Thursday, March 22, 2012

Egyptian Elections: A ‘Dress Rehearsal’ Determining Islamists’ Clout


by Magdy Samaan on Tuesday, November 29, 2011 at 4:39pm
Before the debut of any theatrical work, the players engage in one final run – what the Italians and Egyptians call a ‘prova generale’ – to determine that lines are solidly memorized, reaction times are seamlessly sequenced, and so on. The ‘big night on the stage’ allows no margin for error and no turning back. This upcoming 28th of November, on which Egypt will witness its first parliamentary elections since the uprising, represents a similar ‘dress rehearsal’, determining the extent of the strength of the various political trends, the Islamists foremost among them. What will not be determined, however, is the question of who rules Egypt.Unlike the Tunisian elections in which the Islamist trend, represented by the Ennahda party, seized some 41 percent of the political pie, the victor in Egyptian parliamentary elections will not form a government. The essential objective of this transitional parliament is overseeing the drafting of a new constitution; meanwhile the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will retain the reins of power until the completion of presidential elections. A firm date for these elections has not yet been announced, but they are widely presumed to occur towards the very end of next year. This will then be followed by another set of parliamentary elections, whose import will be determined by those earlier constitutional deliberations – in the event that they follow the model of parliamentary rule, the elections will serve as the determinant of who will govern Egypt.Despite the new constitution’s significance in driving the future of Egypt’s governance, the degree of dispute over that constitution is minimal. The main political factions are for all intents and purposes in agreement over the broad outlines of that document, most significantly the permanence of Article 2 of the old constitution, which stipulates that Islam is the religion of the state and that Islamic law is the primary source of reference for legislation. How one interprets Article 2 is what distinguishes the so-called secular or ‘civilian’ trend from the religious one.Be that as it may, the upcoming elections will provide some indicator of the sentiments of the more than fifty million eligible voters, most of whom are casting votes in parliamentary elections for the very first time. Additionally, it provides an opportunity for the various factions to get their cards in order before the decisive stage.Some hold the view that last March’s referendum on constitutional amendments – for which the Islamic trends secured 77 percent of the public backing – provides an indication of the strength of the Islamic trend, but the circumstances surrounding the referendum differ from those of the parliamentary elections and much water has passed under the bridge since.After the March referendum, the secular trend hastened to affirm its agreement to the permanence of Article 2. In an effort to obtain balance between that article and guarantees that the overarching state would retain a ‘civilian’ form, Dr. Muhammad ElBaradei – former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and presumptive candidate for president – initiated what are known as the ‘supra-constitutional principles’ (the terminology was subsequently changed to the ‘governing principles for the constitution,’ following objections of the Islamists to the first term). This was done to ensure rights and basic freedoms in light of Article 2’s staying in the constitution. What followed was a series of other documents defining basic constitutional principles, numbering around ten in total. Among the most significant were the Azhar document, the human rights organizations document, and the Democratic Alliance document (spearheaded by the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the neoliberal Wafd party, joined by some thirty-nine other parties and political forces).Most of these documents agreed on maintaining Article 2 in the constitution as a textual component declaring commitment to international human rights treaties and protection of the rights of all citizens. The propaganda which the Islamic trends used during the referendum – asserting that leftists, liberals, and Copts wanted to alter the Islamic identity of the state – was soundly rebutted when these trends agreed that Article 2 remain.The strengths of the Islamic trend are well-known and don’t require much explanation: They are well-funded, enjoy the support of Gulf states that seek to impose an Islamic model of governance driven by Salafists, they are well-organized – particularly the MB – and have a clear program to establish a state governed by Shari’a. Finally, they control the mosques’ microphones and are aided by rising rates of illiteracy.On the other hand, given the vast proliferation of Islamist parties – Salafi parties in particular – and all that accompanies them, from controversial statements to verbal abuse and sectarian conflicts, these corollaries could backfire – like the dog that bites the hand that feeds it – making the average Egyptian citizen think twice about the consequences of voting in favor of the Islamists.The Dilemma of Transformation in EgyptWhile democratic transformation appears to be proceeding smoothly in Tunisia, elections in Egypt face enormous obstacles. In addition to the absence of security, and pressures and interventions by regional players antagonistic to democratic transformation in Egypt, there are two main difficulties, which some presumed that the Egyptian revolution, with its degree of relative consciousness, had already dealt with: namely, the relationship of the military to governance and the relationship of Islamists to democracy. Indeed, the SCAF are running the country with the same mindset as that of the Mubarak regime, inspiring increasing tension in its relationship with civilian forces. The army – whose leaders have held the reins of the country since the ’52 revolution and have amassed wealth and personal interests – now appear tentative and elusive regarding the process of handing over power to an elected civilian government.Egyptian Islamic parties and trends, meanwhile continue to flounder (unlike Ennahda, their Tunisian counterparts) despite their efforts to harmonize democracy with Islam or, to be more accurate, to ‘Islamize’ democracy.The military council capitalizes on the presence of Islamic forces and the associated fear surrounding them to promote the notion of the SCAF’s able custodianship of the ‘civilian’ state. We see this manifested in the ‘constitutional principles’ document issued by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Silmi, which effectively places the army above the law.The MB have insisted that they do not intend to achieve a monopoly of power at this stage, noting repeatedly their embrace of the slogan, ‘participation, not contestation.’ This is likely a self-imposed strategy, borne largely of the admission that governance in the upcoming period is going to be a formidable task and that failure during the transition could lead to the collapse of the long-established organization. Salafists meanwhile seek to seize the historic moment to come to power and establish a state governed by Islamic law.The so-called secular parties don’t appear to be up to the fight, having consumed themselves with tangential debates in the months following the fall of the old regime and having failed to coalesce in a bloc strong enough to counter the Islamists. Indeed, some of these secular groups have signed on with the MB in their Democratic Coalition for Egypt, such as Ghad al-Thawra, the party of well-know opposition figure Ayman Nour.Despite the advantages the Islamists enjoy, organizationally and financially, no political faction is expected to gain a comfortable majority.Contours of the New Political Map Following the rise of Ennahda in Tunisia’s constituent assembly elections, it is widely anticipated that Egyptian elections will follow suit with regard to the prominence and proportion of Islamists. It is also believed that the results of the Egyptian elections will provide an indication of the shape of the future map of the Arab world.The House of Saud supports a scenario in which more fundamentally conservative Islamists come to power in Egypt, figuring that such a bloc of ‘Arab Spring’ states might ally with the Gulf states and would thereby strengthen the hand of a number of recently challenged thrones.Israel’s decision to carry out military operations at this particular time bolsters the Islamist trend. And at the same time, the American administration appears prepared to deal with an Islamist Middle East, according to their statements accepting an MB rise to power, provided it comes through honest elections (as if this were a fait accompli – the MB themselves have yet to announce that they seek such power).In any case, the reality points to the fact that the countries of the Arab Spring are preparing for the arrival of a new era in which Islamists either rule outright or participate significantly in that rule. But given Islamists’ ambiguous conceptualizations of democracy, the yield of the Arab Spring will not be fruitful. The immediate future looks set for greater ideological struggle, rather than a political competition that drives the body politic towards progress in solving the problems of that have characterized the decades of paucity of vision and administrative ineptitude of military rule.

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