The SCAF's End Game

By Magdy Samaan

Egypt Source

November 22, 2011

“I want the country to be cleansed” said activist Ahmad Harara, a young dentist in his thirties who lost his right eye in the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution on January 28 and lost his left eye last Saturday, November 19, when he was shot by police snipers. Rooftop snipers have not been seen since last January, but this week they returned, more brutal than ever and backed by military units, to confront the second wave of the revolution.The story of Harara and hundreds of young Egyptians who are facing bullets bare-chested in Tahrir Square has become a source of inspiration for protesters who are back on the frontlines of battle with brutal security forces to demand regime change all over again . Despite the deteriorating situation in the square, Ahmad Harara displayed a broad smile in a November 21 interview with journalist Yosri Fouda, apparently sensing a shift in momentum in favor of the protesters. “We asked [the SCAF] to cleanse the police, media and judiciary, but they did not respond … We want a country not stalling.”As protesters call for a second uprising, Ahmad and his friends in Tahrir Square are telling the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), “Enough is enough,” after months of mismanaging the transition and thwarting the revolution’s demands. The SCAF’s recent behavior has convinced protesters that the military is simply reproducing the regime that they supposedly toppled last January.The confrontations began on November 19 following a major demonstration against the military on Friday, November 18. Islamic movements led the demonstration to protest the constitutional principles document prepared by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi, which outlined sweeping powers for the military, and to demand a quick transfer of power to civilian leadership. While most political movements left the square on the evening of November 19, around 200 injured protesters and their families remained, determined to continue their sit-in overnight. The police’s use of excessive force to break down their demonstration was “the straw that broke the camel's back.” It led to the “explosion” of confrontations that are ongoing, in a manner that is reminiscent of the early days of the revolution. I participated in the deliberations that took place around the Tahrir Square’s main stage the night Mubarak stepped down (February 11, 2011). As the former president transferred executive authority to the SCAF, protesters were divided into two camps on the question of how to respond to the power transfer. Some called for continued demonstrations until the SCAF had fulfilled the demands of the revolution, while others felt that the SCAF should be given a chance to meet their demands and called on protesters to end their sit-in. Ultimately, the second camp prevailed. However, protesters have since come to the conclusion that leaving the Square before the revolution’s demands were met was a historic mistake. The military will not easily give up the power it has held since 1952, and it now seems that the entrenched interests of the SCAF are in danger of extinguishing the revolution’s dreams. According to Amnesty International, some of the human rights violations perpetrated by the current government are worse than those committed by the former regime. The current clashes, signaling a renewed determination to fully realize the revolution unmet demands, raises many questions:Will the elections, scheduled for November 28, be held on time?How dangerous is it to hold elections under the current circumstances with many parties announcing their withdrawal from the electoral race?How legitimate will the elected parliament be?How much more will the clashes escalate?With the bloody confrontations entering their fifth day, the increase in the number of victims and injured (around 33 dead and 2000 injured by November 21) and the spread of protests to over ten governorates, it seems that Egypt’s political crisis has reached the point of no return and the window of opportunity for reaching a political resolution that would allow elections to start on time is rapidly closing. The speech made on the evening of November 22 by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, which he formally accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Essam Sharaf’s cabinet and agreed to hand over power by the end of June 2012, failed to appease the protesters in Tahrir Square who are demanding that the SCAF surrender power immediately to a new governing council headed by a civilian, potentially one of the leading presidential candidates or the head of the Supreme Judiciary Council. Some political forces have nominated the presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei to form a “national salvation government.” ElBaradei has hinted that he is ready to take on this role, saying that he “would do anything to prevent the country’s fragmentation.”For the protesters in Tahrir Square, the SCAF has fundamentally lost its legitimacy. In light of all the crimes it has committed, it is clearly time for the military to give up power and form a national salvation cabinet tasked with administering the remainder of the transitional period. However, it appears that leading political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are no longer representing the interests of protesters after they met with Field Marshal Tantawi on November 22 and agreed to his “solution” and timeline for a transfer of power by June 2012. But it is clear that these political leaders do not speak for the protesters in Tahrir Square and do not have the ability to control or disperse them. While the current clashes represent a dramatic escalation of the military’s repressive tactics, it should be noted that the army has been using excessive force to suppress peaceful protests for months, most recently in the Maspero incident on October 9, which resulted in 27 casualties, mostly Coptic Christians. Whereas the SCAF has been careful to avoid crossing the line of excessive violence in previous confrontations, the military is showing no such restraint in the current clashes. Some have attributed the crackdown to the SCAF’s desire to cancel elections, but is this motivation really powerful enough to prompt a Syrian-style bloodbath?If the SCAF continues to use excessive force in the face of demands for its overthrow and prosecution, Egypt will likely follow the Syrian example rather than the Tunisian one. In the first round of the revolution, protesters’ forced the regime to meet their core demand: Mubarak’s removal. Will they succeed this time or will the revolution devolve into a Syria-style meltdown, as the military deploys lethal violence in a desperate attempt to retain control?

