الأقباط يختارون البابا وسط العاصفة

مجدي سمعان
Egypt Source
لا تكاد تمر عظة بالكنائس القبطية دون أن يتخللها دعاء أو كلمات تعكس حالة القلق
القبطي مما تحمله موجات التغيير التي تجتاح البلاد. جاء رحيل البابا شنودة الثالث،
بطريرك الكنيسة القبطية الأرثوذكسية يوم 17 مارس الماضي عن عمر يناهز 88 عاما ،
ليزيد حالة القلق مما يحمله المستقبل لحوالي 10 مليون قبطي، إلا أنه قد يدفع إلى
بحث الأقباط عن زعامة مدنية تحل محل البابا في ظل عدم طرح أسماء لخلافة البابا
تحظى بنفس شعبيته.

كانت الحشود الهائلة والحزن الكبير انعكاسا لحالة القلق هذه على رحيل رجل مثل الأقباط
لنحو 40 عاما اعتلاها على كرسي الاسكندرية شهدت خلالها البلاد مد طائفي متزايد،
عانى خلاله الأقباط من التهميش والعنف الذي طال الأرواح والممتلكات. وبالرغم من
مواقفه التي كانت تميل إلى تأييد النظام الديكتاتوري في مصر إلا أن الأقباط كانوا
يرون في البابا حصن أمان في وقت العواصف.

مصدر قلق الأقباط يأتي من تزايد نفوذ الإسلاميين الذين يسعون للسيطرة على بقية السلطات
بعدما سيطروا على البرلمان، وبالرغم من أن مواقف الإسلاميين تمثل مصدر قلق بين
الأقباط مثل حديثهم عن إعمال بعض نصوص الشريعة الإسلامية فإن جماعة الإخوان
المسلمين وحزب الحرية والعدالة الذراع السياسي لها يسعون إلى طمئنت الأقباط، من
خلال اللقاءات والحوار بين ممثلي الطوائف الدينية القبطية وبين قيادة الجماعة.

خلال زيارته العلاجية الأخيرة للولايات المتحدة علم البابا شنودة من أطبائه أن حالته
الصحية قد وصلت إلى مرحلة ميئوس منها، فآثر العودة إلى أرض الوطن عالما أنه لم يتبقى له على الأرض
سوى أيام معدودات.
لم ينتظر البابا شنودة حتى عودته لتحديد موعد للقاء مرشد جماعة الأخوان الإخوان
المسلمين الدكتور محمد بديع، وهو اللقاء الذي ألح في طلبه المرشد لعام كامل وماطل
البابا في الاستجابة له. التقي الرجلان يوم 7 فبراير الماضي قبل رحيل البابا ب 40 يوما في لقاء غلب عليه
المجاملات دون الخوض في أحاديث سياسية نظرا لذهاب المرشد للسؤال عن صحة البابا. قد
تكون مبادرة البابا بتحديد موعد على عجل في اللقاء المؤجل مرجعه خشية البابا من
تبعات رحيله دون كسر الجليد ومد جسور الحوار مع الجماعة التي يعتقد أنها ستهيمن
على الأوضاع السياسية في البلاد.
بعث اللقاء برسالة إلى الأقباط مفادها أن عليهم أن يتعاملوا مع الأمر الواقع، لمحاولة
تقليل الخسائر التي قد تطولهم، لكن مع ذلك فحالة القلق القبطي تتزايد يوما بعد
يوم، فالتطيمنيات التي يبعثها الإسلاميين لا يصاحبها ضمانات حقيقية.
تزامن لقاء البابا بالمرشد بلقاءات أخرى عقدتها المرشد مع رؤساء الطوائف المسيحية
القبطية الأخرى، حيث ألتقى بقيادة الطائفة الإنجيلية والكاثوليكية. قيادات هذه
الطوائف المسيحية يبدو أنها سلمت بالأمر الواقع بعد الهزيمة التي نالتها التيارات
السياسية المدنية التي وقفت الكنيسة خلفها في الانتخابات البرلمانية التي حصل فيها
الإخوان والسلفيين على أكثر من 70% من مقاعد مجلس الشعب، وبات واضحا للكنيسة أن
الأحزاب المدنية التي راهنت عليها لم تكن حصانا رابحا، فراحت تتفاوض كارهة مع
التيار الإسلامي الذي يسيطر على عملية صياغة الدستور من خلال أغلبيته في مجلس
الشعب ويسعي لتوسيع سلطاته من خلال إعلان جماعة الإخوان المسلمين أنها ربما تغير
موقفها الذي أعلنت عنه سابقا من أنها لن تنافس على منصب الرئاسة.
ففي نفس الشهر الذي بدأت فيه لجنة الانتخابات الرئاسية في فتح باب الترشيح لأعلى منصب
سياسي في البلاد، تجري اجراءات موازية لانتخاب قائد جديد للكنيسة القبطية
الأرثوذكسية.
البابا شنودة لم يكن مضطرا للتعامل المباشر مع الإخوان المسلمين ورفض مقابلتهم أثناء حكم مبارك وكان تبريره أنهم
جماعة محظورة. لكن البابا الجديد سيكون عليه التعامل مع تلك التيارات، وفي نفس
الوقت مع جيل جديد من الناشطين السياسين الأقباط قاد الاحتجاجات القبطية ضد الانتهاكات التي تعرض
لها الأقباط عقب الانتفاضة. كانت قوة تأثير البابا شنودة وشعبيته تحد من نفوذ
هؤلاء الناشطين المدنين على الأقباط، وفي ظل عدم طرح مرشحين يحظون بشعبية بين
الأقباط حتى الأن فإن الحركة القبطية المدنية مرشحة للتنامي على حساب دور الكنيسة
المعتاد كممثل سياسي للأقباط، وما كان يقبله الأقباط من البابا شنودة من مواقف
سياسية قد لا يقبلونه من البابا الجديد.
لكن حشود الأقباط الضخمة التي أحاطت بالكاتدرائية المرقسية لثلاثة أيام متوالية أثناء
إلقاء نظرة الوداع الأخيرة على البابا تبعث أيضا برسالة أن الأقباط القلون يمكن أن
يمثلوا كتلة سياسية يصعب تجاهلها، ويمكن أن يتعاظم دورهم في حالة ظهور زعيم سياسي
مدني يوظف تلك الطاقات التي تزاحمت حول البابا لصالح ضمان تحول مصر لدولة مدنية ضد
مشروع الدولة الدينية.

