27 that the ruling military council "must task the party which gains the biggest number of seats to form the next government."The SCAF, however, clearly envisions a more limited mandate for the parliament. SCAF member Mamdouh Shahin recently stated that the next People's Assembly will not have the power to form a government or cast a vote of no confidence, noting that the interim constitution issued in March transferred all executive authority - including the power to appoint and dismiss the cabinet - to the interim military leadership. Following the collective resignation of the Cabinet last week, Mohamed ElBaradei called for the formation of a "national salvation government" and offered to lead it, the SCAF rejected his proposal and instead appointed Kamal Ganzouri, a former official in Mubarak's government, as the new prime minister.Despite signs that the SCAF is intent on limiting the powers of the next parliament, voters are still lining up by the thousands to cast their ballots. The dense crowds outside of polling stations are proof that Egyptians are fiercely committed to participating in the political process after nearly six decades of dictatorship, during which the public largely abandoned formal politics out of frustration with the lack of democratic reform.