Inside Egypt's electoral alliances

Magdy Samaan November 18, 2011

Ten months after the January uprising, Egypt’s political scene is more diverse and competitive than ever before, as dozens of new parties ranging in ideology from Salafi to secular seek a place in the post-Mubarak political order. However, only a handful of the more than fifty-registered parties are organized enough to stand a chance at winning parliamentary representation on their own. Acknowledging that strength lies in numbers, most of the smaller parties have aligned themselves with one of four major electoral coalitions, which differ significantly in their constituencies and ideological orientation. So far, the primary beneficiaries of the coalition-building process appear to be the Islamist movements, which are confidently predicting a strong showing in the parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, liberal and civil parties – weakened by divisions and rivalries – have struggled to build a cohesive alliance with a clear campaign platform.Taking advantage of these divisions, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has moved swiftly in the weeks leading up to elections to consolidate its power and privileges by issuing a set of constitutional principles that would preserve a strong political role for the military and shield its budget from oversight by the next elected parliament. Whether or not the four major electoral coalitions will be able to overcome their fragmentation and work together in the next elected government to hold the SCAF accountable remains to be seen.The four main alliances:The Democratic Alliance for Egypt includes many small parties and is led by the Freedom and Justice Party, the official political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.The Islamic Alliance includes the Salafi al-Nour (Light) and Asala (Authenticity) parties along with official political arm of the formerly militant Islamist group, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Building and Development party.The Egyptian Bloc Alliance includes the liberal Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party (founded by the prominent Coptic businessman Naguib Sawiris), and the leftist Tagammu Party.The Revolution Continues Alliance includes seven primarily leftist parties, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, and the liberal Egypt Freedom party. The electoral coalitions reflect the polarization between Islamist and what so called “Civilian powers” as well as between new political powers after the revolution and what so called “Flol” or (the ex regime remnants) and under the unstable security situation, and the political tension, there is a potential that the election will witness violence increase the state of polarization.The Democratic Alliance for Egypt, initially launched by the Freedom and Justice and Wafd parties, at one pointed included 43 parties. However, the FJP’s dominant position within the Alliance and alleged efforts to manipulate its electoral lists prompted the Wafd and several other liberal parties to defect from the coalition. The FJP was keen to keep the Democratic Alliance, to avoid a state of polarization. Before it began to fragment under the strain of internal rivalries, the Alliance succeeded in reaching a consensus on key principles to be included in the next constitution, including citizenship rights and the preservation of Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which identifies Islamic Shari’a law as the primary source of legislation. The FJP continues to advocate a strong role for religion in Egypt’s next political system, despite constitutional and legal provisions that ban religious-based political parties and the use of religious slogans, such as the Brotherhood’s Islam is the solution,” in campaigning. Meanwhile, the SCAF has continued to grant licenses to Islamist parties such as Building and Development, formed by the formerly militant group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, which appear to violate the existing legal framework.In addition to the FJP, other new Islamist forces are emerging as serious contenders on the political scene. The Salafi Movement is fielding candidates in the elections under the banner of the Islamic Alliance. The Salafi al-Nour (Light) Party, which dominates the Islamic Alliance, has significant financial assets enabling it to coordinate extensive voter outreach and campaign activities across the country. 