Pope Shenouda's Departure Raises Copts' Anxiety

By Magdy Samaan

Egypt Source

As liberal and minority groups voice concerns about the composition of an Islamist-dominated constituent assembly that will draft Egypt's next constitution, hardly a sermon goes by at Coptic churches without references to rising fears among Egypt's ten million Christians over the changes sweeping the country. The death of Pope Shenouda III, patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church, on March 17 has only heightened anxieties over the rights and status of religious minorities in the post-Mubarak Egypt.The departure of a spirtual leader who represented the Coptic community for the past forty years marks the end of an era and the dawn of uncertainty. During Shenouda's lifetime, Egypt witnessed rising sectarianism that resulted in the marginalization of Coptic Christians and occassional violence claiming lives and destroying property. In spite of Shenouda’s political stance, viewed as loyal to the Mubarak regime, many Copts saw the Pope as a safe harbor in a storm.Coptic fears currently revolve around the rising influence of Islamists who are seeking to dominate the political process and dictate the future legal framework after gaining control of parliament. Despite concerns that Islamists may seek to strengthen the role of Islamic law in the new constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party have repeatedly reassured Copts and supported inter-religious dialogue between Muslim and Christian leaders. One of Pope Shenouda's last gestures was to engage in this dialogue process. During his last visit to the United States for medical treatment, Pope Shenouda was informed that his illness was terminal. Shenouda made arrangements to return to Egypt but he did not wait until his arrival to arrange a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie -- a meeting Badie had requested a year earlier, but which the Pope had been unwilling to accept until his final days. The two men met on February 7, forty days before the Pope’s death. Their conversation consisted mostly of pleasantries and did not broach controversial political topics in light of Shenouda's deterioriating health. One might attribute the Pope's eagerness to set a date for the long-delayed meeting to his fear of leaving the Coptic community leaderless without having built bridges of dialogue with the group that is expected to dominate Egypt's political scene for the foreseeable future. The meeting sent a message to Christians that they will need to engage in realpolitik and work with the Islamist majority to prevent further marginalization. But Coptic fears grow day by day as the Islamists' promises to support tolerance and inclusiveness are not accompanied by any solid guarantees. The Supreme Guide’s meeting with the Pope coincided with meetings he held with the heads of other Coptic Christian groups, including leaders of the Anglican and the Catholic communities. Even before Christian-backed secular political forces were soundly defeated in parliamentary elections that delivered more than 70 percent of parliamentary seats to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, Christian leaders seemed to accept an Islamist victory as a fait accomplit. As it became clear to the Church that the secular parties on which it placed its bets were not the winning horses, Christian leaders began reluctantly negotiating with the Islamist parties that would control the constitutional drafting process through its majority in the parliament. At a time when Copts are negotiating for their rights from a position of unprecedented weakness, the Christian community is adrift without leadership. In the same month that the High Presidential Election Commission opened the door for nominations for the presidential election, parallel procedures are underway to elect a new leader of the Coptic Church. Pope Shenouda did not have to deal directly with the Muslim Brotherhood during Mubarak's rule, using its status as a banned group to justify his refusal to meet with Islamists. But the new pope will have to deal with these political forces, in addition to a new generation of politically conscious Coptic Christian activists who led anti-government protests and spoke out against hate crimes and sectarian violence during the uprising. The strength of Pope Shenouda’s impact and popularity once limited the influence of activists who criticized the Church's alignment with the regime, but without a strong leader the strength of this grassroots movement is likely to increase beyond the confines of the official religious establishment. In addition, the regime-friendly policies that Copts tolerated under Pope Shenouda may no longer be tenable under a new leader. The huge crowds of Copts surrounding the Cathedral of St. Mark for three consecutive days for a farewell look at the departing Pope also sends the message that Christians represent a political constituency too vocal and significant to be sidelined. Their role and influence could also increase with the emergence of a civil political leader capable of rallying Copts around the principle of a civil state rather than a religious one.

Fulul”: blunting the blade"

[Transit] Egypt. Magdy Samaan sheds some insight on “fulul”, as the remnants of the old regime are called.

The literal meaning of the Arabic verb falla is ‘to nick the blade of a sword and make it jagged’ or ‘to blunt an object’. If a sword becomes jagged, it has fulul (notches). It has lost its edge and requires smoothening and sharpening. When the term is applied to a nation, it implies a defeated or a vanquished people. In the wake of the Egyptian revolution, the term ‘fulul’ has been used to indicate those loyal to the deposed Mubarak regime or those who benefitted from it. It is inaccurately being interpreted in Arabic, and also translated into English, as ‘remnants.’ The question is, have the cronies of the previous regime lost their power and become the proverbial blunted sword? This widespread, inaccurate understanding of the word fulul reflects the state of paralysis and conflict that is stripping the Egyptian revolution of its worth today. Most Egyptians now feel that allowing the army to assume command of this interregnum was a historic mistake, and that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) is no more than an extension of the previous regime. In other words, ‘remnants’, as the word is conventionally used. But the truth is that no chink has been made, no defeating blow delivered yet. After the first anniversary of the January 25th Revolution, the Egyptians find themselves governed by the same rules they presumed they had gotten rid of when the former president, Mubarak, stepped down. Bit by bit, the old faces and practices have re-emerged, to the point where the activists now find that they themselves might more accurately be termed the fulul – notches – and that it is the revolution, the sword in the analogy, that has been blunted and discredited. The popular intifada against Mubarak’s rule initially came with the blessing of the military, which saw in the uprising an opportunity to rid themselves of a source of irritation: the hereditary succession of power. Although the military establishment, the solid core of the previous regime, initially assured the revolutionaries that they would relinquish power to civilian forces, in the following months it did an about-face which has preserved the old balance of power and its beneficiaries and restored military control. The SCAF deliberately utilized the security vacuum, and the dire economic situation, to make a play for the ordinary citizen and intimate that the revolution was responsible for these problems.In the last three months, the military establishment made its antagonism towards the revolution and its instigators clear. Accusations resurfaced, familiar from the first days of the uprising: that Tahrir Square does not represent Egypt, and that activists are funded by foreign sources bent on wreaking havoc, and so on. Following the revolution, efforts to expunge the fulul from the government was limited to former ruling members of the National Democratic Party (NDP), personalities related to the former president and, more specifically, those who were implicated in the agenda for the hereditary succession of power. The SCAF attempted to delude the revolutionaries into believing that the regime had fallen, by putting select representatives of the old regime to trial, while simultaneously re-introducing ‘pre-succession-agenda’ regime figures. One year after the uprising, it appears that the regime the revolution sought to overthrow runs wider than the term fulul implies.In the thirty years that Mubarak held the reins of power, this network continued along the same lines set during the Nasser and Sadat eras – a system of patronage and loyalty won out over direct rule by the military establishment. But in the final decade of Mubarak’s rule, an unexpected change occurred: Mubarak himself decided to upend the system, giving rise to the notion that his son might assume power after him. This prompted the ascent of new beneficiaries professing loyalty to the heir apparent, and triggered resentment towards the ‘old guard’, foremost the military establishment. An unspoken power struggle ensued between the two camps. Mubarak’s civilian heir was a feckless and unconvincing candidate, particularly in the eyes of the military. The ‘old guard’ questioned the share of the political pie accorded to these ‘upstarts’ – most of whom were businessmen – and disputed their administerial competence, which was embodied in the person of Ahmed Ezz, former Secretary of Organizational Affairs for the NDP. In ‘old guard’ circles, the resentment grew. In the twilight years of his rule, Mubarak’s age stunted his capabilities. His son was stunted from the outset by having failed to convince anyone of his capacity to lead. The so-called fulul, however, have yet to be stunted in any way. They continue to resist change, and it is they who retain real power and who enjoy the support of the regional forces, who view democratic change in Egypt as a worrisome threat to their own retention of control. Be that as it may, the persistence and courage demonstrated by the youth of Tahrir in recent confrontations could yet turn the tables.

الصفقات غير المكتوبة للانتخابات الرئاسية المصرية

مجدي سمعان

EgyptSource

 

المتابع للانتخابات الرئاسية المصرية يكتشف أن هناك صفقات غير مكتوبة يلتزم بها أطراف

اللعبة السياسية، وأهمها عدم انتماء المرشحين الرئاسيين البارزين لأحزاب سياسية، وإجماع

الأحزاب الإسلامية على عدم الدفع بمرشح إسلامي لحكم البلاد. كما يسود اعتقاد بأن

المرشح الذي سيكون له الحظ الأوفر في الفوز بالانتخابات تجري بشأنه مفاوضات في

الغرف الخلفية مع المجلس العسكري.