610 of the Alliance’s 693 candidates are affiliated with al-Nour.Overall, the Islamist parties appear more organized and better funded than their secular and liberal counterparts, while maintaining a clear goal of establishing a Shari’a state. Meanwhile, “civil” parties have failed to form a strong coalition that offers a clear alternative, and still practice politics with the same defensive mentality that they were forced to adopt under Mubarak’s rule, when the opposition had no real chance of winning meaningful representation in parliament. Given the disorganization and timidity displayed by its civil rivals, it is no surprise that the FJP is confidently acting as though it has already won a parliamentary majority.An FJP victory is far from certain, however. Some think that the large number of Islamist candidates from a variety of parties and movements may contribute to splitting the Islamist vote, reducing their overall representation in parliament and giving an advantage to civil and liberal candidates, independents as well as the so-called remnants of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which have regrouped in at least eight different NDP-affiliated parties that are fiercely campaigning in the hopes of staging a political comeback, despite the government’s promise reactive a Nasser-era Treachery Law that would bar former NDP members from political activity for five-year period.In an attempt to confront hardline Salafis groups with a strong grassroots following, the civil parties are now beginning to coordinate with another Islamist force, the Sufis, whose 15 million followers adhere to a more moderate interpretation of Islam. Although the Sufi movement has traditionally been largely apolitical,Sufi groups have recently stepped into the formal political arena by licensing official parties, like the Sufi-dominated Egyptian Tahrir Party. Despite the weak coordination between “civil” parties and their lack of preparedness, most of these new parties, including the Adl (Justice) Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and al-Masriyin al-Ahrar (Free EgyptiansParty), are working hard to catch up. One the oldest and most organized parties in the civil camp, the Wafd, will benefit from established support networks, although the party has recently suffered from internal disputes over its alliance with Brotherhood prior to its withdrawal from the Democratic Alliance.Although Islamists had an antagonistic relationship with the former regime, the FJP and other Islamist forces have shown support for the SCAF since Mubarak’s fall, Islamists forces are taking a very different and more cooperative approach to the current military leadership in an effort to carve out a strong role for themselves in the new political system. Early on in the transition, the Muslim Brotherhood showed support for the SCAF by backing the constitutional declaration in March 2011. But the alliance between Islamists and the SCAF began to deteriorate in July, after large-scale demonstrations by the FJP and other groups fueled fears of an Islamist takeover. As Islamists became increasingly assertive in the post-revolutionary political order, the SCAF made a clear shift, moving closer to liberal and civil political parties and drafting a set of supra-constitutional principles that Islamists fear would limit their influence over Egypt’s next constitution. In another sign of its alignment with liberal forces, the SCAF appointed two well-known liberals as deputy prime ministers, Hazem al-Beblawy and Ali al-Selmi, who was assigned to draft the new constitutional document.The draft constitutional principles signaled the SCAF’s commitment to preserving a civil state, but political forces soon realized that the document has another important objective: protecting the military’s political and economic privileges and shielding its budget from parliamentary oversight.While these four major coalitions will play an important role in upcoming elections, the polling process will likely give rise to new political forces and unforeseen alliances that could either work together or against one another in the next parliament. The inability of any one party to secure an absolute majority will encourage the formation of new coalitions or mergers between parties with similar orientations such as the more than fifteen new liberal parties that have formed since the revolution.The campaign season and electoral process will likely deepen the division between Islamists and "civil” powers, which has been expanding since the March referendum. Election results are impossible to predict, but Egypt’s next parliament will undoubtedly reflect a fundamentally altered political landscape marked by new voices, alliances and rivalries.

Fighting for Seats in a Powerless Parliament

Magdy Samaan November 29, 2011

Egyptians have been patiently waiting since the early hours of the morning to cast their ballots on the second day of voting for the parliamentary elections, unfazed by the long lines even though their faces reflect their exhaustion with the deteriorating economic situation and continued political instability.But not all Egyptians attribute such importance to the election. Protesters in Tahrir Square, now entering the eleventh day of their sit-in, are watching the process skeptically, uncertain that elections will help fulfill their core demands: an end to the SCAF's military rule and the formation of a civilian "salvation" government. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the other Islamist parties - more organized than their liberal and leftist counterparts - are happy to see elections proceed on time, confident that they will dominate the next parliament and eager to define the rules of the new system on their own terms.But it is clear from observing the first day of polling that there is a strong desire for elections to succeed, on the part of the Egyptian people as well as the SCAF, whose legitimacy has been severely undermined by the latest clashes in Tahrir Square. Renewed confrontation between the people and the regime is starting to look like the second wave of the revolution that started last January, and is now continuing alongside the electoral process.Clashes between demonstrators and the military and security forces subsided noticeably on the eve of elections, with both sides showing restraint in the interest of allowing elections to proceed smoothly. However, the relative lull in protests may be short-lived. Elections could escalate the antagonism and mutual distrust between the SCAF and the major political forces. If the SCAF succeeds in administering reasonably free and fair elections, the result would be to support the military's preferred transitional scenario, which would allow the SCAF to remain in power until presidential elections in June 2012.Looking at the breakdown of candidates competing for the 168 People's Assembly seats that will be contested in the first stage of elections, Islamist parties clearly have a numerical edge over most of their liberal and leftist competitors. Among the 36 parties and coalitions competing in the elections, 7 parties account for 50 percent of the total candidates. Of these 7 parties the three with the most candidates are all Islamist: the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), with 135 candidates; 2) al-Wasat, with 112 candidates; 3) and the Salafi Nour Party, with 108 candidates.In addition to the proportional strength of the Islamist parties in terms of their share of the candidate pool, the well-funded Islamists have a financial edge in disseminating campaign propaganda and are also working to mobilize voters with old-school patronage tactics, such as distributing food and gifts to voters, which continued illegally during the two-day voting process. And while a number of civil parties suspended their campaign activities for nearly a week during the clashes in Tahrir Square, Islamists continued campaigning at full-speed, announcing that they would participate in elections despite the unstable security situation.While Islamist parties have been campaigning aggressively, civil and liberal parties are expressing concerns that the SCAF may be unable and unwilling to administer fair elections. This week, eleven human rights organizations issued a report documenting a range of human rights violations under military rule, confirming that the SCAF is replicating many of the same repressive methods used by the former regime, such as using the media to smear activists and human rights groups while exaggerating the threat of Islamic fundamentalists as a "scare crow" and only alternative to the authoritarian status quo. This "us-or-them" tactic is the same strategy used by Mubarak to retain the support of the U.S. government and resist calls for reform.The authority of the elected parliament and its role in forming a new government could induce serious political conflict. Confident that its candidates will dominate today's elections, the Brotherhood is already maneuvering to shape the scope of the next parliament's powers. Brotherhood spokesman Mahmud Ghozlan said on November 27 that the ruling military council "must task the party which gains the biggest number of seats to form the next government."The SCAF, however, clearly envisions a more limited mandate for the parliament. SCAF member Mamdouh Shahin recently stated that the next People's Assembly will not have the power to form a government or cast a vote of no confidence, noting that the interim constitution issued in March transferred all executive authority - including the power to appoint and dismiss the cabinet - to the interim military leadership. Following the collective resignation of the Cabinet last week, Mohamed ElBaradei called for the formation of a "national salvation government" and offered to lead it, the SCAF rejected his proposal and instead appointed Kamal Ganzouri, a former official in Mubarak's government, as the new prime minister.Despite signs that the SCAF is intent on limiting the powers of the next parliament, voters are still lining up by the thousands to cast their ballots. The dense crowds outside of polling stations are proof that Egyptians are fiercely committed to participating in the political process after nearly six decades of dictatorship, during which the public largely abandoned formal politics out of frustration with the lack of democratic reform.