هذه الصفقات تبدو أنها نتيجة تفاهمات جرت بين الأطراف السياسية في مصر. الإسلاميون راضون

بما حصلوا عليه في الانتخابات البرلمانية من أغلبية برلمانية تمكنهم من الهيمنة على وضع الدستور، والحفاظ على سيطرتهم على المجتمع، ومقاسمة الرئيس المدني السلطة من خلال الأغلبية البرلمانية. لكن الأمر الذي يدعو للريبة هو انسحاب الأحزاب العلمانية من المنافسة واكتفائها بإعلان تأييدها لأحد المرشحيين المستقلين.

 

المرشحون البارزون في الانتخابات لا ينتمون تنظميا إلى أحزاب، وهم يعتمدون في حملاتهم الانتخابية وبرامجهم على مجهوداتهم الشخصية، وهو الذي سيجعلهم في موقف ضعيف، وهو ما سيسهل عملية الضغط عليهم، خاصة من قبل مؤسسات متجذرة مثل المؤسسة العسكرية المهيمنة على الأوضاع في البلاد وجماعة الإخوان المسلمين.

لا تدور المنافسة والمفاضلة بين المرشحين على أساس البرنامج الانتخابي في الأساس،

وأنما ستكون على أساس الانتماء السياسي وخاصة بين فريقين أساسيين، الأول هو الفريق

الذي يمثل الثورة، والثاني هو الفريق الذي يمثل النظام الحاكم، الذي يحاول أن

يحافظ على توزنات القوى محليا وإقليميا بتغيرات طفيفة عن عصر مبارك، أما المرشحون

الذين يعبرون بدرجات متفاونة عن التوجهات الثورية فأولئك الذين ينطوي توجهاتهم على

إحداث تغيرات أكبر في البينة السياسية المصرية وتوازونات القوى المحلية والأقليمية.

 

واللافت إنه من بين المرشحين الذين يدعون تمثيلهم للتيار الثوري لا يوجد مرشح واحد ليبرالي

بارز بعد انسحاب الدكتور محمد البرادعي، المدير السابق للمنظمة الدولية للطاقة

الذرية، كما لا يوجد مرشح يحظى بإجماع التيارات الثورية، بخلاف أنهم أقل راديكالية

من البرادعي في التغيير.

ويغلب الطابع الأيدلوجي على هؤلاء المرشحين فمنهم ثلاثة ينتمون للتيار الإسلامي هم: عبد

المنعم أبو الفتوح الذي انشق عن جماعة الإخوان المسلمين عقب الثورة ليعلن ترشحه

للرئاسة، وهو يمثل الجناح الإسلامي المعتدل داخل الإخوان المسلمين، والثاني، حازم

صلاح أبو اسماعيل، وهو ينتمي للتيار السلفي المحافظ، لكنه في الوقت ذاته يتبنى

توجها ثوريا، والثالث المفكر الإسلامي محمد سليم العوا، الذي يتبنى تفسيرا وسطيا

للإسلام، ولكن تثار حول علاقته بالمجلس العسكري علامات استفهام، حيث كان من

المدافعين عن مواقف المجلس العسكري خلال العام الماضي.

أما ما يسمي بالتيارات المدنية فيمثلها ثلاثة مرشحين بارزين حتى الآن، هم حمدين صباحي،

وهو ينتمي إلى التيار الناصري، والمستشار هشام البسطاويسي، وهو ليبرالي ذو نزعة

ناصرية، والثالث هو المحامي والناشط العمالي خالد علي، وهو يساري ناصري أيضا.

في حين أن المرشحين المنتمين للنظام، أمثال منصور حسن، وزير الثقافة والأعلام في عهد السادات، وعمرو موسى، أمين عام جامعة الدول العربية السابق، وأحمد شفيق، آخر رؤساء وزراء عهد مبارك، لا يمثلون تيارات أيدلوجية بعينها.

أما حزب الحرية والعدالة، الذراع السياسي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين فيجد صعوبة في

الإستقرار على المرشح الذي يدعمه، في ظل التزامه بعدم دعم مرشح اسلامي، في نفس

الوقت الذي يحظى فيه عبد المنعم أبو الفتوح بشعبية كبيرة بين قواعد الجماعة، فقد

أثارت التسريبات عن نية الحزب دعم منصور حسن، الذي يبدو للكثيرين أنه المرشح

التوافقي الذي يحظي بدعم العسكر، غضب قواعد الإخوان، وهو ما جعل الإخوان يجرون

اتصالات بالمستشار حسام الغرياني، رئيس المجلس الأعلى للقضاء، والذي كان أحد رموز

تيار استقلال القضاء في عهد مبارك، والذي يعرف بتوجهه الإسلامي، لأقناعه بالترشح

للمنصب وهو الأمر الذي لم يحسمه الغرياني بعد.

ويرى كثيرون أن فرص ما يحسبون على التيار الثوري في الفوز بالانتخابات قليلة ما لم ينضم

بعضهم للبعض، على أن يكون أحدهم رئيسا وينضم له اثنين كنواب، وقد جرى الحديث عن

ترشح أبو الفتوح رئيسا وانضمام حمدين صباحي وهشام البسطاويسي إليه كنواب، ولكن

النزعة الفردية تصعب تنفيذ مثل هذه المقترحات.

وذات الأمر بالنسبة لصفقات الرئاسة هناك اتصالات مكثفة تجري في الأبواب الخلفية للتوافق

على الدستور الذي بدأت اجراءات انتخاب اللجنة التأسيسية لوضعه، ويقود هذه التحركات

حزب الحرية و العدالة. وقد جرى ما يشبه الصفقة بين حزب الحرية والعدالة، وقيادات

الطوائف المسيحية في اجتماعات جرت بينهم، توافقوا خلالها على الإبقاء على المادة

الثانية من الدستور التي تنص على أن مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية هي المصدر الرئيسي

للتشريع في مقابل إضافة مادة تنص على أن "لغير المسلمين الحق في الرجوع لشرائعهم"

وهو اتفاق سيزيد قبضة المؤسسات الدينية على المجتمع، وقد يؤدي إلى تقليص الحريات،

خاصة مع تبني حزب النور السلفي ثاني أكبر الأحزاب تمثيلا في البرلماني توجها يقضي

بتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية وهو الأمر الذي يرفضه الإخوان الذين يرضون بالأبقاء على

نص المادة الثانية دون تغير.

 

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The Unwritten Deals of Egypt's Presidential Election

Observers of Egypt’s upcoming presidential election are quickly tuning into rumors of unwritten deals among various players in the political game. This behind-the-scenes bargaining is driving two key trends: 1) the fact that most presidential candidates are not affiliated with the leading political parties; and 2) consensus among Islamist forces against backing an Islamist candidate. There is also a growing conviction that the candidate with the best chance of winning the presidency is already being teed up in back-door negotiations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).These bargains are the result of mutual understandings between various political forces. The Islamists, satisfied by their victory in the parliamentary elections – which will enable them to dominate the constitution-writing process and maintain their control over society – would prefer to share political power with a civilian president while wielding a parliamentary majority. What is surprising and suspicious in this context is the failure of secular parties to put forward their own candidates in the competition, seemingly content to back independents. None of the major front-runners – including Mansour Hassan, Amr Moussa, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh – are affiliated with parties, and their campaigns are fueled by their personal efforts. Their lack of institutional backing will put them in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the state in the event of victory, and will make them vulnerable to pressure from the hegemonic military apparatus and the Muslim Brotherhood. The competition and negotiations between presidential candidates will revolve not around their electoral platforms, but around their affiliation with parties. The two main forces facing off in the election will be representatives of the revolution and those of the ruling regime, which is striviling to preserve a balance of power on the domestic and regional level that has remained virtually unchanged since the Mubarak era. The presidential candidates with revolutionary tendencies represent a threat to the political status quo because they are seeking to effect fundamental changes in Egypt’s political infrastructure and regional dynamics. Although a number of candidates claim to represent the revolutionary forces, no single liberal candidate has emerged on the scene since Mohamed ElBaradei’s withdrawal from the race, accusing the SCAF of governing as if the former regime had never fallen, and saying he could not trust the military to administer free and fair elections. So far, no candidate has been able to build consensus among revolutionary movements, and none of them are as radical in their demands for change as ElBaradei. The leading candidates have overwhelmingly ideological platforms, including the three leading Islamists: Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh (who split from the Muslim Brotherhood after the revolution and represents the group’s moderate wing), the Salafi candidate Hazem Saleh Abou Ismail, and the Islamist thinker Mohamed Selim al-Awaa, whose past statements of support for the SCAF have tarnished his credibility. The so-called “civil” political candidates are led by the Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi, Hisham Bastawisi (a liberal, pro-reform judge with socialist tendencies), and the activist lawyer Khaled Ali, also on the leftist end of the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the candidates associated with the current regime – head of the Advisory Council Mansour Hassan, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, and Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq – do not represent particular ideological currents, but rather, appear to be extensions of the political status quo. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, will find it difficult to settle on a candidate to support, in light of the group’s previous pledge to refrain from backing an Islamist. The FJP has postponed deciding on a nominee until after the close of the nomination period, only fueling speculation about its choice. Aboudl Moneim Aboul Fotouh is still popular within the Brotherhood’s ranks, while anonymous leaks have suggested that the group is leaning toward endorsing Mansour Hassan, viewed by many as a “consensus candidate” who enjoys the support of the military. Still others suggest that the Brotherhood is trying to convince Hossam Ghoriani, head of the Supreme Judiciary Council – one of the symbols judicial independence under Mubarak with known Islamist tendencies – to run for the presidency. Revolutionary forces have little hope of fielding a successful presidential candidate unless they join forces and coordinate. There is talk of rival “civil” candidates trying to buy each other out by promising deputy positions in exchange for withdrawal from the race. Some have suggested that Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh may try to co-opt his competitors by offering vice presidential appointments to Hamdeen Sabahi and Hisham Bastawisi, but the lack of cooperation will make such an arrangement difficult to implement. Bargaining among presidential candidates is playing out against the backdrop of negotiations over the next constitution. The Freedom and Justice Party is leading the controversial and polarizing process of defining procedures for the selection of a 100-member constituent assembly to draft the new charter. There are reports that the FJP has reached a deal with Christian leaders to preserve the existing language of Article 2 – which defines Sharia as the principal source of legislation – in exchange for appending an additional clause granting “non-Muslims the right to refer to their own religious laws.” This deal will only strengthen the hand of religious institutions in Egypt’s political system, and could infringe on the rights of minorities, particularly in light of the Salafi Nour Party’s significant representation in parliament. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis have rejected proposals to preserve the current formulation of Article 2, and may seek to strengthen the role of religion in public life. But Egypt’s future legal framework will depend to a large extent on how the next president will implement and interpret the constitution, and the current negotiations between candidates and parties could determine will likely determine who wins the keys to the executive branch.

Cairo's Undercover Strongman

Meet Murad Muwafi, the most important man in Egypt you've never heard of.

By Magdy Samaan 

Foreign Policy– Democracy Lab, February 3, 2012

CAIRO -- When Hosni Mubarak fell from power in February 2011, many elements of his regime remained in place -- at least at first. In the year since then, the Egyptian army, the police, and the business elite have struggled to cope with the tide of revolutionary change washing over the Arab world’s most populous country.

Not one of these institutions has made it through the process entirely intact. The deeply unpopular national police force has seen its authority relentlessly eroded by protestors and the press. Mubarak-era crony capitalists have landed in jail, their old deals under fire from rivals or

the courts. And the military, which has ruled the country in the guise of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has become the focus of popular anger as it struggles to maintain its control. Now the Muslim Brotherhood, which has ridden recent electoral victories to a dominant position in the new parliament, is set to advance its own agenda, thus adding a fresh element of unpredictability to the struggle for power.

Yet one pillar of the old regime has survived the turmoil with its authority intact -- if not expanded. It is the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID), the country’s most powerful intelligence agency. As the elderly generals of the SCAF have only fanned the flames of discontent with their clumsy maneuverings in recent months, the GID, which reigns supreme among Egypt’s competing security services, has gradually emerged as something like the brain trust of the leadership. Unlike the ruling generals, its officers act outside of the limelight, their workings largely obscure to the media and the public.

Its role has enabled the GID (commonly known in Arabic as the Mukhabarat) to capitalize on the uncertainty that plagues other reigning institutions. As a result, the man who runs it -- an inscrutable 61-year-old by the name of Murad Muwafi -- is now poised to assume a key role in the next phase of high-level intrigue.

It is understandable that historians of revolution tend to focus on the revolutionaries, the drivers of change. Yet every political upheaval also spawns its share of Muwafi-like figures, the backroom operators who use their command of bureaucratic intrigue to make the leap from the old regime to the new. To be sure, the Egyptian spymaster is no Talleyrand.

In contrast with that shrewd defender of monarchy who went on to side with the French Revolution and ultimately served as Napoleon’s foreign minister, Muwafi is no silky intellectual. His rare appearances on Egyptian TV, for example, have tended to highlight his less-than-perfect command of Arabic -- befitting a long-time military officer who has risen through the ranks by virtue of a prodigious memory and a shrewd understanding of the realities of power. Yet there is no question that his long years as political troubleshooter have uniquely equipped him to maneuver through Egypt’s turbulent transition.

When, for example, the leaders of the military decided it was time to talk with human rights activists last fall, it was Muwafi who represented the SCAF at the meeting. One factor may have been his ample experience as Egypt’s chief mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. And when the SCAF dispatched emissaries to Washington last year, Muwafi figured in that delegation, too. (He even had his own privateaudiencewith Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.) U.S.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made a point of including Muwafi among his interlocutors when he visited Egypt in the fall -- right after a sessionof cheesecake and bowling with SCAF supremo Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. And perhaps most revealingly of all, it was Muwafi -- rather than Tantawi or the Egyptian foreign minister – to whom Israeli Prime

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu turned when a mob stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September.

Yet no one should make the mistake of assuming that the GID’s work is restricted to lofty strategic issues. Muwafi’s agency is uniquely equipped to navigate the everyday details of domestic politics by virtue of its position as the country’s top domestic security agency. To this day, no one can get

a job in Egypt’s vast public bureaucracy without being vetted by the secret police -- and the GID has full access to the files, along with its lower-ranking sister agency, the State Security Service (rebranded in March last year as the “National Security Force"). Decades of tracking, interrogating, and blackmailing dissidents give the GID vast leverage over Egypt’s new generation of politicians.

Given its past involvement in matters that hardly fit the traditional Western definition of national security (such as management of the government crisis response during Nile flooding), the spy agency almost certainly has extensive knowledge of Egypt’s economic affairs as well.

“Events since the fall of Mubarak demonstrate that SCAF’s plans to control

Egyptian society were actually dominated by State Security and the GID, which served as the eyes and the memory of the regime,”wrote political analyst Amin Al-Mahdi in a column last year. Former army officer Ahmed Ezzat, who started a Facebook page that tracked allegations of corruption among Egypt’s military establishment, claims that the GID has used its budget funds to start private companies whose profits benefit high-ranking officers of the intelligence service. What’s more, says Ezzat, GID companies have no-bid access to government contracts. “The GID is a state within the state,” he writes.“There is no professional, financial, or legal oversight of its operations.”

Muwafi’s background remains something of a mystery. But what is clear is that he would not be where he is without Omar Suleiman, his predecessor as Egypt’s chief spymaster. During his 18-year reign as head of the GID starting in 1993, Suleiman, one of Mubarak’s key confidants, vastly extended the agency’s reach, broadening its more traditional intelligence portfolio to include sensitive national security issues ranging from relations with Iran and Israel to monitoring the Islamist opposition. At the same time, however, the GID continued to involve itself in the minutia of everyday Egyptian life. GID operatives have been known to intervene in a sectarian conflict involving a Coptic Christian priest, or to arbitrate a labor dispute between managers of a textile factory and their dismissed employees. Cairo human rights lawyer Ahmed Seif El-Islam Hamad recounts a case when sociologists at a provincial university decided to conduct a survey on young

people’s attitudes towards sex. Unsettled by the potentially sensitive nature

of the study, a dean at the university called in a local GID officer for advice.

Muwafi’s talents made him a perfect fit for the peculiarly Egyptian national security establishment. Beginning his career as an army officer, he gradually rose to the head of Egyptian military intelligence. (A rare Arabic-language article on his career is shown herein a rough version provided by Google Translate.) That background served him well when he took on a job as governor of the strategically sensitive Northern Sinai District in 2010. Though he was able to take some credit for improving security in the

border zone, he later came under fire for describing the area’s itinerant

Bedouin tribes as “criminals” who earned profits from their smuggling business with Gaza.

In January 2011, Mubarak promoted Suleiman to the vice presidency in a desperate bid to bolster the foundering regime. But Suleiman, like his boss, failed to live up to the task, and he resigned soon after the dictator’s ouster. Meanwhile, State Security found itself facing the indignities of popular discontent. In early March, a mob attacked its offices in Cairo, seizing files documenting persecution of the government’s opponents. But unlike the seemingly comparable storming of Stasi headquarters in

East Berlin in January 1990, this event didn’t mark the end of Egypt’s internal security services. If anything, it ended up shifting even more power

to the elite GID, which, as part of the military establishment, maintains its

most sensitive facilities on inaccessible army bases, out of the reach of the

turmoil on the streets.

Muwafi, in any event, has only continued to thrive in the post-Mubarak era. Last spring he was one of the first Egyptian officials contacted by the U.S.

after it emerged that the SCAF had freed the brother of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri from jail as part of an amnesty for political prisoners. The brother, Muhamad al-Zawahiri, was re-arrested just a few days later. Around the same time Muwafi was mediating in "unity talks" between Hamas and Fatah, as well as participating in discussions with Hamas about a possible move of its headquarters from Damascus to Cairo. (So far, at least, the move has not materialized.)

When Muwafi made an unprecedented trip to Syria last year in connection with those talks, the event was a source of considerable disquiett o both the Americans and the Israelis, who wondered whether Egypt was in the process of reorienting its policies away from the relatively pro-Israel line of the Mubarak era. Muwafi was also creditedwith helping to broker the prisoner exchange that freed Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit from Hamas captivity.

But Muwafi --though rarely figuring in Egyptian media coverage -- has continued to expand his domestic portfolio as well. As SCAF bosses continued to make misstep after misstep, it was Muwafi who engaged the regime’s opponents in two separate meetings in October 2011. Hamad, the human rights lawyer, who participated in one of the sessions, recalls Muwafi saying that he would report on the talks directly to Tantawi. The encounter was revealing for the insights it afforded into the Machiavellian mindset of the governing military elite. When some of the activists present suggested firing Prime Minister Esam Sharaf, at the time trying to negotiate a delicate course between the SCAF and the demands of protestors in the streets, Muwafi, according to Hamad, responded, “If we let him go now he will become a national hero.” And when the oppositionists demanded the government lift the state of emergency effective in the country since 1971, Muwafi declined on the grounds that “it will look like we succumbed to American pressure.”

There is scant indication that the GID or Egypt’s military rulers have changed their thinking in any substantial ways. Even today, many months after Mubarak’s downfall, activists tell of development projects that have been scotched by the intelligence service’s refusal to grant a “security approval.” It is widely rumored that the recent raids on 17 Egyptian and foreign NGOs, ostensibly triggered by funding irregularities, were based on reports supplied by the intelligence agency. “The SCAF places more trust in the intelligence service because it’s part of the military,” says Bahi El Din Hassan, head of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. “Reports from the Interior Ministry” --which controls the police -- “don’t enjoy the same sort of credibility.”

The dialogue Muwafi started with the activists did not continue. “It seems that the mission waslinked with its timing,” says Hassan. “That was a period when the SCAF was making lots of mistakes in its management of the transition period and criticism of its actions was rising.”It may be that the Muslim Brotherhood’s success at the polls has convinced the generals that they no longer need to take the secular opposition into account; many observers of the Egyptian political scene suspect that the SCAF and the Brotherhood may have already negotiated a covert power-sharing deal. But no matter what happens next, expecto see Murad Muwafi playing a pivotal role.

من هي "الفلول" الحقيقية في مصر ما بعد الثورة؟

مجدي سمعان12- يناير - 2012منتدى فكرة

يقال (فـَـلٌّ)، وتعني الثــَّلــْم فى السيف، والأصح أنه الثـَّـلـْمُ فى أى شىء كان، وسيفٌ أفـَلُّ، أى ذو فلول، أى فقد حدته، وصار يحتاج للصقل. وهم قوم فَلٌّ: منهزمون، والجمع فلول. استخدمت كلمة "فلول" عقب الثورة المصرية لتشير إلى حلفاء النظام السابق والمستفيدين منه، وتترجم إلى الإنجليزية ترجمة غير دقيقة بكلمة "بقايا" فهل فقد رجال النظام السابق قوتهم، وأصبحوا كالسيف الأفل؟ التعريف الخاطئ لكلمة فلول هو ما قاد إلى حالة الشلل والصراع التي تعتري الثورة المصرية الآن. يشعر المصريين أن قبول تولي الجيش إدارة المرحلة الانتقالية كان خطأ تاريخيا، وأن الجيش ما إلا جزء من النظام السابق، أو "فلول" بالتعريف الشائع للكلمة، لكنه لم يفل أو ينهزم بعد، فمع إقتراب الذكرى السنوية الأولى لثورة يناير يجد المصريين أنفسهم محكومون بنفس قواعد النظام الذي ظنوا أنهم أسقطوه بتنحي الرئيس السابق، ورويدا رويدا تعود الوجوه والممارسات القديمة ليجد الثوار أنفسهم هم "الفلول" بالتعريف الدقيق للكلمة، وأن الثورة قد فلت وأصابها الثلم. جاءت الانتفاضة الشعبية على حكم مبارك على هوى الجيش الذي رأي في ذلك فرصة للتخلص من مشروع التوريث الذي كان يزعجه. وبالرغم أن المؤسسة العسكرية، التي هي النواة الصلبة لنظام مبارك، سايرت الثوار في بداية الأمر ووعدت بتسليم السلطة للمدنيين، لكن ممارستها في الشهور التالية للثورة صبت في صالح محاولة إعادة السيطرة وتمرير سيناريو يحافظ على توازونات النظام القديم والمستفيدين منه. واستخدم تعمد غياب الأمن والحالة الإقتصادية الصعبة في الضغط على المواطن العادي والإيحاء بأن الثورة هي المسئولة عن ذلك. وخلال الشهور الثلاثة الأخيرة انكشف عداء المؤسسة العسكرية بشكل واضح للثورة والثوار حيث عادت الاتهامات لميدان التحرير كما كانت خلال أيام الثورة الأولى بأنه لا يمثل مصر، مع توجيه الاتهامات للنشطاء بأنهم مدفعون من جهات خارجية لتخريب البلاد. عقب الثورة اقتصر تحديد الفلول الذي يجب مطاردتهم بالأشخاص الذين كانوا مرتبطين بالرئيس السابق، وخاصة هؤلاء الذين كانوا متورطين في مشروع التوريث، وأعضاء الحزب الوطني. حاول المجلس العسكري إيهام الثوار بأن النظام قد سقط بتقديم رموز جناح التوريث في النظام للمحاكمة، لكنه في الوقت ذاته قام بتمكين شخصيات من نظام ما قبل مشروع التوريث. ومع قرب مرور عام على الثورة يتكشف أن النظام الذي نادت الثورة باسقاطه هو أوسع ممن أطلق عليهم كلمة فلول، فما هو هذا النظام؟ عقب انقلاب الجيش على الدولة المدنية في يوليو 1952، قام بتصفية الوكلاء الإجتماعيين، الذين فرزوا بشكل طبيعي عقب ثورة 1919 التي قادها التيار الليبرالي، وحيث أنه لم تكن هناك وسائل ديمقراطية لتمثيل المجتمع و لتقسيم النفوذ والثروة، اعتمد حكام يوليو على بناء شبكة علاقات جديدة تدين بالولاء لهم، وفي نفس الوقت تقوم بدور الوكلاء الإجتماعيين. خلال ثلاثين عاما من سيطرة الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك على مقاليد الحكم في مصر استمر في بناء شبكة من العلاقات على النمط الذي تم إرسائه خلال الحقبة الناصرية والسادتية. وكان نظام الولاء يصنع لحساب سيطرة المؤسسة العسكرية على الحكم. خلال العقد الأخير من حكم مبارك طرأ متغيرا جديدا على نظام صناعة الولاء، فقد قرر مبارك نفسه الإنقلاب على النظام الذي أرساه العسكر منذ يوليو، وذلك بتصعيد ابنه لتولي الحكم من بعده. أثار تصعيد مستفيدين جدد يدينون بالولاء للوريث سخط مؤسسات النظام القديمة وعلى رأسها المؤسسة العسكرية. حدث نوع من الصراع المكتوم على السلطة بين مؤسسات النظام القديمة وبين مؤسسات التوريث التي كانت تقوم بانقلاب منظم على النظام. لم يكن الوريث المدني مقنع، وخاصة للمؤسسة العسكرية، كما أن مشاركة الوافدين الجدد، وأغلبهم رجال أعمال، في كعكة المصالح، وفجاجة إدارتهم للبلاد، كما تجلى في نموذج أمين التنظيم في الحزب الوطني أحمد عز، جعل حالة السخط تنمو في أوساط المستفيدين القدامى من النظام. لعبت الأجهزة الأمنية الدور الرئيسي في صناعة ولاءات الوكلاء الإجتماعيين، واتبع أسلوبين في صناعة الوكلاء الإجتماعيين: الأول استقطاب الوكلاء الإجتماعيين الحقيقيين، وهم من يملكون نفوذ مالي أو عائلي أو موهبة تمكنهم من التأثير، واستخدامهم للسيطرة على الجمهور الذين يؤثرون فيه. وفي سبيل شراء الولاء كان النظام السابق يقدم لهؤلاء مصالح وفوائد وتنازلات لضمان استمرار ولائهم، ولضمان استمرار نفوذهم على من يمثلونهم، وأمثلة ذلك، رؤساء الطوائف الدينية، رؤساء العائلات الكبيرة، رجال الأعمال، المشاهير من الفنانين ولاعبي الكورة... ألخ. كان هؤلاء مستفدون من النظام، وشعروا بتهديد عقب الثورة، بعضهم حاول التأقلم مع الثورة والتلون بلونها، وغالبيتهم عملوا لإجهاض الثورة، كما حاولوا خلال أيام الثورة الأولى وفشلوا. كما فشلوا في أواخر عصر مبارك في القيام بالدور المرسوم لهم، فالمهة كانت صعبة لأن اللعبة كانت قذرة والوجهة غير مقنعة، علاوة على أن الفساد الناتج عن حكم مبارك، وتكلفة فساد صناعة الولاءات لمشروع التوريث، جعل الغضب الإجتماعي أقوى من السيطرة، وهو ما أدي إلى تفكك التوازنات. أما النمط الثاني فهو القيام بعملية صناعة واختراق منظمة للنخبة السياسية والمجتمع المدني بهدف سهولة السيطرة عليها. هذه النخبة، هي التي ركبت مطالب الثورة وادعت تمثيلها، ولأن معظمهم من هواة العمل السياسي فلم تستطيع صياغة كيان سياسي قوي، ولم تستطيع ملء فراغ المنتمين للنظام السابق أو الفلول، وعادوا تدريجيا لدور المعارضة الذي اعتادوا ممارسته. لقد فل مبارك في أواخر سنوات حكمه بسبب تقدمه في السن، كما كان ابنه فل لا يقنع أحد بقدرته على القيادة، لكن لم يفل بعد "الفلول" ولازالوا يقاومون التغيير وهم يملكون القوة الصلبة، إضافة إلى دعم إقليمي من دول ترى التغيير الديمقراطي في مصر خطرا يهددها، لكن الإصرار والشجاعة التي أظهر شباب التحرير في المواجهات الأخيرة قد تعيد الأمور إلى نصابها.

Who are the True "Fulul" of Post Revolution Egypt?

Magdy SamaanFikra Forum - January 12, 2012

The literal meaning of Arabic verb falla is ‘to nick a blade of a sword and make it jagged,’ or ‘to blunt an object.’ So if a sword, for instance, is made jagged, it has ‘fulul’ (notches), or it has lost its edge and requires smoothening and sharpening. When the term is applied to a nation, it implies a defeated or a vanquished people.In the wake of the Egyptian revolution, the term ‘fulul’ has been used to connote those loyal to the deposed Mubarak regime or those who benefitted from it, and has inaccurately been translated into English as ‘remnants.’ The question is, have the cronies of the previous regime lost their power and become the proverbial blunted sword?The mistaken rendering of the word fulul has in part led to the state of paralysis and the conflict that is stripping the Egyptian revolution of its worth today. Most Egyptians now feel that allowing the army to assume command of this interregnum was a historic mistake, and that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) represents no more than an extension of the previous regime, or ‘remnants,’ as the conventional translation of the word is used. But the truth is that no chink has been made, no defeating blow delivered yet. With the approach of the first anniversary of the January revolution, Egyptians find themselves governed by the same rules of the regime which they presumed they had gotten rid of when the former president stepped down. Bit by bit, the old faces and practices have reemerged, to the point where the activists now find that it is they themselves that might more accurately be termed the fulul (notches) and that the revolution, if it assumes the role of sword in the analogy, has been blunted and ultimately discredited.The popular intifada against Mubarak’s rule initially came with the blessing of the military, which saw in the uprising an opportunity to rid itself of a source of irritation, namely, the idea of hereditary succession of power. Although the military establishment – which otherwise represents the solid core of the previous regime – initially aided the revolutionaries and assured them that they would relinquish power to civilian forces, subsequently created in the months following an about-face scenario which would preserve the old balance of power and its beneficiaries and restore military control. The SCAF deliberately utilized the security vacuum and the dire economic situation to play on the ordinary citizen and intimate that the revolution was responsible for these. In the last three months, the military establishment has made its antagonism to the revolution and its instigators clearly known, with accusations resurfacing from the first days of the uprising that Tahrir Square does not represent Egypt and that activists are funded by outside sources bent on wreaking havoc, and so on.Following the revolution, the effort to expunge fulul from the government was limited to former ruling NDP party members, personalities related to the former president and, more specifically, those who may have been implicated in the agenda to allow for the hereditary succession of power. The SCAF attempted to delude the revolutionaries into believing that the regime had fallen by putting select representatives of this ‘succession wing’ of the old regime to trial, while simultaneously re-introducing ‘pre-succession’ regime figures.With nearly one year passed now since the uprising, it would appear that the regime which the revolution sought to overthrow is far broader than those implied by the term fulul. How, then, should we categorize the regime?Following the Free Officers’ revolt against civilian rule in 1952, the military sought a purge of social agents who had themselves been tapped by the proponents of the liberal trend which led the 1919 revolt, and which the Free Officers viewed as unrepresentative of society as a whole. The July officers sought to distribute wealth and influence more evenly and aimed to design a new social network, one founded on loyalty to them.In the thirty years that Mubarak held the reins of power, this network continued along the same lines set out during the Nasser and Sadat eras – a system of patronage and loyalty won out over direct rule by the military establishment. But in the final decade of Mubarak’s rule, an unexpected change occurred to the ‘loyalty’ model – Mubarak himself decided to upend the system that the July officers set out years ago, giving rise to the notion of his son assuming power after him. This prompted the ascension of new beneficiaries, professing loyalty to the heir apparent and triggered resentment towards the Old Guard, foremost among these the military establishment. An unspoken power struggle ensued between these two camps. The civilian heir was a feckless and unconvincing candidate, particularly in the eyes of the military. Similarly, the Old Guard questioned the share of the political pie accorded to these ‘new upstarts’ - most of whom were businessmen – and disputed their administerial competence, embodied in the person of Ahmed Ezz, former Secretary of Organizational Affairs for the NDP. In Old Guard circles, the resentment grew.Security services played an essential role in manufacturing the loyalties of key influencers, following one of two methods to produce these social agents: the first was to attract the wealthy, from prominent families, with a particular talent to inspire and use their status to control their respective constituencies. In order to buy loyalty, the old regime would offer benefits and concessions, assuring these individuals of continued influence over their spheres. Examples of this are numerous – heads of the various religious sects, heads of well-known families, businessmen, movie stars, soccer players, etc. Those who benefitted from this system perceived a kind of threat after the revolution. Some attempted to adapt to the revolution, to change their stripes to suit the revolution. Most, however, worked to curtail the revolution, as was tried in vain at the beginning of the uprising. These individuals found themselves in a similar spot throughout the final years of the Mubarak era, unable to carry out their designated roles, due to the great cost of the dirty game and the corruption stemming from the regime’s succession project. The people were no longer convinced, and societal anger had become greater than the regime could manage. This is what ultimately tipped the scales.The other model involves the creation – and infiltration - of something like a syndicate for the political elite and civil society, with a view to easily controlling that body. But this elite, which rode the demands of the revolution and claimed to represent it, ultimately lacks political savvy and the ability to construct a solid political base capable of filling the void left by those affiliated with the previous regime, and has gradually returned to its traditional role of ‘domesticated opposition.’In the twilight years of his rule, Mubarak’s age stunted his capabilities. His son was stunted from the outset by having failed to convince anyone of his capacity to lead. The so-called fulul¬, however, have yet to be stunted in any way. They continue to resist change, and it is they who retain real power and enjoy the support of regional forces which view democratic change in Egypt as a worrisome threat to their own retention of control. Be that as it may, the persistence and courage demonstrated by the youth of Tahrir in recent confrontations could yet turn the tables.

عندما تتحول الانتخابات الديمقراطية إلى انتخابات ثيوقراطية

مجدي سمعانAtlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East

قبل أن تذهب ماريان شكري من مدينة أولا صقر بمحافظة الشرقية بمصر للإدلاء بصوتها كان عليها أن تتصل برقم خاص للشركة المصرية للاتصالات (شركة حكومية) لمعرفة البيانات الانتخابية الخاص بها. رد عليها موظف "السويتش" وقبل أن يعطيها البيانات الانتخابية الخاصة بها فاجأها بالسؤال: "لمن ستدلي بصوتك؟" ردت عليها وهي متفاجئة: "لا أعلم بعد" فأجاب: "طبعا ستعطي صوتك لحزب النور" يحلو للكثيرين اغماض أعينهم عن التجاوزات الجسيمة التي شهدتها انتخابات مجلس الشعب المصري للقفز إلى نتيجة مفادها أن الانتخابات كانت "حرة ونزيهة" لكن من وجهة نظري فالانتخابات لم تكن كذلك، فالتعاطف والمساندة التي لاقتها الأحزاب الإسلامية لم تكن فقط من موظف "السويتش" بل أيضا من قضاة وموظفين من المشرفين على الانتخابات طبقا لكثير من تقارير متابعة الانتخابات، هذا التعاطف عززه من ناحية أخرى تغاضي اللجنة العليا المشرفة على الانتخابات عن خروقات جسيمة للقانون والدستور خلال العملية الانتخابية، وخاصة من جانب الأحزاب الإسلامية. من لم يتصل وذهب للجنة الانتخابية مباشرة، مثل كثير من البسطاء والأميين، كان بانتظارهم أمام اللجنة خيمة مجهزة بها شخص ينتمي لحزب الحرية العدالة الإخواني، يجلس خلف كمبيوتر ومعه البيانات الخاصة بالناخبين. بعد أن يقوم هذا الشخص بكتابة بيانات الناخب على ورقة دعائية عليها صورة مرشح حزب الحرية والعدالة يكتب له أسماء مرشحي الحزب ورمز القائمة، ووفي ظل تكدس استمارة الإقتراع بالأسماء لا يجد الناخب من يعرفه سوى هذا الشاب المبتسم، والذي سبق وأن قدم حزبه بعض السلع التموينية له، والورقة الاسترشادية التي في يده. وبالرغم من شكوى القوى السياسية من هذه الممارسة المخالفة لقانون الانتخابات الذي يحظر الدعاية الانتخابية في يوم الإقتراع، إلا أن الجنة العليا المشرفة على الانتخابات لم تتخذ أي إجراء على مدى الثلاث مراحل الانتخابية لوقفها. ومن ناحية أخرى كان السلفيون يستخدمون المساجد كمقار انتخابية، ليس هذا فقط، وإنما استخدمت دعاية دينية وطائفية هي محظورة بحكم الإعلان الدستوري وقانون الانتخابات، وأصبح الخيار كنتيجة لذلك هكذا: "انتخب الكتلة المصرية التابعة للنصارى بقيادة رجل الأعمال نجيب ساويرس، أو انتخب حزب النور أو الحرية والعدالة "لنصرة الإسلام" أو "لتدخل الجنة" ووصل الأمر إلى تكفير من ينتخب قائمة الكتلة أو يصوت للأحزاب الليبرالية. كما لم تسائل الحكومة الأحزاب الإسلامية على تخطي حملاتها الدعائية والانتخابية سقف الإنفاق المالي المسموح به، وعن مصدر هذه الأموال الهائلة التي كان لها الكلمة العليا في الإستعداد الجيد للانتخابات، كما تغاضت عن التحقيق الجاد في اتهامات من مصادر مختلفة عن تلقي هذه الأحزاب لأموال من دول الخليج. يأتي هذا في وقت يشن فيه المجلس العسكري حملة منظمة لتشويه صورة التيارات السياسية العلمانية والمجتمع المدني بإلصاق تهمة تلقي تمويلات أمريكية، بالرغم من أن هذه التمويلات تمر عبر قوانين منظمة وتشرف عليها الحكومة- ولا يقتصر الأمر على التشويه فقط بل واكبه استخدام مفرط للقوة في مواجهات سقط خلالها أكثر من 60 قتيلا من الناشطين السياسيين الشباب، الذين ناهضوا سياسات المجلس العسكري في توجيه العملية الانتقالية في اتجاه ينفي عنها كونها عملية ديمقراطية. بينما تغاضت السلطات الحاكمة بقيادة المجلس العسكري عن قيام مجموعات سلفية بالدعوة على موقع الفيس بوك لتأسيس هيئة بإسم "هيئة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر" على غرار السعودية، ولم تكتفي بالدعوة وإنما عرضت مكافأة مالية قدرها 500 جنيه شهريا لمن ينضم إليها، وأستوردت شحنة صواعق كهربائية، صادرتها السلطات من ميناء السويس لكن لم تفتح تحقيقا مع من استوردها، وقام بعض السلفيين بالفعل بالاحتكاك بالمواطنين لنهييهم عن "المنكر" تبادل الخدمات بين المجلس العسكري بدأ منذ وقت مبكر من المرحلة الانتقالية، فقد دعم الإسلاميون الإستفتاء على التعديلات الدستورية الذي فرض بمقتضاة المجلس العسكري سيناريو للمرحلة الانتقالية لازالت البلاد تعاني من تبعاته، ورد العسكر ذلك بمنح تراخيص للأحزاب الإسلامية بالمخالفة للدستور وقانون الانتخابات الذي يحظر انشاء أحزاب سياسية على أساس ديني، والآن يجني الإسلاميين ثمار سيناريو المرحلة الانتقالية الذي وضعه العسكر، ويسعون لاقناع القوى السياسية بضمان عدم محاسبة قادة الجيش على أفعالهم قبل وبعد الثورة. وتتجه التيارات الإسلامية إلى الفوز بنسبة ثلثي مقاعد البرلمان، وهو ما سيجعل لها الكلمة العليا في تقرير مسار العملية السياسية في مصر، وصياغة دستور ما بعد الثورة، وسيضع البلاد في مفترق طرق ما بين اندماج الإسلاميين في عملية سياسية ديمقراطية أو تحقيق حلم إقامة الدولة الإسلامية الذي سيفتح موجة ثانية من المواجهة ليس فقط مع المجلس العسكري ولكن مع أصحاب الأغلبية من الإسلاميين

When Democratic Elections Turn Theocratic

Magdy Samaan January 11, 2012Atlantic Council Rafiq Hariri Blog Egypt SourceBefore Marianne Shukri, a resident of Awlad Saqr in the Sharqiyya governorate of Egypt, could cast her vote, she had to call the state-run Egyptian Communications Company to determine the location of her polling station. The operator answered her call but before he would give her the information, Ms. Shukri was astonished by his inappropriate question, “Who will you vote for?” Surprised, she answered, “I’m not sure yet,” to which he replied, “Of course you’ll vote for the [Salafi] Nour party.”Many have turned a blind eye to the serious abuses witnessed during Egypt’s parliamentary elections and jump to the conclusion that the process was “free and fair.” From my point of view, however, they were not. The sympathy and support expressed for the Islamist parties came not only from the switchboard operator, but also from the judges and election workers according to many reports from those who have followed the elections. This sympathy, reinforced by the indifference of the High Election Commission (HEC) that monitors the elections, has led to serious breaches of the law and the constitution during the elections process, particularly on the part of Islamists.Those who did not call ahead and went directly to the election station, such as the poor and illiterate, found a tent in front of the station attended by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) who sat at a computer with voter information. After that person wrote the voters’ data on a campaign flyer with a picture of the FJP candidate on it, he would write the names of the FJP candidates and draw the logo for their list. Confronted with a massive ballot form full of names, the voters would find no one they knew but for the smiling face whose party had earlier offered its assistance and whose campaign flyer they held in their hand. Despite complaints from other political forces regarding this violation of the elections law that prohibits campaigning on the day of the vote, HEC monitors took no steps over the course of the three rounds of voting to stop it.On the other hand, the Salafists not only used mosques as elections headquarters, but also used sectarian and religious campaigning which was also prohibited by the constitutional declaration and the elections law. The end result was this: either vote for the Christian Egyptian Bloc headed by businessman Naguib Sawiris, or vote for the Nour Party or the FJP for the “glory of Islam” or “to get into heaven.” It reached the point where voting for the Bloc or the liberal parties was akin to apostasy. As a result 80 percent of the votes were cast along sectarian lines, according to the Nasar Human Rights Center, an Egyptian organization that monitored the elections.Neither did the government investigate the Islamist parties’ violation of the financial ceiling permitted for campaigning and advertising, nor did it question the source of the massive funding – much of it allegedly obtained from the Gulf monarchies -- that enabled them to prepare and campaign so effectively.This situation was compounded by the poor and at times chaotic administration of the elections process. Under Mubarak’s rule, elections results were commonly rigged by counting the votes of the deceased. One would hope that this practice would have been eliminated in the new Egypt, so it was shocking to discover that one candidate who died a week before start of parliamentary elections not only remained on the ballot, but amassed more than 4,000 votes in a Sharqiya district, prompting a court to order a re-run. One election worker told me that his colleague received money from the candidates in exchange for inflating their vote counts. Last Tuesday, several candidates held a press conference announcing that they had discovered 9 million surplus votes over the course of the three election rounds, due to voters casting multiple ballots. All this at a time when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is waging an organized smear campaign against secular revolutionary activists and civil society groups accusing them of illegally receiving American funding without the necessary government registration permits. This harassment campaign is not limited to defamation but has also included the use of excessive force in confrontations with protesters resulting in the deaths of at least 60 activists who have criticized the SCAF’s handling of the transition. While targeting liberal activists and democracy-promoting NGOs, the SCAF has turned a blind eye to Salafi propaganda including a new Facebook group called “The Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,” clearly inspired by Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi establishment, which offers a monthly stipend of LE 500 to the group’s members. The government also ignored an imported shipment of electric detonators confiscated by the authorities from the port of Suez and neglected to open an investigation into the source of the shipment. Fistfights and altercations have been reported between Salafis seeking to prevent “vice” and non-Islamist Egyptians.The alignment between the SCAF and the Islamists began early in the transitional period, when the Muslim Brotherhood strongly supported the referendum on the SCAF’s proposed constitutional amendments. The military seemed to reward the Islamists for their support by tolerating their violation of electoral regulations including the law forbidding the establishment of political parties based on religion. The Islamists are now reaping the fruits of the transitional roadmap developed by the military and are working to shield Egypt’s military leaders from accountability for their actions before and after the revolution.The Islamists are set to win two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, which could grant them the final say over the trajectory of Egypt’s transition. Their parliamentary majority will also enable Islamists exert significant influence over the drafting of the post-revolution constitution, which will need to address the integration of Islamists into a democratic political process. If Salafi groups seek to incorporate their vision of an Islamic state into Egypt’s future legal framework, they could provoke a new round of confrontations between the SCAF and Islamists.